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On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its opinion in Roe v. Wade. 1 The seven-member majority seemed 
confident it had authoritatively resolved the volatile controversy over 
abortion. On December 14, 1987, the Court, by a vote split four to 
four, left standing an appellate court decision in yet another in the 
chain of cases spawned by Roe: Hartigan v. Zbaraz. 2 Only eight jus-
tices were on the Court, because the United States Senate had not yet 
consented to the appointment of one of President Reagan's nominees to 
replace retired Justice Powell. The continuing conflict in abortion ju-
risprudence results from continued adherence to the flawed analysis in 
Roe v. Wade. 
This is a critique of Roe v. Wade and its progeny, based on the 
I. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987)(per curiam), affg by an equally divided Court 763 F.2d 1532 (7th 
Cir. 1985 ). The unsettled nature of abortion jurisprudence may be seen in the table Chronology 
1980-1986 in E. RuBIN, ABORTION, PoLITICS, AND THt: CouRTS: Rot: v. WAI>t: AND ITs AF-
Tt:RMATH 193-204 (1987). 
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anomalous judicial treatment of the right of abortion. The anomaly will 
be demonstrated in two ways. 
First, the tangent initiated by Roe will be examined. The degree of 
its departure from precedent and the Constitution will be shown. By 
following this tangent, subsequent abortion cases have diverged widely 
from the normal rules and principles of law. This divergence will be 
shown in the misuse of stare decisis in abortion cases, and in the ex-
treme result achieved by the Court in the 1986 case, Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 3 the most recent 
abortion case decided by the Court on the merits. 
Second, areas of the law related to abortion-privacy rights, fetal 
rights, medical regulation, and procedural and adjudicatory is-
sues-will be examined in the context of abortion cases. As will be 
seen, the normal rules in these areas are distorted when the case in-
volves abortion. This abortion distortion factor is present throughout 
abortion case law. 
The distortions consistently occur in the direction of making the 
abortion right more absolute. The special treatment for the abortion 
right violates the principles underlying the rule of law, the foundation 
stone of our constitutional system. Consequently, abortion jurispru-
dence should be reformed to conform it to the rest of the law. This 
requires the reversal of Roe v. Wade:' 
II. Roe's TANGENTIAL DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT 
Roe v. Wade left the usual bounds of the law and set off on its 
own tangent. This section deals first with the abrupt angle of that tan-
gent: Roe's radical departure from the norm, shown through a review 
of prior critiques,11 and the abuse of stare decisis in subsequent abortion 
decisions. Second, this section examines Thornburgh to reveal the dis-
tance from the norm achieved in abortion jurisprudence by following 
the trajectory set by Roe. Thornburgh is the most recent word on abor-
tion from the Court and the best example of the great rift achieved. 
3. 476 U.S. 747 ( 1986). 
4. Whether a Court holding comported with the Constitution might not be the only consider-
ation of a justice in determining whether to reverse precedent. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 
1987, at A 1, col. 3 (Judge Bark, in Senate confirmation hearings, mentioned he would consider 
several factors, including whether there was a basis for abortion rights in the Constitution.) This 
article does not deal with issues such as moral and ethical arguments, but only with considerations 
permitted by legal positivism, such as consistency and equal treatment of parties. 
5. Detailed analysis of Roe's treatment of privacy rights, proeedural rules, and other aspects 
of the law related to abortion jurisprudence will be dealt with in subsequent subsections. For 
treatment of privacy rights see infra section III-A. For treatment of procedural rules see infra 
section III-D. 
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A. Roe v. Wade 
As Roe v. Wade set the angle of departure from the rest of the 
law, it is appropriate to begin with a review of Roe-its facts, holding, 
and flaws. 
1. Facts 
In 1970, an unmarried, pregnant woman, using the pseudonym of 
Jane Roe, brought a class action in a federal district court in Texas. 6 
She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas abortion statute was 
unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. 7 The Texas 
statute allowed abortion only "by medical advice for the purpose of 
saving the life of the mother."8 A majority of the states had similar 
statutes. 9 
2. Holding 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declared the statute a violation of 
the right of privacy "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept 
of personal liberty."10 However, the Court declared that the right of 
privacy was qualified by compelling state interests. 11 This balancing of 
the right of privacy against the state's interests resulted in a trimester 
framework for legal analysis of state efforts to regulate abortion. 
For the first trimester of pregnancy, no state interest was found to 
be "compelling." Therefore, a woman was free to decide whether to 
have an abortion, so long as she did so in consultation with her physi-
cian.12 This was so because, until approximately the end of the first 
three months, the first trimester, medical science had demonstrated that 
it was safer to have an abortion than to carry the fetus to term. 13 At the 
end of this period, the state's interest in maternal health was considered 
to be compelling. Thus, from the beginning of the second trimester, the 
state could reasonably regulate abortion in order to promote maternal 
health. 14 
6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. A physician, James Hallford, MD, intervened in the case, and a 
married couple, using the pseudonyms of John and Mary Doe, were also plaintiffs. The district 
court granted standing to Dr. Hallford but denied it to the Does. /d. at 120-29. The appeal was 
taken directly to the Supreme Court, which granted standing only to Jane Roe. /d. 
7. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. 
8. /d. at 118. 
9. /d. 
10. /d. at 153. 
11. /d. at 154. 
12. /d. at 163. 
13. /d. at 149, 163. 
14. Jd. at 163. Subsequent cases have allowed minimal health regulations in the first trimes-
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At the point of viability, the Court held that the state's interest in 
"potential life" became compelling.15 Thus, for roughly the last trimes-
ter of pregnancy, the state "may go so far as to proscribe abortion ... 
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
mother." 16 The fetus was held to have no rights of its own, because the 
Court decided it was not a "person," within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment. 17 
The Texas statute was declared unconstitutional for sweeping too 
broadly, by failing to distinguish among the stages of pregnancy and by 
allowing only the exception for preserving maternal life. 18 The abortion 
statutes of all of the states fell along with the Texas statute: Roe made 
them unenforceable. 
3. Critiques 
The radical departure of Roe from the norm was evident in its 
rejection by legal scholars. So much ink has been spilled in the debate 
over Roe that a comprehensive review of the literature is impossible 
here. 19 Rather, a sketch of early classics will be given to provide back-
ground for the analysis in this article. The excellent analysis of these 
early works has not been matched. 
Some of these early critiques were philosophical in nature. For 
instance, Charles Rice, in The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, 20 placed Roe at the apex of modern positivist jurisprudence and 
then attacked the entire structure. Some of the more cogent critiques 
from a philosophical-jurisprudential perspective appeared in Catholic 
publications. 21 Nearly all early critiques of Roe featured prominent dis-
cussions of the personhood of the fetus. The philosophical literature, 
likewise, especially emphasized the personhood arguments. Another 
noteworthy aspect of this literature was the fear expressed that the 
abortion precedent, because of its loose language and lack of constitu-
tional roots, would expand into a precedent for infanticide and eutha-
nasia. 22 It is at least arguable that the casual judicial attitude toward 
teras well. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
16. /d. at 163-64. 
17. /d. at 158. 
18. /d. at 164. 
19. By 1985, "Roe ha[d] been the subject of more than 200 law review articles published 
since 1973." Wardle, Rethinking Roe v. Wade, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 237 n.39. 
20. Rice, The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth Century, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1059 (1973) 
21. Similarly, Catholic legal scholars of the 1930's were a force in the reaction to Legal 
Realism, of which Roe is clearly a product. See E. PuRcn.L, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THE-
ORY 159-78 (1973)(ch. 9). 
22. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 20, at 1065-67 (discussing Kelsen's "pure" theory of law as 
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the rights of handicapped infants displayed in cases such as the Bloom-
ington, Indiana, "Baby Doe" case is a function of Roe. 23 
Other early Roe criticisms were from a positivist perspective. 
Many were by supporters of abortion rights. John Hart Ely's The 
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade24 may be the most 
insightful discussion of Roe's shortcomings as constitutional adjudica-
tion. After surveying its logical leaps and lapses, Ely concluded that 
Roe was a "Lochnering" opinion much more dangerous than the previ-
ous activist opinions of the Warren Court. Roe, he concluded, might be 
durable, but it was, 
a very bad decision. Not because it [would] perceptibly weaken the 
Court ... and not because it conflict[ ed] with [his] idea of progress .. 
. . It [was] bad because it [was] bad constitutional law, or rather be-
cause it [was] not constitutional law and [gave] almost no sense of an 
obligation to try to be.25 
Archibald Cox agreed that Roe was a bad decision, but he seemed 
to disagree that Roe was durable. 
My criticism of Roe ... is that the Court failed to establish the legiti-
cited favorably in Byrn v. New York City Health and Hasps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 
887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972)). 
23. See In re The Treatment and Care of Infant Doe, No. GU-8204-004A, slip op. at 2 
(Monroe County Cir. Ct., Ind. Apr. 12, 1983), Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition 
denied sub nom. State of Indiana ex rei Infant Doe v. Monroe Circuit Court, No. 482S 140 (Ind. 
Apr. 14, 1983), cert. denied, sub nom. Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hospital, 104 S. Ct. 394 
(1983), reprinted in 2 ISSUES IN LAw & MED. 77 (1986). The "slippery slope" is also discernible 
in the attitudes expressed in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 
(D.D.C. 1983)(infanticide); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. 
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)(euthanasia); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 
3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)(suicide). See also "wrongful life cases:" Turpin 
v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982)(California); Harbeson v. 
Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983)(en banc)(Washington), Procanic v. Cillo, 97 
N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984)(New Jersey). 
24. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
25. Id. at 947 (emphasis in original). Ely related a similar critique in DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST (1980). Cf Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
Ely's argument that the court was not engaging in constitutional law in Roe is bolstered by 
recently released memoranda between members of the Roe majority written during consideration 
of Roe. The memoranda, found in papers of Justice Douglas and released by the Library of 
Congress, expressed concern that much of the opinion constituted "dicta" and questioned "the 
desireability of dicta being quite so inflexibility 'legislative.'" The memoranda reveal the author 
of Roe acknowledging that the opinion contained dictum and that the lines drawn were "arbi-
trary." Noticeably absent was discussion of the requirements of the Constitution; rather, the ex-
changes read like negotiations among members of a legislative conference committee seeking to 
hammer out compromise legislation. Woodward, The Abortion Papers, The Washington Post, 
Jan. 22, 1989, at D1, col. 1. The memoranda help put in context Justice White's charge that in 
Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the majority was engaged in an exercise of •· •.• w 
judicial power." Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting). 
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macy of the decision by articulating a precept of sufficient abstract-
ness to lift the ruling above the level of a political judgment .... The 
failure to confront the issue in principled terms leaves the opinion to 
read like a set of hospital rules and regulations, whose validity is good 
enough this week but will be destroyed with new statistics upon the 
medical risks of childbirth and abortion or new advances in providing 
for the separate existence of a foetus .... Constitutional rights ought 
not to be created ... unless they can be stated in principles suffi-
ciently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and 
continuity over ... time .... 1111 
187 
As things now stand, it appears that Cox's viswn of the future was 
more correct than the Roe Court's belief that the progressive forces of 
history indicated the decision it delivered.27 
Alexander Bickel wrote a brief but telling analysis. Roe "may be a 
wise model statute," he wrote, but he expressed reservations about the 
Court's prohibition of "state regulation of the places where the abortion 
[was] . . . performed. The state regulates and licenses restaurants and 
pool halls and ... God knows what else in order to protect the public; 
why may it not similarly regulate ... abortion clinics, or doctors' of-
fices ... ?"28 Ultimately, Bickel agreed with Ely: "One is left to ask 
why. The Court never said. It refused the discipline to which its func-
tion is properly subject."29 
Richard Epstein also argued that "Roe . . . [was] symptomatic of 
the analytical poverty possible in constitutional litigation. "30 Epstein 
criticized Roe's irrationality and the Supreme Court's activism, con-
cluding that "we must criticize both Mr. Justice Blackmun in Roe v. 
Wade ... and the entire method of constitutional interpretation that 
allows the Supreme Court ... both to 'define' and to 'balance' interests 
on the major social and political issues of our time. "31 Epstein also 
criticized the Court's laxness in procedural issues-Roe's standing and 
the mootness of her case. Recognizing the procedural laxness as both a 
symptom and a cause of the Court's generally slipshod activism, Ep-
stein argued that Roe's case was moot and that she should have been 
26. A. Cox, THE RoLE OF THE SuPREME CouRT IN AMERICAN GovERNMENT 113-14 
(1976). 
27. See Abortion, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 9 ("[I]f the Court's guess concern-
ing the probable and desirable direction of progress is wrong, it will nevertheless have been im-
posed on all 50 states, and imposed permanently, unless the Court itself should in future change 
its mind."). 
28. A. BICKEL, THE MoRALITY oF CoNSENT 27 (1975). 
29. ld. at 28. 
30. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. 
CT. REV. 159, 184. 
31. !d. at 185. 
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denied standing. 32 The presence of a doctor in the initial litigation 
showed "that the Court was mistaken when it held that the mootness 
requirement must be relaxed in the abortion cases because they present 
questions which [would] constantly arise yet be incapable of review." 33 
He added, "The criminal trial of a doctor would provide him with 
every opportunity to challenge the abortion statute on its face. " 34 These 
lapses on technical questions mark abortion jurisprudence to the pre-
sent day. 3" 
Philip Heymann and Douglas Barzelay, defenders of Roe's result, 
sought to rewrite the Court's opinion. They argued that "Roe was am-
ply justified both by precedent and by those principles that have long 
guided the court in making the ever-delicate determination of when it 
must tell a state that it may not pursue certain measures .... " 36 How-
ever, the authors acknowledged that Justice Blackmun obscured the ar-
gument favoring a constitutional right to abortion. 37 
Donald Regan noted that the precedent on which Heymann and 
Barzelay depended was "a rag-tag lot." 
Most of them either claim to be or are best understood as being pri-
marily about something other than 'marriage, procreation, and child-
rearing.' It is not clear that they add up to anything at all, especially 
when one remembers other cases in which colorable claims concerning 
marriage, procreation, or child rearing have received short shriftas 
Regan based his own support for abortion on the Good Samaritan doc-
32. /d. at 164-65. 
33. /d. at 164. 
34. /d. 
35. See Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae at 2-6, 10-14, Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)(No.84-495). These rules serve a 
useful purpose, just as substantive rules of law do. As will be discussed below, this recurrent 
heedlessness in the abortion context is another source of instability in abortion jurisprudence. See 
infra section III-D of this article for a further treatment of procedural and adjudicatory matters. 
36. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 
B.U.L. REV. 765, 765 (1973). 
37. /d. ("The language of the Court's opinion in Roe too often obscures the full strength of 
the ... argument that underlies its decision."). Heymann and Barzelay's thesis stands or falls on 
their interpretation of the precedent cited in Roe. It is argued below that this interpretation is 
impressionistic and unjustifiable. Perhaps in recognition of the fact that no matter how looselv the 
privacy precedents are construed the abortion right does not follow. The authors argued for a 
more open-ended jurisprudence. Yet, even if their fundamental values approach is accepted, it is 
by no means clear that the abortion right is fundamental. The Supreme Court's skewed history in 
Roe certainly casts doubt on this. /d. at 777-83. See also Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Consti-
tution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CourM. L. REv. 
1410 (1974). 
38. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1639 (1 979)(citing Sosna v. 
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Baker v. Owen, 423 
U.S. 907 (1975), summarily affg 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975). 
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trine.39 Applying an altered form of equal protection analysis,40 he ar-
gued that the physical and psychological burdens imposed on the wo-
man desiring an abortion were greater than those imposed on any other 
potential Samaritan.41 This basis, he argued, "provide(d] a better justi-
fication than the Court's for the result in Roe. " 42 
Laurence Tribe has adduced a similar argument in his latest at-
tempt to rewrite Roe. 43 Tribe is the embodiment of the confusion cre-
ated by Roe's poor reasoning. He has developed and discarded several 
alternative justifications for Roe in the past thirteen years. In Fore-
word: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law,44 
he argued that, in this century, only religious groups have purported to 
decide when a human being with independent moral claims begins life. 
Since this is the central question of the abortion debate, it cannot be 
resolved without an unconstitutional entanglement of church and state, 
he argued.'5 
Tribe has since conceded that this argument is faulty. 46 Subse-
quent to the religious entanglement argument, Tribe argued that Roe 
could be justified based on a judicial right to intervene during a state of 
moral flux to help a new consensus evolve.'7 
Finally, Tribe has concluded that the fundamental issue in abor-
tion jurisprudence is power. 48 This issue has been obscured by discus-
sions of privacy and physicians' rights, he claimed.'9 According to this 
analysis, pregnancy, at least the unwanted variety, enslaves women. 
They are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The Constitu-
39. Regan, supra note 38, at 1569. 
40. /d. 
41. /d. at 1572. 
42. /d. at 1642. It is beyond the scope of this article to rebut all the alternatives offered in 
place of Roe. A systematic rebuttal of the asserted alternatives may be found in Bopp, Will There 
be a Constitutional Right to Abortion after the Reconsideration of Roe v. Wade, 15 J. CoNTEMP. 
L. -- (1989). It is, however, a sign of how low Roe has fallen in legal opinion that the Good 
Samaritan doctrine, with all its readily applicable exceptions, is considered a better foundation for 
an abortion right than Roe's analysis. Cf Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A 
Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHio ST. L.J. 3, 40 n.114 (1981)(arguing that Re-
gan violated goal of avoiding moral issues). 
43. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and 
the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 335-36 (1985). 
44. 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
45. /d. at 23-29. 
46. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 928-29 (1978). See also McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
47. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 293 (1975); Tribe, 
Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 8 (Summer 1975). 
48. Tribe, supra note 43, at 335-36. 
49. /d. at 335. 
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tion, he argued, imposes affirmative duties to eradicate such inequal-
ity.50 Tribe cited the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of involuntary 
servitude, from which he deduced certain inalienable rights which the 
government must uphold. One of these, he claimed, was a federally-
funded abortion. 51 
Michael Perry is another writer who is pro-abortion but critical of 
Roe. 52 He attempted to defend its result by arguing that Roe was a 
ratification of conventional morality.53 That, he argued, is part of the 
Court's function in policing legislation designed to regulate public 
morality. 54 
Thomas Grey argued that Roe was a ratification of "the stability-
centered concerns of moderate conservative family and population pol-
icy."55 In effect, this approach amounts to the ratification of the per-
sonal prejudices of the Court's majority. Grey saw the abortion and 
contraception cases (as well as Stanley v. Georgia, 56 an obscenity pos-
session case) not as endorsing any liberty principles,57 but as decisions 
"dedicated to the cause of social stability .... "58 He argued that these 
cases represented "two standard conservative views: that social stability 
is threatened by excessive population growth,59 and that family stability 
50. /d. 
51. /d. at 335, 338. 
52. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of 
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689 (1976). 
53. /d. at 733. 
54. /d. at 694. It is arguable that the Court's assessment of conventionul morality is wrong in 
the abortion cases, or was wrong in 1973. Is the function of the Court simply to ratify what it 
perceives (perhaps not impartially) to be widely held values, even if these values are not tied to the 
Constitution> /d. at 734. See Rice, supra note 20, at 1066. Certainly, the Legal Realists saw such 
ratification as the function of juridical science. See, e.g., Danzig, A Comment on the jurisprudence 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975). But see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 
U.S. 429, 434 (1984)(The fact of widely-held "racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a 
racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother . ."). It 
seems that law-making and adjudication involve something more than the reading of historical 
trends and the taking of informal opinion polls. Of course, Roe did not ratify the common consen-
sus, even if it purported to do so. Justice Blackmun polled primarily the opinions of elite groups, 
such as the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association. These groups have 
their own biases. A majority of the voters in a majority of the states had voted otherwise through 
their legislatures. 
55. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 83, 90 
(Summer 1980). 
56. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
57. Grey, supra note 55, at 84 (contrary to allegations of contemporary disciples of John 
Stuart Mill). 
58. /d. at 88. 
59. Indeed, the ideological origins of the pro-abortion movement lay in the population control 
movement-a movement financed and propelled in large part by professionals and moderate to 
liberal Republican-types, not unlike some members of the Court. See generally NATHANSON, 
ABORTING AMERICA (1979) for the intellectual history of the pro-abortion movement. See also S. 
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is threatened by unwanted pregnancies, with their accompanying frag-
ile marriages, single-parent families, irresponsible youthful parents, 
and abandoned or neglected children."60 
Given the intellectual history of the pro-abortion movement, the 
background of key figures on the Court, and the language of Roe, 
Grey's version of the mental processes behind Roe may be the most 
accurate and honest explanation of that opinion. The great deference to 
and preoccupation with medical opinion evident in Roe, 61 Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 62 and Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health63 offer evidence that Roe reflects the 
prejudices of a few representatives of the professional classes. Justices 
Blackmun and Powell, the authors of those opinions, have strong ties to 
the medical community. Blackmun was formerly general counsel to the 
Mayo Clinic. Powell is from a family of obstetrician-gynecologists. 
Grey's explanation of Roe has been avoided by others, despite its 
reinforcement of the common charge that Roe is judicial legislation, and 
despite its compatibility with the Legal Realism school. Perhaps this is 
because verification requires some judicial "psychoanalysis," or because 
it is impolite to suggest that Supreme Court justices are not objective.64 
Grey's analysis, nevertheless, has common-sense appeal, even if it is not 
scientifically verifiable. 
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg in a 1985 essay continued the reanal-
ysis of Roe. 611 She declared that "the Court ventured too far in the 
KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1984). 
60. Grey, supra note 55, at 88. Grey went on to suggest that fornication and sodomy laws 
would one day be invalidated for similar reasons. "Thousands of couples are living together today 
outside of marriage. The fornication laws ... stand in the way of providing a stable legal frame-
work for ... these unions." !d. at 97. "Similarly, the homosexual community is becoming an 
increasingly public sector of our society." !d. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 476 U.S. 747 
(1986)(declaring laws against sodomy constitutional). 
61. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
62. 428 U.S. 52 ( 197 6 ). 
63. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
64. See Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegom-
enon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 85-87 (arguing that Roe resulted from the Court working out its 
own legislative compromise among competing groups). 
65. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 
N.C.L. REV. 375 (1985). John Robertson has also sought to justify Roe v. Wade in a 1987 
volume of the AMERICAN joURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE devoted to praising Justice Blackmun. 
However, while seeking to justify Roe he differs with Roe's reliance on the burdens of childrearing 
because those may be eliminated by adoption. Robertson, Gestational Burdens and Fetal Status: 
Justifying Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J. L. & Mm. 189, 193 (1987). His primary focus is on the 
personhood of the unborn, seeking by a discussion of the stages of human d~velopment to demon-
strate that a fetus is not a person. !d. at 194-202. For present purposes, his conclusion is relevant: 
"Roe v. Wade has begun a dialogue ... that needs refinement and further elaboration." ld. at 
212. While praising Justice Blackmun and Roe, Robertson notes Roe's "limited analysis" con-
tained "defects." /d. 
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change it ordered and presented an incomplete justification for its ac-
tion."66 In place of Roe's "medically approved autonomy idea," Gins-
burg implies that she would have substituted a "constitutionally based 
sex-equality perspective."67 She noted that Roe's "[h]eavy-handed judi-
cial intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, 
not resolved, conflict. "68 
The Court's attempt to anchor the abortion right in the history of 
western civilization has also received numerous criticisms. A more de-
tailed treatment of this aspect is found below in the discussion of pri-
vacy rights. 
Two passages from the August 1979 Michigan Law Review, an 
issue wholly devoted to abortion jurisprudence, summarize the critiques 
well. In the first, Richard Morgan observed: 
Rarely does the Supreme Court invite critical outrage as it did in Roe 
by offering so little explanation for a decision that requires so much. 
The stark inadequacy of the Court's attempt to justify its conclusions 
... suggests to some scholars that the Court, finding no justification 
at all in the Constitution, unabashedly usurped the legislative 
function. 69 
In the second passage, the editors of the law review, surveying the 
literature on Roe, concluded, "[T]he consensus among legal academics 
seems to be that, whatever one thinks of the holding, the opinion is 
unsatisfying. "70 
The great doubt about Roe's validity, and the wide disagreement 
among scholars on an acceptable substitute for Justice Blackmun's 
opinion, suggest that Roe cannot be satisfactorily modified and should 
be overruled. 
B. Stare Decisis Abuse 
The deviation of abortion case law from the usual rules of law is 
also evident in the abuse of the doctrine of stare decisis in Roe and the 
subsequent abortion cases. The soundness of Roe's analysis and the 
doctrine of stare decisis have been invoked as the twin justifications of 
post-Roe decisions dealing with legislative attempts to regulate abor-
tion. 71 Justice Powell stated this explicitly in Akron: 
66. Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 376. 
67. ld. at 386. 
68. /d. at 385-86. 
69. Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 
1724, 1724 (1979). 
70. Editor's Preface, 77 MICH. L. REv. (no number)(1979). 
71. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983). 
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There are especially compelling reasons for adhering to stare decisis 
in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade. That case was considered 
with special care .... Since Roe was decided ... the Court repeat-
edly and consistently has accepted and applied the basic principle that 
a woman has a fundamental right to make the highly personal choice 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.72 
193 
This language may have signaled only a desire to adhere to the 
basic principle of Roe-that the privacy right includes a fundamental 
abortion right-and not the whole trimester framework. 73 The Akron 
Court may actually have been backing away from certain aspects of 
Roe, as Akron seemed to represent a modification of the Roe frame-
work.74 Yet, even where the Court seemed to back away from the lan-
guage of Roe, it took pains to formally re-affirm the Roe trimester stan-
dard. That standard, claimed Justice Powell, "continues to provide a 
reasonable legal framework for limiting a State's authority to regulate 
abortions. " 76 
This adherence to Roe on the dual and distinct grounds of inher-
ent soundness and stare decisis is significant. Roe's analysis is criticized 
even by those who accept the substantive result of that decision. 76 Roe is 
probably the most rewritten (by critics) opinion in Supreme Court his-
tory. Despite such general criticism, Roe endures. This indicates that it 
is the doctrine of stare decisis, not the intrinsic soundness of the opin-
ion, that preserves Roe. 77 However, the analysis employed in Roe, and 
72. /d. 
73. Wardle has argued this. Wardle, supra note 19, at 251-52. However, Wardle acknowl-
edged that the abortion privacy doctrine alone is sweeping in the regulations it prohibits, quite 
apart from the trimester scheme. /d. at 249. 
74. See, e.g., Comment, Abortion: From Roe to Akron, Changing Standards of Analysis, 33 
CATH. U.L. R~:v. 393 (1984). The author charged that the Court in Akron retreated from the 
"bright-line" trimester scheme in the name of physician discretion. In Akron the Court refined its 
trimester scheme in light of new standards established by the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists. Akron, 462 U.S. at 437. But see Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976)("[I)t is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to 
place viability, which essentially is a medical concept .... "). There seems to be some tension 
between the Supreme Court's imposition of the trimester rule and its affinity for physician discre-
tion. Compare Akron, 462 U.S. at 429-31 with Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
and Comment, Abortion: From Roe to Akron, Changing Standards of Analysis, supra, at 415-17 
with Comment, Toward Constitutional Abortion Control Legislation: The Pennsylvania Ap-
proach, 87 DicK. L. Rt:v. 373, 377 (1983). 
75. Akron, 462 U.S. at 429 n.ll. 
76. See, e.g., Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and 
Law, 87 HARV. L. Rt:v. I (1973); L. TRIBE, supra note 46; Ely, supra ~ote 24; Regan, supra 
note 38. See also Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 36. 
77. In a recent poll of federal judges, only 33 percent thought Roe "was correctly decided, 
although an additional 31 percent said that despite their disagreement with the decision, they 
would not overturn it." The View from the Bench, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1987, at S12. 
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developed in subsequent decisions, is fundamentally antithetical to the 
values that underlie the doctrine of stare decisis. 78 
1. Traditional view of the doctrine of stare decisis 
The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to a system founded upon 
the rule of law. Justice Powell acknowledged this in Akron: "[T]he 
doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a 
constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society 
governed by the rule of law. "79 
The rule of law is one of the foundation stones of American soci-
ety. The concept is crucial to the debate over Roe. A preliminary exam-
ination of political and jurisprudential theory80 will demonstrate why 
this 1s so. 
a. The American rule of law. The debate over the optimum sys-
tem of governance has raged for millenia. Aristotle pointed out the 
weakness of a constitutional system incorporating the rule of law with 
an analogy: 
The advocates of kingship maintain that the laws speak only in gen-
eral terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any 
science to abide by written rules is absurd. In Eqypt the physician is 
allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he 
takes the risk. Hence it is clear that a government acting according to 
written laws is plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dis-
pense with the general principle which exists in law; and that is a 
better ruler which is free from passion than that in which it is innate. 
78. Abortion jurisprudence undermines the rule of law and stare decisis in many ways, as 
shown below. For example, Akron suggested that state legislators keep abreast of the latest medi-
cal standards and techniques. Akron, 462 U.S. at 431 (The state may not "depart from accepted 
medical practice."). By so doing they may have some hope of constitutionally regulating abortion. 
/d. Yet, the Akron Court ignored the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG) standards, on which it relied so heavily in evaluating maternal health interests, when it 
came to Akron's informed consent provision. ACOG recommended that "sufficient time for reflec-
tion" be allowed a woman seeking an abortion, yet the Court struck down a codification of this 
notion. Akron, 462 U.S. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(citing ACOG STANDARDS FOR OB-
STETRIC-GYNECOLOGICAL SERVICES 54 (5th ed. 1982)). There is no guidance by the Court as to 
when a legislator should follow current medical opinion and when to ignore it. 
79. Akron, 462 U.S. at 419-20 (emphasis added). 
80. While juridical science is not identical to political science, it is a part of political science. 
This is an ancient notion given fresh impetus by Legal Realists, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 
adherents, and others, who acknowledge the link between politics and judicial decision-making. 
Most modern theorists tend to subjectify politics and devalue political theory, while CLS seems to 
identify politics and judicial decision-making. However, it is impossible to gain a proper apprecia-
tion of abortion jurisprudence without placing it in its proper political context. The problems 
created by Roe are more than logical puzzles for lawyers and law professors. They are moral and 
political problems. Indeed, Roe has had an impact on American mores and has hastened the trans-
formation of American politics. 
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Whereas the law is passionless, passion must always sway the heart 
of man. Yes, it may be replied, but then on the other hand an individ-
ual will be better able to deliberate in particular cases.81 
195 
This statement is emblematic of the argument against a constitu-
tion based on the rule of law: as it is folly for a physician to treat a 
patient according to fixed rules, so it is folly to tie the hands of rulers 
with fixed, pre-determined laws. Each situation is different. Discretion 
is required. There are too many contingencies for fixed rules to apply. 
It is noteworthy, however, that Aristotle concluded the above discussion 
with a comment that, where one feared for his safety at the hands of a 
physician, one "would be more inclined to seek treatment by the rules 
of a text-book."82 The American revolutionaries had seen the "physi-
cian," the English monarch, in action and feared for their safety. 
Rejecting the arguments for giving wide discretion to political au-
thorities, our founding fathers set out to create a rule of law regime par 
excellence. The Declaration of Independence set forth the principle 
along with a catalogue of the abuses of royal prerogative. The new 
republic had practical experience with the evils of discretionary rule. 
The Constitution set forth a rule of law in its enumeration of powers 
and fundamental rights. This was reinforced by the Bill of Rights. 
These were safeguards against the types of abuses the framers of the 
Constitution observed in the mercurial legislatures of the day. 83 In the 
debate over rule of law versus rule of men, the prudent, practical judg-
ment of American statesmen has usually been for the rule of law. 
In our constitutional system, the rule of law means that the law, 
duly enacted by the representatives of the people, governs. No official 
may exercise power not granted to him or her by law. The rule of law 
operates on two levels, on the rulers and on the ruled. 
Rules are imposed on rulers to guide them in their duties and to 
curb their discretion in likely areas of abuse. For example, the Consti-
tution prohibits ex post facto laws.84 Likewise, the first amendment 
guards an area of traditional abuse. There may be excellent reasons to 
retain the power of censorship in the hands of the ruler. However, the 
Constitution reflects the practical judgment that, despite its advantages, 
e.g., in national emergencies, censorship should not be allowed. It is 
safer to generally prohibit such censorship, with judicial oversight of 
81. ARISTOTLE, PoLITICS 1286A, lines 10-22 (2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 
2042 (Barnes ed. 1984)). 
82. /d. at 1287a, lines 37-38 (2 Tm: COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE at 2043). 
83. See, e.g., G. WooD, THt: CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); 
B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967). 
84. U.S. CoNS'!'. art. I, § 9, cl.3. 
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any possible exceptions.811 
The essence of self-government is a sharing of the activities of rul-
ing and being ruled. Rulers are not above the law and are required to 
maintain the rule of law. Rulers must impose rules of conduct on "pri-
vate" societal actors when the public good requires it. Such regulation 
is only tolerated where essential, due to the favored status of individual 
discretion in our individualistic society. 
The most novel aspect of the framers' new scheme of politics was 
their preference for regulating private conduct through an invisible 
hand mechanism-many factions competing and cancelling each other 
out. 86 The federalist system envisioned a similar mechanism operating 
at the level of society's rulers-a system of ambition checking ambi-
tion.87 This striving all takes place within a framework of constitu-
tional rules, regulating the conduct of the rulers. 
Such rules were intended to apply to the judiciary as well. As 
Judge Robert Bork has observed, "[T]he Court's power is legitimate 
only if it has, and can demonstrate in reasoned opinion that it has, a 
valid theory derived from the Constitution .... " 88 If the Court chooses 
rather to pretend it has a theory (or offers none at all), while imposing 
its own "predilections, the Court violates the postulates of the Madis-
onian model that alone justifies its power."89 Furthermore, any theory 
which the Court employs must not only be neutrally applied but also 
neutrally defined and neutrally derived from the Constitution.90 Other-
wise judges are simply "imposing their values on the rest of us."91 
In places the language of the Constitution is ambiguous. This al-
lows for some modification of the rules in light of changing circum-
stances.92 The Constitution also provides a formal amendment process 
85. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
86. THE FmERAI.IST No. 10 (J. Madison). 
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison). 
88. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 3 
(1971). 
89. Jd. 
90. Jd. at 7. 
91. I d. Cf Wolfe, How the Constitution Was Taken Out of Constitutional Law, 10 HARV. 
J.L. & PuB. Pm.'v 596 (1987). 
92. Some textual indeterminacy, however, is not a general warrant for the unbridled discre-
tion of any branch, least of all the judiciary. As Ely has noted, even the wildest pre-Roe activism 
entailed some effort to trace the holding to some pre-existing constitutional rule. The Roe Court 
paid lip service to this requirement by citing some privacy precedents. Ely, supra note 24, at 947-
49. Bork gives as an example of this type of modification the case of Brown v. Board of Education. 
Bork, supra note 88, at 14. As those who initiated the fourteenth amendment stated only the 
principle of racial equality as an objective, but were divergent as to the implications of this princi-
ple, the Court could only follow "the majestic and ambiguous formula: the equal protection of the 
laws." ld. The Court could not impose the missing "detailed code" which might allow equality in 
one .case but not another, as some were advocating. Id. Thus, as Bork declared, "the no-state-
181] RIGHT TO ABORTION 197 
for more substantial changes. Beyond these, there IS no authority for 
additions to or deletions from the Constitution. 
However, the temptation is always strong for the Supreme Court 
to act to resolve apparently urgent societal dilemmas. Such an urgent 
need for intervention was felt by the Court in the early part of the 
twentieth century. State and federal governments had decided that lais-
sez-faire economics was not working. Social welfare legislation was en-
acted to curb business discretion. The Supreme Court responded by 
striking down the legislation, in the name of freedom of contract (where 
state regulation was involved)93 or by narrow construction of the com-
merce clause (where federal regulation was involved).94 
The cases of this period are symbolized by Lochner v. New York. 911 
In Lochner, the Court struck down state legislation limiting the hours 
that bakers could be required by their employers to work. The ten 
hours per day and sixty hours per week limitation was enacted, under 
the states' traditional police power, to protect the health of bakers. The 
tool employed by the Court to overthrow such legislation was substan-
tive due process. The Court read its laissez-faire economic philosophy 
into the "liberty" of the fourteenth amendment, in order to find a fun-
damental right to contract unfettered by government regulation.96 
This approach was strongly rejected by critics, by dissenting jus-
tices,97 and, eventually, by the Court itself. In 1963, the Court noted 
the use of substantive due process in the past: 
There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this 
Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, 
unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social phi-
losophy. In this manner the Due Process Clause was used, for exam-
ple, to nullify laws prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries, 
outlawing "yellow dog" contracts, setting minimum wages for women, 
and fixing the weight of loaves of bread. This intrusion by the judici-
ary into the realm of legislative value judgments was strongly objected 
to at the time .... Mr. Justice Holmes said, 
I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do 
whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohi-
enforced-discrimination rule of Brown must overturn and replace the separate-but-equal doctrine 
of Plessy v. Ferguson." /d. at 15. 
93. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adair v. United States, 208 
U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
94. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 
(1936); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Rail;oad Retirement Bd. v. 
Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
95. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
96. /d. at 53. 
97. See, e.g., id. at 74-75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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bition m the Constitution of the United States or of the State, and 
that Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond 
their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public pol-
icy that the particular Court may happen to entertain. 98 
The Court then observed that the doctrine, "that due process au-
thorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the leg-
islature has acted unwisely, [had] been discarded."99 The Court con-
cluded, "We have returned to the original constitutional proposition 
that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the 
judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws." 100 
It is noteworthy that this rejection of substantive due process was 
not limited to economic matters, as some have argued, but extended to 
"social" matters as well. 101 Further, the fact "that the 'right to abor-
tion,' or noneconomic rights generally, accord more closely with 'this 
generation's idealization of America' than the 'rights' asserted in ... 
Lochner," makes no difference, declared Ely. 102 "[T]hat attitude," he 
observed, "is precisely the point of the Lochner philosophy, which 
would grant unusual protection to those 'rights' that somehow seem 
most pressing, regardless of whether the Constitution suggests any spe-
cial solicitude for them."103 
The Court has often been accused of "Lochnering" in Roe. 104 
However, the parallels are more numerous than they first appear. Both 
Roe and Lochner appear result-oriented, unjustified by the Constitu-
tion, and designed to protect a certain profession, rather than all inter-
ested parties. 1011 The reasoning process behind both sets of cases is anal-
ogous. Both reflect the clear biases of the justices. Both dealt with issues 
that seemed especially pressing and important at the time (less so in a 
broader historical perspective), but were not mentioned by the framers. 
The Lochner Court was clearly sympathetic to, and allied with, 
American business. It believed that sound policy dictated unfettered 
business. Business discretion could be trusted to bring about the best 
98. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963)(footnotes and citations omitted). 
99. /d. at 730. 
100. /d. (emphasis added). See also Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & 
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 533-37 (1949). 
101. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1961). 
102. Ely, supra note 24, at 939 (footnotes omitted). 
103. Id. (emphasis in original). Ely adds, "The Constitution has little to say about contract 
[footnote omitted], less about abortion, and those who would speculate about which the framers 
would have been more likely to protect may not be pleased with the answer." /d. 
104. Ely, supra note 24, at 937-43; Epstein, supra note 30, at 168. 
105. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense 
and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 809, 812-21 (1935). 
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state of affairs. The Court was willing to strain to find constitutional 
support for this position. The justification for this faith was a belief in 
equal bargaining power and identity of interests between business and 
labor. 106 The Lochner model posited two free and equal 
adults-employer and employee-entering into a mutually beneficial 
agreement. By protecting the interests of the employer, the Court pur-
ported to protect the employee's interests. 107 Also bound up in the 
Lochner argument was the notion of an independent right to earn a 
living as one chooses. 108 
Roe contained dicta reminiscent of this latter notion. 109 The Roe 
Court was clearly sympathetic to the medical profession and believed in 
its sound exercise of discretion. 110 The Roe model of the doctor-patient 
relationship was predicated on an identity of interests between the phy-
sician and his patient. Because it was assumed that their interests ex-
actly coincided with that of their patient, doctors have long been trusted 
to define their own standard of care. Both physician and patient 
benefitted from the patient's health. A physician's interest in more pa-
tients and payment of his fee would compel him to do justice. This 
positive view of the doctor-patient relationship is analogous to the 
Lochner Court's view of the employer-employee relationship. It was 
assumed that the physician would offer his best judgment and advice in 
assisting the woman to come to the best possible decision. 111 
Just as the Lochner Court believed that state regulations were dis-
rupting its model system, the Roe Court believed that state regulation 
would disrupt the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors were to be left 
unfettered. This model of the doctor-patient relationship is unrealistic, 
especially in the abortion context, just as the Lochner Court's model of 
labor relations was unrealistic at the time. 112 
The states have responded to the breakdown of the "family physi-
cian" model of medical care just as they responded to perceived busi-
106. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 55, 57, 61. 
107. /d. 
108. /d. at 53. 
109. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66. See also, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973). 
110. Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-47, 156, 165-66; Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197; Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). Akron relied heavily on the customs of the medical 
profession and placed great faith in the doctor-patient relationship. /d. at 437, 450-51. See also 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61, 65 n.4, 73-75 (1976). 
111. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66; Bolton, 410 U.S. at 195-200; Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379, 387 (1979). See also Wood & Durham, Counseling, Consulting, and Consent: Abortion and 
the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 783, 785. 
112. Wardle, supra note 19, at 244-45 n.72; Nathanson, Deeper Into Abortion, 291 N. ENG. 
J. MED. 1189 (1974); Zekman & Warrick, The Abortion Lottery, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 14, 
1978, at 11-13. 
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ness abuses. Statutes designed to limit abuses by physicians, such as 
those at issue in Thornburgh, were, in this regard, similar to the state 
regulations of the Lochner era. Federal abortion funding restrictions 
and attempts to amend the Constitution to protect the unborn are anal-
ogous to New Deal reform attempts. Those attempts to reform or work 
around the Supreme Court opinions of the Lochner era were thwarted 
by the High Court. 
Eventually, the Supreme Court recognized that the imposition of 
its economic philosophy on the country was inappropriate. It acknowl-
edged that stare decisis was not a compelling argument for adhering to 
opinions that lacked the essentials of law. The Court recognized that 
the rule of law was consistent with the regulation of private actors. 113 
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will relearn the Lochner lesson, 
recognize the unconstitutionality of its holding in Roe, and overturn 
Roe. The rule of law in our Constitutional scheme requires such self-
correction by the Court when the Court has transgressed the bounds of 
its lawful authority. 
Abortion jurisprudence, then, may be seen as antithetical to the 
rule of law. It is so in several senses. First, it is based upon an unwar-
ranted Constitutional theory. As shall be seen, the right to abortion 
may not be logically derived from substantive due process, even if such 
analysis were appropriate. The Court has never demonstrated the con-
nection between the Constitution and the Court-created right to choose 
abortion. Thus, the Court has transgressed a fundamental principle of 
the rule of law-that all are bound by the law, even justices. They may 
not lawfully exercise power where it IS unauthorized by the 
Constitution. 
Second, abortion jurisprudence is antithetical to the rule of law 
because it grants an unwarranted degree of disrretion to a powerful 
elite-physicians. By allowing this discretion, the Supreme Court has 
impeded a primary function of the rule of law-to ensure impartiality 
113. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)(acknowledging the reality of uneven 
bargaining power); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)(permitting federal 
regulation of labor relations). It might be argued that these opinions were inconsistent with the 
rule of law, because they paved the way for a bureaucratic welfare state in which tremendous 
power is delegated to unelected executive personnel. Nevertheless, the doctrine of Schecter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)(limiting standardless delegation of discretionary pow-
ers to the executive and to a private elite), still stands as a safeguard. Moreover, the history of 
administrative law reveals persistent impositions of rule-of-law constraints to limit the discretion 
of administrative agents. See, e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1975). While our constitutional scheme might have been modified in light 
of changed circumstances, a distrust of unfettered discretion has remained constant. Today, how-
ever, three powerful groups seem to possess such discretion: the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and physicians who perform abortions. 
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among powerful social actors and that rulers and ruled act out of rea-
son, principle, and the common good, rather than from passion and 
self-interest. 
Third, abortion case law is antithetical to the rule of law because 
it undermines the ability of the state legislatures to enact generally ap-
plicable rules. This is an essential rule-of-law function. In the abortion 
context, the Court has mandated physician discretion, requiring case by 
case treatment of abortion. The Court has done this despite the fact 
that abortion patients generally are not given individualized treatment 
but are treated on a wholesale basis. The legal principle of treating like 
cases alike is violated. By so doing, the Court undermines a rule-of-law 
constraint on adjudication-the requirement of reasoned, principled de-
cision-making. As will be demonstrated, the Court fails to treat abor-
tion the same as other privacy rights, analogous medical procedures, 
and other legal issues involving the unborn. 
Fourth, the rule of law also requires statutes, regulations, and ju-
dicial pronouncements to be susceptible to obedience. Yet, it is often 
difficult for state legislatures to determine just what regulation of abor-
tion is permitted. A ready example is the Court's confusing pronounce-
ments on post-viability regulations. Is the trimester scheme a "bright-
line" framework, or does the physician have discretion to adjust these 
lines according to his own determination of viability? 
Fifth, a corollary principle is the importance of stability in the 
law. Despite invocation of Roe as a polestar for creating and reviewing 
abortion regulation, abortion law has been marked by instability and 
uncertainty. As will be shown, the Supreme Court's pronouncements 
have been far from clear. As a result, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
predict what the Court will do with any given regulation. 
b. Stare Decisis. To allow obedience to and stability in the law, 
the rule-of-law doctrine of stare decisis has been developed. One of the 
essential aspects of the rule of law is that laws must be known in order 
to be followed. Thus, we have statute books. Where courts make law, 
the decisions of the courts are written and published. Where questions 
of law arise in subsequent cases, prior opinions are consulted for the 
controlling rules of law. Unless a prior decision is overruled as incor-
rect, the precedent is binding on subsequent cases. Judges are bound by 
the laws they have made before, unless they provide rationale for over-
turning them. They may not make ad hoc dispositions of cases. 
If employed properly, the doctrine makes it possible to predict, 
with reasonable accuracy, what a court will decide in future cases 
which raise similar issues. As will be shown next, abortion jurispru-
dence undermines the rule of law by neglecting the proper application 
of the doctrine of stare decisis in abortion cases. 
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2. Court neglect of stare decisis in abortion cases 
It is ironic that, while claiming to follow Roe, the Court has sys-
tematically gutted Roe to allow the current desired result. The doctrine 
of stare decisis presupposes a precedent with content to be followed. By 
emptying Roe of content, the Court's appeal to stare decisis is now an 
appeal only to the skeletal concept that a woman may have an abortion 
whenever she desires, for whatever reason. 
The Court indicates this to be the core and substance of the prece-
dent it follows. It has struck down any meaningful attempt to codify the 
restrictions allowed in Roe and abandoned key elements of the Roe 
formula when convenient. It is clear, then, that, while the Court raises 
the cry of stare decisis, it has not in fact followed its own precedent, 
except in the most skeletal fashion. Illustrations abound. Some are set 
forth below. 
a. Erosion of Roe's "bright line" trimester analysis. In Roe, the 
Court adopted its famous trimester scheme.U4 In the first trimester, the 
state could impose little regulation. "[T]he abortion decision and its ef-
fectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant wo-
man's attending physician."1111 In the second trimester, the state could 
regulate abortion to protect its compelling interest in maternal 
health. 116 Beginning with viability (roughly the third trimester), the 
state's interest in the fetus became compelling, and it could even pro-
scribe abortion, with exceptions to protect the life or health of the 
mother. 117 
In Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services v. Bowen, 118 an In-
diana District Court adhered to the precedent in Roe. At issue was a 
statute requiring hospitalization for second trimester abortions. 119 The 
plaintiffs argued that, since the D & E (dilation and evacuation) abor-
tion techniques had improved since Roe, the hospitalization require-
ment was no longer rationally related to maternal health for at least the 
first half of the second trimester. 120 They argued that the second tri-
mester should be split in half and clinic abortions allowed through 
eighteen weeks. 121 
The trial court rejected such argument, saying that "[ t ]o adopt the 
114. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-66. 
115. ld. at 164. 
116. !d. 
117. !d. at 164-65. 
118. 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980) affd sub. nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's 
Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981). 
119. !d. at 896. 
120. !d. at 897. 
121. !d. 
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plaintiffs argument would require this Court to controvert the express 
language of Roe. " 122 The court noted that Roe had specifically ad-
dressed the issue, and quoted Roe, emphasizing the relevant portions: 
Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are require-
ments as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the 
abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which 
the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospi-
tal .... 123 
The district court then continued: 
The language is clear. A hospitalization requirement for second tri-
mester abortions is constitutional. Indiana and many other states have 
relied on this interpretation of the language. This Court has "an obli-
gation to follow the precedents of our highest Court." (Citation omit-
ted.] This Court is bound by the language of Roe. This Court may 
not controvert specific rulings of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The express language of Roe mandates that Indiana's second 
trimester hospitalization requirement be found by this Court to be 
constitutional. 124 
The district court went on to indicate that splitting the second tri-
mester would require "some cutoff other than the end of the first tri-
mester. The Roe language clearly demonstrates the intent of the Su-
preme Court to encourage, indeed force, states to use the end of the 
first trimester as a cutoff point for regulations designed to protect ma-
ternal health." 1211 The court noted Roe's implied requirement that tri-
mesters be treated as units and not broken up. 126 
The Gary-Northwest court also rejected the argument that "Roe 
allow[ed] regulation not of second trimester abortions, but only of abor-
tions more dangerous than childbirth."127 The court answered this 
argument: 
The specific ultimate rulings in Roe with regard to the various stages 
of pregnancy were somewhat arbitrary judgments necessitated by a 
wide variety of factors. This Court must respect Roe's specific ulti-
mate rulings. If this Court does not respect the specific ultimate rul-
ings in Roe, those rulings will lose their usefulness .... (S]tates will 
be hard pressed to pursue their legitimate, compelling, interests in 
122. /d. at 898. 
123. /d. at 899 (emphasis in original); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. 
124. Gary-Northwest, 496 F. Supp. at 899. 
125. /d. 
126. /d. at 900. 
127. /d. 
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protecting maternal health. 128 
The court noted that making the rule depend on whether child-
birth was more dangerous than abortion would require a case by case 
determination of constitutionality, because the facts of each pregnancy 
differ. 129 Further, "[i]f the Supreme Court had intended the test ... to 
be the safety of the abortion relative to childbirth, the Supreme Court 
would have so stated the test."130 It did not, the district court noted, but 
selected as the test the chronological stage of the pregnancy .131 
Finally, the district court stated: 
It would be impractical for the constitutionality of a second trimester 
regulation to depend on a factual question, such as whether the regu-
lation in fact reduced maternal morbidity and mortality. [This] would 
require relitigation of the regulation's constitutionality with each 
change in the availability of abortions, with each improvement in 
abortion technique, and with each publication of statistics showing 
that abortion skills had improved. Such an interpretation of Roe 
would result in repeated relitigation of the constitutionality of the 
same statute. It is the policy of the Supreme Court to avoid, if possi-
ble, the creation of rules of law which increase litigation. 132 
Therefore, the court held that, since it was reasonably related to pro-
moting maternal health, the second trimester hospitalization require-
ment was constitutional. 133 "A contrary ruling would controvert Roe," 
it concluded. 134 
The Gary-Northwest case gave a clear example of stare decisis in 
practice. As indicated in Gary-Northwest, many states relied on this 
interpretation of Roe. 135 The United States Supreme Court summarily 
affirmed the decision on appeal. 136 Not surprisingly, this was widely 
interpreted as indicating the Court's continued approval of statutes re-
quiring hospitalization for abortions after the first trimester. 137 
128. /d. 
129. /d. 
130. /d. 
131. /d. 
\32. /d. at 901. 
133. I d. at 902. 
\34. /d. 
135. /d. at 899. 
136. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981). 
137. The view was not unanimous, however. See, e.g., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. 
Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980)(Margaret S. (/));Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 
1984)(Margaret S. (//)). Margaret S. (II) found Gary-Northwest not to be binding. Interestingly, 
one distinction it employed was that Indiana had a broader definition of "hospital" than did Loui-
siana, thereby making second and third trimester abortions "more readily accessible in Indiana." 
Margaret S. (//), 597 F. Supp. at 656. However, the court also cited the jurisdictional statement of 
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With this clear statement of Roe, the precedent seemed clear. A 
post-first trimester hospitalization requirement was constitutional. The 
city council of Akron, Ohio, codified this precedent. 138 However, the 
Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine of stare decisis in reviewing the 
regulation. 
The doctrine of stare decisis required the Supreme Court merely 
to examine its own precedents and follow them. The district court in 
A.kron did so/39 and the court of appeals affirmed. 140 The Supreme 
Court reversed, because the American Public Health Association 
(APHA) and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG) had altered their positions. 141 At the time of Roe, 142 and when 
the Akron ordinance was enacted/43 APHA and ACOG recommended 
hospitalization after the first trimester. By 1982, they did not. 144 The 
Gary-Northwest, which set forth one of the three issues as, "[ w ]hether the district court abused its 
discretion in preliminarily upholding the second trimester hospital restriction, when the over-
whelming majority of Indiana hospitals ban all abortion services, and there is no compelling 
health reason for mandatory hospitalization." /d. at 654 (capital letters removed). The distinction 
based on accessibility seems a rather weak one at best. More importantly, as Margaret S. (II) 
conceded, this issue "could possibly be characterized as substantive." /d. at 655 (other issues were 
definitely procedural). The Margaret S. (II) court argued, however, that, since only a preliminary 
injunction had been sought, this "was not tantamount to a decision on the merits on the constitu-
tionality of a post-first trimester hospitalization requirement since it is clear that different stan-
dards apply in the granting of preliminary and permanent injunctions." /d. (citations omitted). 
While this assertion of different standards is correct, it is not dispositive. As Margaret S. (II) 
noted, one must show a "likelihood of success" (rather than "success") on the merits for a prelimi-
nary injunction. Thus, it is apparent that the Supreme Court did not believe that the district court 
abused its discretion in finding it likely that the state would prevail at a trial of its post-first 
trimester hospitalization requirement (even though one is not required to prove all one's case at a 
preliminary injunction hearing). /d. 
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would have summarily affirmed if it had believed that a 
second trimester hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The case was not entirely pro-
cedural, and the substantive aspect revolved around the sole issue of the hospitalization require-
ment. There was little doubt that the case would be widely perceived as placing the Court's en-
dorsement on the hospitalization requirement. Indeed, this was the case with the Akron district 
and appellate courts. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1983). 
If the Supreme Court did not intend to affirm a post-first trimester hospitalization requirement, it 
should have avoided the use of a summary affirmance, which certainly left such an impression. 
There is strong evidence that the Court still felt the hospitalization requirement was constitutional 
in 1981, because the American Public Health Association (APHA) and American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), its authorities, had not yet agreed on a change. In 1981, 
APHA published its revised viewpoint, and ACOG's 1982 standards included its shift of opinion. 
!d. at 437. Thus, the shift in medical opinion was just then in progress and was not yet completed. 
138. Akron, Ohio, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.03 (1978)(requiring that all abortions af-
ter the first trimester be performed in a hospital). 
139. Akron, 462 U.S. at 426. 
140. /d. 
141. !d. at 435-37. 
142. /d. at 435. 
143. !d. at 431. 
144. /d. at 437. 
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Court said the state (or its cities) may not "depart from accepted medi-
cal practice. " 145 
The state may no longer look to the precedent of the Court, but 
must now keep track of shifting medical opinions and follow them in 
order to legislate constitutionally. The "bright-line" trimester approach 
was abandoned. 146 The Court, by its "diligent research," 147 decided 
that abortions in clinics were safe through the sixteenth week of preg-
nancy because of improvements in the D & E abortion technique. 148 
Therefore, the state may no longer treat the trimester as a unit but 
must fine-tune its legislation to the latest APHA and ACOG pro-
nouncements. Of course, the Court's latest guideline at sixteen weeks 
may not be safe for a legislator to follow, because ACOG now says 
eighteen weeks is the proper place to draw the line. 149 One is left not 
knowing whom to follow. In Akron, the Court followed medical orga-
nizations rather than its own pronouncements. 150 
145. /d. at 434 (citations omitted). 
146. See id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
147. /d. 
148. /d. at 436. 
149. /d. at 437. 
ISO. /d. The Akron Court attempted to find precedent for its holding in Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179 (1973). See Akron, 462 U.S. at 433. Bolton rejected a state requirement of hospitaliza-
tion in accredited hospitals, for abortions in all three trimesters. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973). 
However, the Akron Court rewrote the Bolton precedent in so doing. The Bolton Court held 
specifically the following: "We hold that the hospital requirement of the Georgia law, because it 
fails to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy, see Roe, ... at 163, is also invalid." /d. at 195. 
The Akron Court not only failed to clearly quote its holding in Bolton, but it relegated it to a 
passing comment at the end of a footnote. Akron, 462 U.S. at 434 n.l9. The Bolton Court also 
cited the state's failure to adduce enough evidence to support its hospital requirement for abortions 
in all trimesters. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 195. This the Akron Court presented as the primary reason 
for invalidation, rather than the first trimester infringement clearly indicated in the Court's own 
statement of its holding. Akron, 462 U.S. at 433. In any event, the Supreme Court's subsequent 
affirmation of Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 
1980) ajj'd sub. nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981), which 
dealt with the issue of a second trimester hospitalization requirement, should have been dispositive 
of any question of the required level of proof. The Gary-Northwest district court opinion sup-
ported the hospitalization requirement on rationality grounds: 
Clearly, it is reasonable for a state to conclude that a hospitalization requirement will 
promote health. It cannot be seriously disputed that medical risks accompany abortions. 
It is therefore eminently reasonable to require that abortion be performed in a hospital. 
Hospitalization may be the most obviously reasonable health-related regulation that 
there is. [Citation omitted.] That is probably why the Supreme Court of the United 
States expressly stated that hospitalization would be a regulation reasonably related to 
maternal health. Indiana's determination that a hospitalization requirement would pro-
mote maternal health can be supported by reason. 
Gary-Northwest, 496 F. Supp. at 902. 
The Supreme Court affirmed Gary-Northwest, including the prominent statement by the 
District Court that the "ultimate test" was "whether the legislature acted reasonably in determin-
ing that the regulation would promote maternal health." /d. Specifically rejected in Gary-North-
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In a footnote, Akron referred to Gary-Northwest, noting that the 
court of appeals believed itself bound by this precedent. m The Su-
preme Court dismissed the case as not being binding. 1 ~2 It asserted this 
by reading into Gary-Northwest an alternative decisional basis: that the 
plaintiff did not prove the safety of second trimester abortions outside of 
hospitals. 1 ~3 However, the district court in Gary-Northwest held that 
"even if the plaintiffs could prove birth more dangerous than early sec-
ond trimester D & E abortions," that would not affect the constitution-
ality of the statutes. 1 ~4 As Justice O'Connor observed, the Court simply 
ignored this fact. 1 ~~ 
Thus, the Supreme Court first held post-first trimester hospitali-
zation requirements constitutional (in keeping with APHA and ACOG 
holdings) and then said they were not. This is a failure to observe the 
doctrine of stare decisis. Even if the Court really meant one must keep 
up with the latest rulings of medical panels, that also is a failure of 
stare decisis, for, in Roe, trimesters were set forth as units, and now the 
lines are being blurred. Surely stare decisis presupposes neutral princi-
ples "sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community 
and continuity over significant periods of time." 1 ~6 Finally, stare decisis 
surely requires adherence to decisions by the courts and not to the mov-
ing target of changing medical opinions. 
The approach of the Akron majority to stare decisis wreaks havoc 
with the principles of the doctrine, especially consistency, susceptibility 
of obedience and amenability to generally applicable laws. How may a 
legislator predict what will be held constitutional under such a High 
Court approach? Of course, this emphasizes again the fallacy of the 
trimester approach, based as it is on the shifting sands of medical tech-
nology rather than on the bedrock of the Constitution. 
Thus, stare decisis was abandoned in the same case (Akron) in 
which it was declared to be controlling. The Court in Akron followed 
what it wished in Roe and ignored what was inconvenient. In so doing, 
it distorted stare decisis and made the abortion right more absolute. 
b. Ignoring physician consultation requirements in abortion 
cases. A second key concept of Roe was the requirement that the wo-
man make the abortion decision "in consultation" with her physician, 
west was the test of "whether the statute has the statistically demonstrable result of decreasing 
maternal morbidity or mortality for specific groups of abortions." Id. 
151. Akron, 462 U.S. at 433 n.18. 
152. Id. 
153. See id. 
154. Gary-Northwest, 496 F. Supp. at 903 (emphasis added). 
155. Akron, 462 U.S. at 455 n.3. 
156. A. Cox, supra note 26, at 114. 
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who must find "that, in his medical judgment, the pregnancy should be 
terminated."157 The Court so held because the Court considered the 
abortion decision "inherently, and primarily, a medical decision. " 158 
The medical judgment of the physician was thus tied to the woman's 
freedom which the Court left in place during the first trimester. In an 
era when physicians, clinics, and corporate franchises make their living 
from abortion, this is not a very substantial check. However, the Court 
envisioned a traditional doctor-patient relationship and required con-
sultation in Roe. 159 
In Akron, the Court restated the principle that a woman, during 
the first trimester, "must be permitted, in consultation with her physi-
cian, to decide to have an abortion and to effectuate that decision ... 
. "
160 The Court added that informed consent requirements would be 
permissible if they leave "the precise nature and amount of this disclos-
ure to the physician's discretion and 'medical judgment.' " 161 The 
Court even noted that "in Roe and subsequent cases we have 'stressed 
repeatedly the central role of the physician, both in consulting with the 
woman about whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining 
how any abortion was to be carried out.' " 162 However, the Court 
broke with its precedent and held that someone else could consult with 
the woman besides her physician (or any physician). 163 The Court 
noted that the "practice" at abortion clinics was not to have the physi-
cian consult with the patient and, therefore, held that requiring the 
physician to do so was unconstitutional. 164 The Court held that "it 
[was] unreasonable for a State to insist that only a physician [was] com-
petent to provide the information and counseling relevant to informed 
consent. " 165 
Again, the Court violated the doctrine of stare decisis. While pur-
porting to follow Roe, it emptied Roe even further of content. Once 
more the "precedent" of medical practice ruled over the precedent of 
the Court. 
c. A pattern of stare decisis abuse. Other illustrations show a dis-
157. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
158. /d. at 166. 
159. See id. 
160. Akron, 462 U.S. at 429-30 (emphasis added). 
161. See id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
162. /d. at 447 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387)(emphasis added). 
163. /d. at 448. 
164. Id. at 447-48. 
165. /d. at 449. Interestingly, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), still employed the physician consultation language. Along with aban-
doning the requirement of physician counseling went the concept that abortion was to be based on 
medical judgment. /d. at 762, 764. 
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turbing and consistent pattern of stare decisis abandonment. In 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, recordkeeping 
was clearly allowed. However, in Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstretics & Gynecologists, the Court struck down comparable record-
keeping req uirements. 166 
In Poelker v. Doe, the Supreme Court noted that the personal mo-
tives of the ones promulgating the law are irrdevant. 167 In Thorn-
burgh, the Court recited the history of Pennsylvania's attempts to pass 
constitutional abortion legislation "as if it were evidence of some sinis-
ter conspiracy." 168 
The Supreme Court approved of informed consent requirements in 
Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpatrick, 169 Danforth, 170 and 
Guste v. Jackson. 171 However, in Thornburgh, it struck down similar 
requirements which carefully steered clear of the hazards found in 
Akron. 172 
In Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, the Court held 
that parental consent may be required for certain minors before an 
abortion may be performed. 173 Though no court procedural rules had 
yet been promulgated, the Court said, "There is no reason to believe 
that Missouri will not expedite any appeal consistent with the mandate 
in our prior decisions." 174 In Thornburgh, a virtually identical statute 
under virtually identical circumstances was enjoined until procedural 
rules were adopted. 1711 
Finally, as noted by Justice O'Connor, the Court has even 
changed some of its tests. For example, in Akron, it failed to apply the 
usual threshold inquiry for fundamental rights analysis of whether the 
right was "unduly burden[ed]." 176 Also, at one point, the Akron Court 
abandoned the usual "reasonable relationship" test for a newly created 
"vital state need'' test. 177 
166. See Planned Parenthood of Central !vlissouri v. Danforth, 42~ L.S. 52 ( 1976); Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynerolo~ists, 47(, ll.S. 767 ( 1986). This subject is 
further developed in infra section III-C-5 
167 . Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977). See a/.1u C:1ty of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 
F.2d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1984 )(rejecting the use of kgislativc motives). 
168. Thornburgh. 476 US. at 751-52, 798 (White, J, dissenting). 
169. 401 F. Supp. 554, 583 (E.D Pa. 1975), affd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 
U.S. 901 ( 1976). 
170. J)anforth, 428 U.S. at 67. 
171 429 C S. :l'!'), 400 (1977)(per curiam) 
172. A detailed discussion is found in the informed consent discussion infra section III-C-3. 
173. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 4(,2 U.S. 47(,, 490-'!3 (1983). 
174. !d. at 491 n.16. 
175. Thornburgh. 476 li.S. at 758 n.9. 
176. i\kron, 462 US. at ·l(,(J. 
177. !d. at 471 n.l'l. 
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d. Consequences of stare decisis abuse. The result of this vacilla-
tion is that abortion jurisprudence appears result-oriented. Stare decisis 
is adhered to when convenient and abandoned when not. Stability, pre-
dictability, and consistency-important purposes of stare decisis-are 
set aside, leaving legislators and the public puzzled as to what the law 
is on abortion. 
Indications that the Court is playing politics in its abortion deci-
sions compound this unpredictability. The abortion funding cases178 
and H.L. v. Matheson 119 might be interpreted as an effort to soften the 
political outrage at other decisions seeming to strengthen the protection 
of abortion. Given the Court's previous decisions, these latter holdings 
were not predictable. Indeed, they have been criticized as anomalous. 180 
Finally, abortion jurisprudence displays a cultural bias by the Su-
preme Court and a favoritism toward an elite group- physicians who 
perform abortions. Such bias is unseemly in a rule-of-law regime. 
The rule of law has been discussed by many scholars. Different 
components have been stressed by different writers. Differing purposes 
have been set forth, such as securing democratic liberalism, securing 
maximum freedom, protecting property, or curbing irrational, arbitrary 
and corrupt rule. 181 The focus here is not to enter this debate but to 
observe that rule of law serves highly desirable ends. Among these are 
the securing of good government and the happiness of the citizenry. 
In Akron, Justice Powell acknowledged that ours is a society "gov-
erned by the rule of law." He also noted that stare decisis is an impor-
tant means to implementing such rule. 182 However, Roe and its prog-
eny have been shown to be at war with the principles of the rule of 
law. The application of stare decisis to such precedent, thereby uphold-
ing the right to abortion, undermines the rule of law. 
17R. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
179. 450 us 398 (1981). 
I HO. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 43. 
181. The literature is voluminous. See, e.g., J. LocKt:, St:COND TRt:A'riSt: OF (;ovt:RN-
Mt:NT, chap. 7 (R. Cox. ed. 1982); F. HAYt:K, THt: PouTICAL lm:AL oF THt: Ruu: oF LAw, 
Lerture lil (1955); j. RAWLS, A THEORY OF jUSTICE 235-43 (1971); j. RAZ, Tm: AUTHORITY 
oF LAw: EssAYS ON LAw AND MoRAI.ITY, chap. 11 (1979); R. UN<:t:R, LAw IN Mont:RN 
Socit:TY: TowARD A CRITICISM oF SoCIAL THt:<>RY (1976); L. FULLER, THt: MoRAI.ITY oF 
LAw (rev. ed. 1969). See also Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. Lt:<;AL Snm. 351 (1973); D. 
EPSTEIN, THt: PoLITICAL THt:ORY OF THt: Ft:I>t:RAI.IST (1984). Of course, ARISTOTLt:'s, POI.IT-
ICS, and Ptxro's, Rt:Pl!BI.IC, STATESMAN, and LAWS remain the most insightful discussions. See 
also PLATO, CRrro. 
182. Akron, 462 U.S. at 420. 
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C. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists 
The wide divergence of abortion case law from the usual rules of 
law is also evident in the extreme result reached by the Court in 
Thornburgh. 183 This 1986 case demonstrates the problem states have 
in predicting and conforming to the Court's boundaries. As Justice 
O'Connor wrote in her dissent to Akron, the "bright lines" have be-
come "blurred."184 
The following discussion is an overview of Thornburgh. Certain 
elements of the decision will receive further treatment in the later dis-
cussion of the different aspects of abortion law. 
1. Background to Thornburgh: The statutes and the lower courts 
In Thornburgh, the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Abortion 
Control Act was at issue. The challenged provisions included a require-
ment of a second physician in post-viability abortions to preserve the 
life of the fetus, if possible. 1811 The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit found this unconstitutional because it lacked an explicit emer-
gency exception. 186 
Another Pennsylvania provision required use of the abortion tech-
nique most likely to preserve fetal life, unless it would cause signifi-
cantly greater risk to the mother. 187 The Third Circuit found this un-
constitutional by interpreting it to require an impermissible trade-off 
between maternal health and fetal rights. 188 
The Pennsylvania Act included an informed consent provision. It 
required physicians to make available state-prepared information con-
cerning alternatives to abortion, available assistance for alternatives, 
and objective information regarding fetal characteristics and the possi-
bility of fetal survival.189 The physician was required to disclose (1) the 
possibility of unforeseeable psychological and physical risks of abor-
tion/90 (2) the availability of medical assistance benefits for prenatal 
care, childbirth, and neonatal care,191 (3) the liability of the father for 
183. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
184. Akron, 462 U.S. at 455 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
185. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT.§ 3210(c)(1983). 
186. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 
300-01 (3d Cir. 1984) affd 476 U.S. 747 (1986). But see Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 
462 U.S. 476, 485 n.8 (1983). See also Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 5-6. 
187. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 3210(b) (1983). 
188. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 300. See Co)autti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979). 
189. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3205(a)(2)(iii) (1983). 
190. /d. § 3205(a)(l )(ii). 
191. /d. § 3205(a)(2)(i). 
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child support, 192 and ( 4) the probable gestational age of the fetus. 193 
The court of appeals invalidated all of these provisions on the basis of 
Akron. 194 
Pennsylvania also included a parental consent provision which es-
sentially codified the Supreme Court's holding in Bellotti v. Baird 
(Bellotti (II)). 195 The appeals court enjoined enforcement of this until 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court promulgated implementing 
regulations. 196 
The Pennsylvania Act also required physicians to provide reports 
with a variety of data for statistical purposes. 197 Included was a report 
of the basis for the physician's determination that the fetus was not 
viable or "that the abortion [was] necessary to preserve maternal life or 
health."198 The court of appeals invalidated these requirements because 
they were too extensive and complicated and, hence, were likely to in-
crease the cost of an abortion and possibly have a chilling effect on 
physicians' willingness to perform abortions. 199 
Another Pennsylvania provision required health insurers to make 
available policies that excluded elective abortion coverage (except in the 
case of rape or incest). These policies would have been mandatorily 
priced less than policies with abortion coverage.200 The appeals court 
invalidated this as an unjustified barrier to a woman's access to 
abortion. 201 
2. Reasoning of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court's holding in Thornburgh had major proce-
dural implications. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to 
go to the merits of the case, even though no final judgment had been 
192. Id. § 3205(a)(2)(ii). 
193. !d. § 3205(a)( I )(iv). 
194. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 295-96. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45. But see Brief for the 
United States, supra note 35, at 7-8. 
195. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT.§ 3206 (1983). See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)(Bellotti 
(II)). 
196. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 297. But see Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 4-
5. 
197. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. § 3214 (1983)(requiring information including the physician's 
name, location of facility, woman's age, race and marital status, type of abortion procedure, and 
any complications). 
198. !d. § 3211. 
199. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 301-02. But see Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 
9-10. 
200. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3215(e) (1983). 
201. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 303. But see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980); 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
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rendered below.202 The trial court had only denied a preliminary m-
junction from which this appeal was taken. 203 
The Thornburgh opinion also contained substantive rulings re-
garding informed consent, reporting requirements, and regulations 
designed to preserve the lives of viable, aborted fetuses. The Court in-
validated almost every regulation Pennsylvania had passed, and it did 
so with a hostile, summary attitude. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's finding of un-
constitutionality regarding the informed consent provisions, holding 
that they were designed to persuade women to withhold consent. 204 It 
added that the required giving of information "intrude[d] upon the dis-
cretion of the pregnant woman's physician," the two-week interval de-
scriptions of fetal development was overinclusive, and requiring such 
disclosure was "contrary to accepted medical practice."20~ The Court 
likened the Pennsylvania statute to Akron's "parade of horribles" 
(which it had found unconstitutional) and declared it facially unconsti-
tutional because it "cannot be saved by any facts that might be forth-
coming at a subsequent hearing."206 Finally, the Court refused to sever 
the defective portions, claiming the result would bear little resemblance 
to what the legislature intended.207 
The Supreme Court also invalidated the provisions which required 
physician reports of the basis for a determination of nonviability or 
medical necessity (where abortions have been performed) and other in-
formation for statistical purposes. 208 These had been invalidated by the 
appellate court because of possible added expense and a chilling effect. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but on a different 
rationale. It found that "identification [was] the obvious purpose of 
these extreme reporting requirements."209 
The Pennsylvania requirements of a second physician to care for 
the fetus at abortions after viability210 and the use of the abortion 
method most likely to preserve fetal life, unless it would cause signifi-
cantly greater risk to the mother,211 were clear efforts to assert the 
State's compelling interest in the viable, unborn fetus which Roe de-
202. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
203. Jd. 
204. See id. at 764. 
205. /d. at 762. 
206. See id. at 7 60-64. 
207. Jd. at 764-65. 
208. Jd. at 766. 
209. Jd. at 767. 
210. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 3210(c) (1983). 
211. Jd. § 3210(b). 
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clared.212 However, the Court affirmed the appellate court and struck 
down the latter provision as requiring an impermissible "trade-off' be-
tween maternal health and fetal rights,213 and the former as having no 
emergency section. 214 
The Supreme Court also allowed a temporary injunction to stand 
against the enforcement of the parental consent provision. Although no 
defect in the provision itself was found, the statute was enjoined pend-
ing promulgation of procedural rules by the state courts to implement 
it.21~ 
Thornburgh further demonstrates the Court's abandonment of 
stare decisis. Roe declared that states have compelling interests in ma-
ternal health, from the second trimester on, and in fetal life, after via-
bility. Stare decisis would require continued recognition of those inter-
ests and sympathetic treatment of regulations seeking to implement 
them. The Court has not done this. Rather, the Court has struck down 
virtually every legislative attempt to assert these "compelling" interests. 
Thornburgh indicates the extremes to which the Court will go in 
avoiding its own precedent in Roe. 
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Thornburgh observed how these 
state interests had been ignored. First, he noted the state's compelling 
interest in maternal health which Roe established. He declared, "Yet 
today the Court astonishingly goes so far as to say that the State may 
not require that a woman contemplating an abortion be provided with 
accurate medical information concerning the risks inherent in the medi-
cal procedure .... "216 Second, he pointed out the state's compelling 
interest in viable fetal life established by Roe. He then argued that the 
Court's willingness to strike down a second physician requirement (to 
care for viable aborted children) made the conerns of the Court in Roe 
"mere shallow rhetoric."217 He added, "Undoubtedly the Pennsylvania 
Legislature added the ... requirement on the mistaken assumption that 
this Court meant what it said in Roe concerning the 'compelling inter-
est' of the states . . . . "218 
Thornburgh is indicative of the problems Roe engenders. "The 
212. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
213. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69. 
214. /d. at 770-71. 
215. /d. at 758 n.9. 
216. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This subject is further devel-
oped in the informed consent discussion infra section 111-C-3. 
217. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 784 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court struck 
down this statute because it lacked an emergency clause, though a construction allowing one was 
fairly possible. This is further developed in infra section 111-D-3. 
218. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 784 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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soundness of our holdings must be tested by the decisions that purport 
to follow them," observed Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in 
Thornburgh. 219 While Roe rejected abortion on demand,220 Thorn-
burgh indicated that virtually no meaningful state abortion regulation 
would survive-even a requirement that the choice be informed.221 
While Roe recognized a "compelling" state interest in viable fetal 
life,222 Thornburgh indicated that any assertion of that interest would 
be met with hostility. 223 The Thornburgh majority was defensive, in-
transigent, 224 and so restrictive, even by Roe standards, that Chief Jus-
tice Burger, who concurred with the majority in Roe, dissented in 
Thornburgh and called for a reexamination of Roe. 2211 
In sum, as Justice White observed, the majority viewed Pennsylva-
nia's efforts to codify what the Court previously said was allowable 
regulation as "some sinister conspiracy"226 and "change[ d] the rules to 
invalidate what before would have seemed permissible."227 In the pro-
cess, as noted by Justice O'Connor, the Court trampled on accepted 
procedures and rules developed over years of judicial consideration,228 
creating a climate of instability, unpredictability, inconsistency, un-
workability, and unfairness229-the antithesis of the values sought to be 
promoted by stare decisis and the rule of law. 
Throughout the opinion, references were made to Roe. The major-
ity saw Roe as controlling and reaffirmed its "general principles."230 
The dissenters saw Roe as the initial flaw leading to the hostile tone231 
and the unacceptable results of Thornburgh. 232 
This emphasis on Roe as the heart of the matter is significant. 
219. /d. at 785. 
220. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-155. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973)(Burger, 
C.J., concurring)("Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abor-
tions on demand."); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
221. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)("We have apparently al-
ready passed the point at which abortion is available merely on demand. If the statute at issue 
here is to be invalidated, the 'demand' will not even have to be the result of an informed choice."). 
222. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
223. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814 (White, J., dissenting). Especially noticeable in the opin-
ion was the hostility toward the legislature for its "duplicity," signalling a new focus on the state 
legislature's motives. Comment, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians: Return to 
Roer, 10 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'v 711, 724 (1987). 
224. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 814 (White, J., dissenting). 
225. !d. at 785. 
226. /d. at 798 (White, J., dissenting). 
227. /d. (White, J., dissenting). 
228. /d. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
229. /d. at 821, 826-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
230. /d. at 759. 
231. !d. at 788 (White, J., dissenting). 
232. E.g., id. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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Despite sixteen years and numerous decisions, Roe remams the center 
of the controversy. 
Significantly, Roe was decided by seven justices with two dissent-
ing.233 Akron was decided by a six to three majority. 234 In Thornburgh 
the margin was narrowed to five to four, and, in Hartigan, the eight 
member Court divided evenly on the subject of abortion. 235 
Chief Justice Burger, in Thornburgh, declared that the Court had 
left its original consensus of no abortion on demand and, with it, had 
left him behind.236 As shall be demonstrated in the detailed sections 
below, Thornburgh is an excellent illustration of why Chief Justice 
Burger's call for reexamination of Roe was appropriate. 237 
The most significant aspect of Thornburgh was that, in failing to 
overrule (or clarify) Roe, the Supreme Court failed to lead the courts 
and the nation from the moral and political storm in which they have 
trudged since the winter of 1973.238 However, the Thornburgh case did 
233. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973). 
234. Akron, 462 U.S. at 418. 
235. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 749; Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987). 
236. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 782-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
237. /d. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
238. Roe truly has blown out the moral lights around us creating great confusion about the 
proper solutions to the problems an unwanted child conjures up: familial decay, sexual. promiscu-
ity, the plight of women and the poor and the collapse of community. The great change in Ameri-
can politics-the rise of conservatism and the search for new answers to the social conundrums 
spawned by bankrupt liberalism-if not itself a solution is at least evidence of problems that Roe 
has failed to resolve and to which it has, in fact, contributed. Certainly the currents of contempo-
rary American politics gained impetus from the reaction to Roe and its consequences. As of 1985, 
approximately 17.5 million abortions have been performed since Roe. Henshaw, Forrest, & Van 
Vorl, Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 64, table 
I (1987). Abortion is the most common operation performed in this country at about 1.5 million 
per year. F. jAFFE, B. LINDHEIM, & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS: PRIVATE MORAI.ITY AND 
PUBLIC Poucv 7 (1981 ); Henshaw, Forrest, & Blaine, Abortion Services in the United States, 
1981 and 1982, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 119, 120 table I (1984). Approximately one-third of all 
pregnancies end by abortion, and, in many cities, abortions exceed live births. Henshaw, Forrest, 
Sullivan & Tietze, Abortion in the United States, 1979 and 1980, 14 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 5, 6 
table I (1982). The problem of teen pregnancy is also an abortion problem; one-third of all abor-
tions are performed on teenagers. Henshaw, Forrest, Sullivan, & Tietze, Abortion in the United 
States, 1978-1979, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 6, 17 table 10, 18 table II (1981). The easy availa-
bility of abortion may be a cause of family and community decay. While this is not dear, it is clear 
that easy availability of abortion has reinforced broader social trends leading to this unfortunate 
state of affairs. 
Moreover, this superficial solution (abortion) prevents families and society from confronting 
the personal and economic problems involved in unwanted pregnancies. Rather than offering com-
passion and resources to a woman confronted with the dilemma of childbirth or abortion, society 
has elected the easy solution. Perhaps abortion should not even be called an attempted solution. It 
is an attempt to annihilate the problem. 
Widespread abortion has also acted to prevent new, committed family units from developing, 
by depriving numerous couples of an adoptable child. See Wardle, supra note 19, at 243 n.63. 
Other ill effects include women psychologically scarred from the abortion experience and a grow-
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cast some light on the long road out of the national cns1s created by 
Roe. It cast this light indirectly, by providing further evidence that "the 
seminal opinion of Justice Blackmun"239 is not sufficiently principled 
to withstand either the test of time240 or the test of reason. 241 
Thornburgh provided further evidence that any judge who takes 
Roe as a "polestar"242 is assured of getting hopelessly lost in a jurispru-
dential jungle of ill-considered ideas. Roe is neither a measure nor a 
rule of action,243 so perhaps the common argument that Roe is bad law 
is wrong. Perhaps it ought not to be considered law at all. In many 
respects, Roe does not possess those characteristics commonly thought 
essential to law, or it possesses them only minimally. Roe (and its prog-
eny) lacks legal rationality. It claims legitimacy by historical correctness 
rather than by justice. Abortion jurisprudence after Roe is primarily a 
ratification of what is, not a prescription of what ought to be. It ratifies 
what certain doctors and patients do (and what certain "forward-look-
ing" elites think) rather than discussing how they ought to act. 
The doctrine of stare decisis sometimes commands us to obey even 
bad law. 244 Should it require us to adhere to Roe? In an unusual ac-
tion, the United States Justice Department said no, 1s amicus curaie in 
Thornburgh, calling for the reversal of Roe. The government argued 
that "where a judicial formulation affecting the allocation of constitu-
tional powers has proven 'unsound in principle and unworkable in 
practice,' where it 'leads to inconsistent results at the same time that it 
disserves principles of democratic self-governance' [the] Court has not 
hesitated to reconsider a prior decision. " 2411 
This article argues that Roe is such a case. Roe's analysis is funda-
mentally antithetical to the values that underlie the doctrine of stare 
decisis-the rule of law, logical consistency, practical workability, sta-
bility, predictability, and fairness. It is both paradoxical and counter-
ing callousness toward children and other "inconvenient" persons. See id. at 243 n.64. 
239. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 291 
(3d Cir. 1984) rev'd, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
240. A. Cox, supra note 26, at 114; Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
241. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 24; Rice, supra note 20. 
242. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 290-91. 
243. See T. AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA 1-11, Question 90, Art. 1 (giving this definition 
of law). 
244. Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws should be changed; but 
when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution would seem to be 
required. For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and when the advantage 
is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not 
gain so much by making the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience. 
ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, at 2014, 1269a, lines 12-17. 
245. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 21 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985)). 
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productive to invoke stare decisis to perpetuate doctrines that under-
mine the achievement of the ends to which adherence to precedence is a 
means. 
III. THE LEGAL ANOMALIES OF Roe AND ITS PROGENY 
The Roe decision and the subsequent abortion cases, which fol-
lowed Roe's tangential departure from the rest of the law, contain nu-
merous legal anomalies. Some of these have already been demonstrated 
in the discussions of the critiques of Roe, the misapplication of stare 
decisis in abortion law, and the extreme position taken by the Court in 
Thornburgh. 
This section further demonstrates the divergent nature of abortion 
jurisprudence by comparing it with areas of the law relating to abor-
tion. For example, the right to abortion is categorized by the Supreme 
Court as a privacy right. Yet, it is not treated the same as other privacy 
rights. Similar anomalies occur when abortion touches other areas of 
the law, such as fetal rights, medical regulations, and procedural and 
adjudicatory rules. Each of these areas will be discussed individually 
below to demonstrate the disparities. 
As will be seen, the "abortion distortion effect" on the law is con-
sistently making the right to abortion more absolute. This is ironic, as 
the Supreme Court in Roe made much of the fact that the right to 
abortion was not absolute. Justice Blackmon noted that Jane Roe and 
some amici claimed "that the woman's right is absolute and that she is 
entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, 
and for whatever reason she alone chooses."246 The Court disagreed, 
holding that the states had compelling interests in "safeguarding health, 
in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life" at 
certain points in a woman's pregnancy. 247 The Court declared, "The 
privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute."248 
However, John Hart Ely had more insight and foresight than the 
Court. He observed, in 1973, that the Supreme Court had granted the 
abortion right a "super-protected" status.249 He characterized the pro-
tection given abortion as "far more stringent" than that accorded any 
other right, "so stringent that a desire to preserve the fetus's existence is 
246. Roe, 410 US. at 153. 
247. /d. at 154. 
248. /d. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 US. 179, 208 (1973)(Burger, C.J., concurring)("! do 
not read the Court's holdings today as having the sweeping consequences attributed to them by the 
dissenting Justices .... Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires 
abortion on demand."). 
249. Ely, supra note 24, at 935. 
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unable to overcome it-a protection more stringent ... than the present 
Court affords the freedom of the press explicitly guaranteed by the 
First Amendment."2110 
Today, abortion enjoys even greater protection. It is more pro-
tected than any other privacy right. Less protection is provided the fe-
tus in the abortion context than in any other context. Abortion is sub-
ject to less regulation than any other medical procedure. The 
abortionist-patient relationship is more sacrosanct than the doctor-pa-
tient relationship. The progeny of Roe have consistently rejected at-
tempts by the states to assert their "compelling" interests, steadily mak-
ing the abortion right more absolute. Today, abortion is available 
virtually on demand throughout the whole nine months of pregnancy. 
Apart from minor health regulations, the right to abortion has become 
absolute. 
A. Privacy Rights 
The anomalies of abortion jurisprudence may be seen in a com-
parative study of the abortion privacy right and other privacy rights. 
The Court observed in Roe: "The Constitution does not explicitly men-
tion any right of privacy."2111 Yet, the Supreme Court has recognized a 
variety of rights subsumed under the general right of privacy. The pri-
vacy analysis in Roe culminated in the assertion that "the right of per-
sonal privacy includes the abortion decision."2112 Therefore, the exami-
nation of abortion as a privacy right analogous to other privacy rights is 
an essential starting point to determine the permissible scope of state 
abortion regulation. 2113 
1. Roe's privacy analysis 
In brief, Roe's privacy analysis consisted of citations to several 
cases covering a wide variety of subjects (from the fourth amendment 
bar to unwarranted search and seizure to the right to make a living as a 
German teacher), the conclusion that these cases constituted a constitu-
tional right of privacy, the conclusion that the privacy right is broad 
enough to include abortion, an impressionistic discussion of the 
problems of unwanted pregnancy, an assertion that the abortion right is 
not absolute, and a make-weight argument based on prior state court 
250. /d. 
251. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
252. /d. at 154. 
253. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60-61 
(1976) 
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abortion decisions. 254 
The cases cited by the Court did not clearly constitute a right of 
privacy. Two of the precedents cited were search and seizure cases,2511 
two involved telephone taps,256 one involved a court-ordered physical 
examination in a negligence action,257 and one involved the possession 
of obscene matter in one's home. 258 Of this group, none was related to 
abortion. 
The other cases, cited as precedents in Roe, were only slightly 
more related-in the sense that they were related to marriage, family, 
and procreation- to the issue of abortion. Two involved parental rights 
to direct rearing of their own children,259 one involved a prohibition on 
children selling goods in public (with parental permission),260 one in-
volved state prohibition of interracial marriage,261 one involved state 
sterilization of repeat felony offenders,262 and two entailed the use and 
dispensing of contraceptives.263 
Richard Epstein commented on the Court's effort to derive a con-
stitutional right of privacy from these cases. He remarked, "It is diffi-
cult to see how the concept of privacy linked the cases cited by the 
Court, much less ... explains the result in the abortion cases."264 John 
Hart Ely echoed this opinion: "The Court has offered little assistance 
to one's understanding of what it is that makes [the privacy "prece-
dents"] a unit." 265 He concluded, "Instead it has generally contented 
itself with lengthy and undifferentiated string [cites] .... [You] can say 
a bunch of words, but a constitutional connection [should] require 
something more than this."266 
To support its shaky precedential foundation, the Court sought to 
anchor its privacy right, including the right to abortion, in the Consti-
tution. It mentioned various constitutional provisions alleged by others 
254. Ror, 410 U.S. at 1 52-'iY. Thi; latter argument demonstrated only that previous state 
court decisions were divided. 
255. Terry v. Ohio, 392 l: S. I (!%H), Boyd v. t:nited .'itates, 111, trs. 616 (1HH6). 
256. Katz v. United States, 3K'J U.S \47 11967), Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S 438 
(1928) 
257. t:nion Pac. R). v Bot>lonl, 141 t:.S 250 (1891). 
258. Stanley v. (;eor~ia. 394 U.S. 557 (I %9). 
259. Pierce v. Societv of Sisters, 268 l 1 S. 510 (1'J2'J), Meyct v "ir·braska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) 
260. Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S l.'lH 11944 ). 
261. Loving v. Virginia. 3HH l1 S. 1 ( 1% 7). 
262. Skinner v. Oklahoma, ·;I(; U.S 5:\5 ( 1942). 
263. Eisemtadt v. Bairn, 41" U.S 4\B (1972); Criswold v. Connecticut .. 1KI U.S 479 
(1965) 
264. Epstein. supro nnte :lil. ;,t 170. 
265. Ely, Foreword: On /Ji,,-overing Fundamental Value.\, '!2 BAR\' l. RFv. S ( 1978). 
266. /d. 
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to provide such an anchor. The Court selected substantive due process, 
"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty," 
as the source of the Constitutional right of privacy.267 As discussed ear-
lier in this article, such analysis is highly suspect-as violative of the 
rule of law and the constitutional separation of powers-and had previ-
ously been rejected by the Court and legal scholars.268 
However, the Court not only failed to show how the cases it cited 
added up to anything, but it also failed to show how a right of privacy, 
if indeed such a right existed, could include a right to abortion. It fur-
ther failed to demonstrate, using its chosen form of analysis (substantive 
due process), how a right to abortion could be established from such 
analysis. 
Rather, the Court simply declared that "[t]his right of privacy ... 
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy."269 No logical connection was given. 
Instead, the Court switched immediately to policy arguments. The 
majority fretted that: 
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental 
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the 
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and 
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable . 
. . to care for it. In other cases ... [the] stigma of unwed motherhood 
may be involved.270 
As Ely remarked of this reliance on policy argument, "all of this is true 
and ought to be taken very seriously. But it has nothing to do with 
privacy in the Bill of Rights sense or any other the Constitution 
suggests. " 271 
Next, the Roe Court rejected the argument that the abortion right 
ought to be absolute. In addition to noting compelling state interests in 
maternal health, medical standards, and fetal life, the Court observed 
that one does not have "an unlimited right to do with one's body as one 
pleases .... " 272 Justice Blackmun cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 273 
which allowed compulsory vaccination, and Buck v. Bell, 274 which al-
lowed non-consensual sterilization of mental incompetents, and ob-
267. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
268. See supra section 11-B-1-(a). 
269. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
270. /d. 
271. Ely, supra note 24, at 932. 
272. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
273. 197 U.S. II (1905). 
274. 274 us 200 (I 927). 
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served: "The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this 
kind in the past."2711 
Finally, the Supreme Court cited the decisions of a number of 
lower federal and state courts. 276 This was inconclusive, and showed 
only that the courts were divided on the issue of abortion. It lent no 
credibility to the Court's discovery of a right to abortion. 
Despite the cruciality of the privacy right, the Roe Court's privacy 
analysis was singularly slipshod-a methodological precedent to which 
the Court has adhered in Roe's progeny. The Court failed in Roe, and 
in the subsequent cases, to link abortion and other privacy rights in a 
precise or convincing manner. The sole connection between Roe's dis-
cussion of privacy rights and an abortion right was the bald assertion 
that the former was "broad enough to encompass" the latter. 277 The 
logical link was missing. 
Although this point has been made repeatedly since Roe, the Court 
has been content to parrot its original conclusion. It has recently done 
so in an even more abbreviated form, substituting a few post-Roe pri-
vacy cases for some of the more questionable precedents cited in Roe. 278 
2. Disparate treatment of privacy rights 
The Court's unwillingness or inability to restructure its privacy 
analysis has left it with some tortuous jurisprudential puzzles. For ex-
ample, the central issue of Bellotti v. Baird279 was how to choose be-
tween mutually exclusive privacy rights: the fundamental right of par-
ents to raise their children according to their own lights280 and the right 
of the child to have an abortion. The difficulty of the choice was en-
hanced by the Court's repeated claims that both rights were fundamen-
tal and fundamentally similar, and that the abortion privacy right 
sprang from the familial privacy right. As applied by the Court, the 
abortion rights of minor children supercede parental rights within the 
275. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
276. /d. at 154-55. 
277. !d. at 153. 
278. "Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain 
private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government." Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)(citing Carey 
v. Population Servs. lnt'l (1977), Moore v. East Cleveland (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972); 
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska (1923); 
Whalen v. Roe (1977)(citations omitted)). See also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 426-27 (1983). 
279. 443 US. 622 (1979)(Bellotti (II)). 
280. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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family. 281 
This disparate treatment of the abortion right, as compared with 
other privacy rights, is typical. If abortion is a privacy right similar to 
other privacy rights, then it should be treated similarly to other privacy 
rights rather than being super-protected. Further comparison of judicial 
treatment of abortion with other privacy rights demonstrates the 
incongruity. 
In Roe, the Court began its privacy discussion with a citation to 
Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford. 282 In Botsford, the Court held that 
"in a civil action for an injury to the person, the court [had no legal 
right or power to] ... order the plaintiff, without his or her consent, to 
submit to a surgical examination as to the extent of the injury sued 
for." 283 The underlying rationale for the Botsford holding was that 
every individual has a right "to the possession and control of his own 
person. " 284 
However, the Botsford Court acknowledged that an exception ex-
isted at common law which limits the precedential value of this case for 
a right to abortion. The exception was the "writ de ventre in-
spiciendo. " 2811 This writ authorized examination of a woman, without 
consent, to determine whether she was pregnant. It was issued when a 
woman was convicted of a capital crime "in order to guard against the 
taking of the life of an unborn child for the crime of the mother."286 
Professor John Gorby states that, though this case may indicate a com-
mon law right to privacy, "the common law not only acknowledged a 
right to life in the fetus but also recognized precedence of this right over 
the common law right of privacy."287 
Of course, Roe's own citation of Jacobson and Buck indicates that 
the privacy right to control one's own person is not absolute. In fact, 
the Court suggested that the abortion right might be subject to more 
strictures than other privacy rights because fetal rights must be added 
to the traditional privacy paradigm.288 However, the Court has not al-
lowed more restrictions on abortion than other privacy rights but, in 
fact, has allowed fewer. 
As Justice White observed in his Thornburgh dissent, the Court 
281. Bellotti (II), 443 U.S. at 622. 
282. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). 
283. 141 U.S. at 251. 
284. /d. 
285. /d. at 253. 
286. /d. 
287. Gorby, The 'Right' to an Abortion, the Scope of Fourteenth Amendment 'Personhood,' 
and the Supreme Court's Birth Requirement, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1, 19 & n.95. 
288. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
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has abandoned the application of the Jacobson principle to abortion. 289 
He noted that Jacobson demonstrated that "a compelling state interest 
may justify the imposition of some physical danger upon the individ-
ua\."290 According to Roe, the state interest became compelling after 
viability. 291 Applying the Jacobson principle, a state ought to be able to 
legislate in the interest of protecting the fetus, even at the risk of some 
increase in danger to the woman. 
The Pennsylvania legislature applied this principle in enacting a 
requirement that physicians use the abortion technique most likely to 
allow fetal survival, unless it would impose "significantly greater medi-
cal risk" to the mother. 292 The Thornburgh majority declared this un-
constitutiona\.293 Justice White noted that, according to the majority, 
the state's "compelling interest [could not] justify any regulation that 
impose[d] a quantifiable medical risk upon the pregnant woman."294 
He argued that this was a direct contradiction of Roe's holding that the 
state had a compelling interest so strong that it could "forbid all 
postviability abortions except when necessary to protect the life or 
health of the pregnant woman."2911 The implication of Thornburgh is 
that the privacy right at stake in Jacobson is now absolute (and Jacob-
son is overruled sub silentio), or the Court has abandoned its previous 
holding that abortion is limited, as are other privacy rights. Likewise, 
Chief Justice Burger argued that the Court had left its consensus 
against abortion on demand,296 and Roe's recognition of "another im-
portant and legitimate interest ... protecting the potentiality of human 
life. " 297 As he noted, the concern of Roe "for the interests of the states" 
had been rendered "mere shallow rhetoric" by Thornburgh. 298 
In fact, the only part of the Roe privacy analysis that retained any 
certain validity after Thornburgh was the reference to Buck. The ap-
proval of sterilization for the mentally retarded and uneducated poor in 
BucP99 parallels the fear in Thornburgh that informed consent re-
289. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 809 
(1986)(White, J., dissenting). 
290. /d. (White, J , dissenting). 
291. Roe, 410 U.S at 163. 
292. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768. 
293. /d. 
294. /d. at 808 (emphasis in original). 
295. /d. at 809 (emphasis in original). 
296. /d. at 782-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
297. /d. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (emphasis in original). 
298. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 784 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
299. A recent article demonstrated that Carrie Buck and her daughter were not "imbecilic" 
or "feeble minded." Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CoNST. CoMM. 331 (1985). 
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quirements might discourage abortions. 300 Both promote the same 
theme: The Constitution greatly values unburdening society of the un-
wanted and undesirable. Today, the right to privacy seems to stand less 
for a right of individuals to a sphere of purely personal or intimate 
activity301 than for the right to pursue nineteenth century theories of 
eugenics and social Darwinism.302 In his Thornburgh dissent, Justice 
White observed that Roe "[was] not premised on the notion that abor-
tion [was] itself desirable ( ... as a matter of ... social policy). "303 
However, apart from H.L. v. Matheson, 304 Harris v. McRae, 3011 and 
Maher v. Roe, 306 the Court's subsequent abortion decisions have 
strongly suggested that, at least for some of the Court's members, abor-
tion holds extra-constitutional intrinsic value. 307 Indeed, Justice White 
went on to demonstrate that the Court had not adhered to Roe's pre-
mise that abortion was permissible, but undesirable, by its overreaching 
to invalidate legislation that would have been allowable under the Roe 
rule. 308 
After citing Botsford, the Roe opinion moved to more contempo-
rary cases, and found privacy rights in various constitutional provisions: 
the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments, as well as the 
"penumbras of the Bill of Rights."309 Most of the rights cited there had 
clear roots in the common law and the text of the Constitution. Taken 
together they did not constitute a right broad enough to encompass the 
abortion decision. Unlike the abortion right, these other rights have re-
mained limited and hedged with exceptions justifying state regulation. 
For example, the Roe Court's lone first amendment privacy case 
was Stanley v. Georgia. 310 Stanley stood for the proposition that pos-
session of obscene material within one's home was protected, even 
though the first amendment did not protect its distribution. 3 n This ar-
gument, based on the traditional notion that a man's house is his castle, 
was similar to arguments advanced by the Court in certain search and 
300. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763. 
301. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
302. See Ely, supra note 24, at 947 n.139. 
303. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 797 (White. J., dissenting). 
304. 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
305. 448 U.S. 297 ( 1980). 
306. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
307. Cf Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 796-97 n.5 (White. J., dissenting). 
308. /d. at 797-814 (White. J., dissenting). See also id. at 783 n* (B~rger, C.J., dissenting). 
309. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
310. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
311. "Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not 
think they reach into the privacy of one's own home." /d. at 565. 
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seizure cases312 and in Griswold v. Connecticut. 313 
It is possible to read Stanley as a simple first amendment case 
with little or no implication for a right of privacy.314 However, Stanley 
and other Supreme Court holdings do evince a fear of governmental 
intrusion into precincts traditionally considered private. Nevertheless, 
the right to pornography is very circumscribed. 31 ~ Viewing of pornog-
raphy outside the home, as well as the distribution of pornography, are 
subject to various regulations. 316 
The Stanley opinion is sometimes read as standing for a right to 
receive information.317 However, just as compelling state interests may 
justify restrictions on the right to convey certain forms of information, 
they necessarily justify restrictions on the right to receive information. 
Zoning ordinances burden the rights of purveyors of pornographic films 
as well as their audience. Indeed, the right to receive information may 
be abridged altogether, given a strong enough interest. Child pornogra-
phy may not be distributed even if it meets the Miller v. California318 
obscenity test. 319 School children have no right to deliver lewd speeches 
to their classmates, even if the remarks may be otherwise protected,320 
nor are their first amendment rights unrestricted in school newspa-
pers.321 Clearly, under the family privacy cases, parents may abridge 
the same interest in privacy at stake in Stanley by denying to their 
children the freedom to view pornography. Although the Supreme 
Court does not treat children as adults when it comes to first amend-
ment rights, it very nearly does so when the right at stake is 
abortion.322 
Under Stanley's "right to receive information" language, a state 
could presumably protect this right for both minor and adult females 
regarding abortion information. If a state reasonably perceived a lack of 
information or information imbalance endangering this right, it should 
312. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)(holding that a warrantless arrest of 
a "driving while intoxicated" suspect in his home violated the fourth amendment). 
313. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
314. See Ely, supra note 24, at 930 n.71; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (indicating 
that activity in one's bedroom is not automatically constitutionally protected). 
315. See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126 
(1973). 
316. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); New York v. P. J. Video, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986); Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Young and Renton upheld the zoning of adult theaters. 
317. See Board of Educ. v. Pica, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982). 
318. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
319. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
320. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
321. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 479 U.S. 1053 (1988). 
322. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at, 74; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at, 642-44. 
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be able to mandate the giving of certain information by a physician to 
his patient. 323 Of course, the state could not require the physician to 
mouth state slogans,324 make speculations,325 or relate matters of dubi-
ous veracity. 326 
Pennsylvania perceived that women (minors and adults) who 
sought abortions were not getting all the information they needed to 
make an informed choice. They were not being told enough about the 
maternal health implications of abortion, nor were they being fully in-
formed of programs designed to effect the state's permissible interest in 
"potential life." In response, the state designed neutral, objective infor-
mation to be made available to women who requested it. It was not to 
be forced on anyone. The legislation was accurately tailored to effect 
the woman's right to receive information. It did not force her or her 
physician to adhere to or mouth any official state views. 
Yet, the Supreme Court held that Roe compelled the conclusion 
that this legislation placed an unconstitutional burden on the woman's 
privacy right. 327 It seems odd that a right flowing from Stanley v. 
Georgia would compel such a result, when Stanley was used to support 
the abortion right. 
When Roe was decided, John Hart Ely observed that abortion was 
accorded more stringent protection than the first amendment right to 
freedom of the press, protection "so stringent that a desire to preserve 
the fetus's existence [was] unable to overcome it. " 328 Ely cited 
Branzburg v. Hayes329 to illustrate this point. 
In Branzburg, the state's interest in protecting its citizens, through 
efficient criminal investigations, overrode the first amendment right of a 
journalist to withhold the identity of a source. In Thornburgh, by way 
of contrast, the Court refused to give any scope to the state's equally 
compelling interests in protecting "potential life," maternal health, and 
informed consent. Furthermore, when the abortion right actually 
clashed with the free speech rights of picketers, the outcome was pre-
dictable. In Bering v. SHARE, the Supreme Court of Washington, cit-
ing the need to protect the right to make a choice for abortion set forth 
in Roe, affirmed an injunction limiting the free speech of abortion pick-
323. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)(requiring certain in-
formation disclosure by attorneys). 
324. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (l977)(New Hampshire license plate slogan 
case). 
325. See Akron, 462 U.S. a! 444. 
326. /d. 
327. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759. 
328. Ely, supra note 24, at 935. 
329. 408 U.S. 665 ( 1972). 
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eters, even including limits on words that could be used. 330 Even the 
foundational right of free speech, without which a democracy cannot 
maintain ordered liberty, was subordinated to the abortion right. Ely's 
assessment is as true today as it was sixteen years ago. 
The other privacy rights, which the Roe Court cited along with 
Stanley, were subject to a wide variety of burdens and abridgements by 
various compelling state interests. The fourth and fifth amendment 
opinions illustrate this well. The Court cited Terry v. Ohio, 331 Katz v. 
United States, 332 Boyd v. United States, 333 and Justice Brandeis' dis-
sent in Olmstead v. United States. 334 
Justice Brandeis' dissent is often noted for its description of "[ t ]he 
protection guaranteed by the [fourth and fifth] Amendments .... " 336 
These amendments, he believed, "protect[ ed] Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations," conferring "as 
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. " 336 
The accuracy of his statement is dubious, in light of the constitu-
tional text and the views of the framers. 337 Men who love their privacy 
may love community as much or more. In fact, the very notion of civili-
zation involves some necessary interference with individual privacy.338 
Moreover, this was a dissenting view of the law in 1928, and it is a 
dissenting view today. 339 The Court's fourth and fifth amendment pri-
vacy decisions make clear that there are limits to this sphere of personal 
autonomy. So it is with all of the other privacy rights as well, with the 
exceptions of Roe and its progeny. While the abortion privacy right has 
expanded since Roe, fourth and fifth amendment privacy rights have 
remained limited and, indeed, have been further restricted. 340 
330. 106 Wash. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987). 
331. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
332. 389 u.s. 347 (1967) 
333. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
334. 277 us. 438, 471 (1928). 
335. !d. at 478. 
336. !d. 
337. Even assuming the accuracy of Brandeis' legal argument, it is evident that his assertion 
about the universal love of privacy among civilized men is a rhetorical exaggeration, along the 
lines of his colleague's catchy dictum in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)(Holmes declared, 
"Three generations of imbeciles are enough."). 
338. The current Governors of New York and Massachusetts support both a woman's right 
to have an abortion and the states' right to force drivers to wear seat belts. What do they value 
most? The right to be left alone' The right to life? The right to live in a eivilized and safe 
community? 
339. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986)(Blackmun, j., dissenting). 
340. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 122 (1986)(Brennan, J., concurring in part & 
dissenting in part). 
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Boyd v. United States ,341 cited in Roe, 342 prohibited "a compul-
sory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge 
against him, or to forfeit his property .... " 343 The case contained a 
long discussion of an English precedent, Entick v. Carrington. 344 Ac-
cording to the Court, the case laid down far-reaching principles, apply-
ing to "all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of 
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."345 
However, there was no indication that the Boyd Court thought its 
statement extended beyond the facts of the case. Further, Boyd had 
been repeatedly distinguished and limited, and much of the opinion had 
been dismissed as dicta. 346 In United States v. Doe, 347 Justice 
O'Connor noted that "[ t ]he notion that the Fifth Amendment pro-
tect[ ed] the privacy of papers originat[ ing] in Boyd" was overturned in 
Fisher v. United States346 and that "'[s]everal of Boyd's express or im-
plicit declarations [had] not stood the test of time.' " 349 
Katz v. United States,350 also cited in Roe, 351 held that electronic 
surveillance of private phone calls by the government constituted a 
fourth amendment search and seizure. The Court also cited Terry v. 
Ohio, 352 which held constitutional a weapons search without probable 
cause, provided it proceeded from a reasonable inference and was prop-
erly limited to a search for weapons only. 3113 The privacy right underly-
ing these cases remains; that is, unreasonable searches are barred. 
However, the privacy right is not absolute; exceptions to this traditional 
form of privacy, outlined in these cases, have been created. It should 
also be noted that Terry, also holds that other state interests may justify 
abridging the right in certain circumstances.354 
Examples of the exceptions include the holding by the Court that 
electronic surveillance might be undertaken, without warrant, where 
341. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
342. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
343. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622. 
344. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765) reprinted in MAY's CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND, Vol. 3, (American ed. Vol. 2) chap. 11 (1977). 
345. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
346. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
US. 294,301 (1967). 
347. 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
348. 425 U.S. 391 (1976)(contents of business records ordinarily not privileged). 
349. Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407). 
350. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
351. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
352. /d. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
353. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
354. !d. at 29. 
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there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.366 Also, the Court has 
held that "[ t ]he seizure of property in plain view involve[ d] no invasion 
of privacy and [was] presumptively reasonable, assuming that there 
[was] probable cause to associate the property with criminal activ-
ity."366 No warrant is needed to search a car, including compartments 
not in plain view, when the car is legitimately stopped and there is 
probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed there. 367 
Minors' privacy rights are also subject to special infringement in 
this context. No warrant is needed for searches by educators in schools. 
The searches need only satisfy a reasonableness requirement.368 Fi-
nally, remedies for violations of these rights have been trun-
cated-weakening the exclusionary rule.369 
The point of this analysis is that the justifiable limitations on first, 
fourth, and fifth amendment privacy rights are numerous and signifi-
cant. The limitations allowed on the abortion right are few and insig-
nificant. The absolute right to be secure in one's person and possessions 
may be abridged by g~tting a warrant. It may even be abridged without 
a warrant in certain circumstances. 
Nevertheless, if the state has "probable cause" to believe that it 
could protect both potential life and maternal health by requiring two 
physicians to be present at postviability abortions, it might be prohib-
ited from doing so.360 This, and the striking down of most of the abor-
tion regulations, seems inconsistent with the permissible limits on other 
rights as noted above. 
Following the citations of these search and seizure cases, the Roe 
majority noted, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, that the privacy right 
had also been found in the ninth amendment and in the "penumbras" 
355. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705 (1984); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
356. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 
(1983). 
357. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); United States v. Ross, 665 F.2d 346 (5th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982). 
358. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
359. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See also United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433 (1976). 
360. Such a provision was upheld in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 
(1983), but the Thornburgh Court seemed to suggest that this ruling should be overturned, if it 
was not a dead letter already. The Thornburgh majority went out of its way to indicate that the 
Ashcroft ruling was "by a 5-4 vote, but not by a controlling single opinion .... " Thornburgh, 
476 U.S. at 770. The Court then proceeded to deliberately misread the Pennsylvania provision, 
obviously compatible with Ashcroft, so as to create a constitutional problem with it. Id. at 812 
(White, J., dissenting). Thus, the Thornburgh discussion created more unpredictability, not in 
keeping with the principles underlying stare decisis. See discussion of statutory construction infra 
section 111-D-3. 
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of the Bill of Rights. 361 Griswold, like the first, fourth, and fifth 
amendment cases above, can best be understood as protecting "the sa-
cred precincts of the marital bedroom."362 
The Roe decision also cited Eisenstadt v. Baird363 as authority for 
its abortion right. 364 John Noonan, Jr., now judge on the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, has argued that Eisenstadt is Roe's only true prece-
dent. 36~ He observed this was because Eisenstadt, by extending a right 
formerly "based on the special position of the married" to individuals, 
married or not, "repudiated the legally privileged position of mar-
riage."366 By so doing, the Court "turned the liberty on its head," 
claimed Noonan.367 He added that Eisenstadt was "decided after Roe 
v. Wade had been argued to the Court, so that its revolutionary ration-
ale was probably invented with Roe v. Wade in view."368 
If the right to abortion truly has its roots in marital privacy, one 
would expect that marriage and abortion would be treated similarly. 
However, in contrast to the virtually nonexistent restrictions allowed on 
abortion, there are many common restrictions on the right to marry. 
This is so even though another Supreme Court decision, cited by 
Roe, 369 found marriage to be a "fundamental" civil right of man.370 
Restrictions on marriage include licensing by the state, physical exami-
nations, blood tests (including rubella tests), submission of personal 
data for recordkeeping, number of spouses (no polygamy or bigamy), 
waiting periods, residency requirements, and restrictions on who may 
be married due to age, prior marriage, insanity, sex (homosexual and 
transexual marriage may be barred), membership in the human race 
(no marriage to horses), blood relationship, or possession of certain ail-
ments (including venereal diseases, impotence, drug addiction, alcohol-
ism, epilepsy, and pulmonary tuberculosis). 371 For minors, parental 
consent is required with certain state-created exceptions, and, in one 
state, a court may order premarital counseling for minors, focusing on 
social, economic and personal aspects of marriage, in addition to gener-
361. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86; Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
362. /d. at 485. 
363. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
364. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
365. j. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 21 
(1979). 
366. Id. 
367. /d. 
368. /d. 
369. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
370. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
371. See generally H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 130-54 
(1980). 
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ally applicable three to five day waiting periods. 372 Regulation of mar-
riage ceremonies and the persons performing ceremonies is also al-
lowed.373 The state imposes duties, including support obligations, and 
presumptions, such as that of paternity, based upon marital status. 374 
Dissolution of the marital relationship is also controlled by the state 
and subject to its regulations.375 
The contrast with permissible regulation of abortion is remarka-
ble. For example, while states may require marriages to be licensed, 
Bolton declared that states could not require hospitals performing abor-
tions to be licensed.376 Although waiting periods of three to five days 
from the time of receiving the marriage license to the time of the cere-
mony are common, Akron held unconstitutional a twenty-four hour 
waiting period extending from the time a woman contacted an abor-
tionist until the abortion was performed.377 Despite residency require-
ments for marriage and divorce, Bolton rejected state residency require-
ments for abortion.378 Ignoring the requirement of parental consent for 
minors to marry, Danforth struck down a state statute requiring paren-
tal consent for minors to obtain abortions. 379 While extensive record-
keeping is permitted in marriage regulation, Thornburgh declared state 
recordkeeping regulations for abortion unconstitutional, even though 
confidentiality was guaranteed in the statute.380 And, despite the medi-
cal examinations and tests required for marriage, Akron struck down a 
statute requiring a physician to tell a woman "( t]hat according to his 
best judgment ... she is pregnant" before performing an abortion pro-
cedure on her. 381 
Of course, there are limits on restrictions a state may impose on 
the fundamental right of marriage.382 However, this fundamental right 
372. /d. at 93. 
373. /d. 
374. /d. 
375. /d. at 185-238, 779-1110. 
376. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973). 
377. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 451 (1983). 
378. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 200. 
379. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). 
380. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766 
(1986). 
381. Akron, 462 U.S. at 423 n.5. See also Women's Medical Center of Providence v. Rob-
erts, 530 F. Supp. 1136 (D.R.I. 1982)(holding unconstitutional a provision requiring that a wo-
man be told whether she was pregnant and receive a copy of her pregnancy test prior to any 
abortion procedure). 
382. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Zablocki struck down a Wisconsin 
statute requiring state permission to remarry for non-custodial parents required to make child 
support payments. Permission was predicated on proof that support obligations were current and 
that new obligations of the marriage would not jeopardize the pre-existing obligation of support. 
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of marriage has not been made absolute, as has the abortion right. 
The Roe Court also cited the fundamental liberty of procreation, 
as seen in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 383 to support the right to abortion. 384 
However, the Court's application of this right has not been absolute, as 
has been the application of the right to abortion. John Noonan ob-
served the extinction of the liberty to procreate when it confronted the 
liberty to abort and argued the incongruity of such logic. 385 
Noonan employed a number of prior Court holdings in his argu-
ment. He noted that Skinner "had held that Oklahoma could not steril-
ize a recidivist chicken thief-the right to procreate was so fundamental 
that it could not be arbitrarily taken by the state. " 386 This right, N oo-
nan said, "could reasonably be argued ... [to] include the protection of 
the child procreated throughout pregnancy."387 Noonan continued his 
argument, stating that Loving's right to marry "could reasonably be 
argued ... to include liberty to have children."388 He observed that the 
Court had held that a divorced mother "could not constitutionally ar-
range for the adoption of a child in her custody without giving notice to 
the child's father. " 389 From this it could be argued that a father should 
be entitled to a hearing before losing his child in the mother's womb. 390 
The Court also held that an unwed father had special status in adop-
tion proceedings simply because of his biological connection to the 
child.391 "It could reasonably be argued," said Noonan, "that, if biology 
conferred rights, a father has as much interest in an unborn child of 
eight weeks as in an infant of eight months."392 However, when the 
Court decided the issue of paternal rights versus abortion rights in 
Danforth, it was held that since the State itself lacked the power to veto 
abortion, "the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, 
even the spouse, to prevent abortion .... " 393 The Court missed the 
whole point. The father's right was not derivative from the state, but 
was rooted in familial rights, from whence, purportedly, also sprang 
the right of abortion. The abortion right was found to be absolute, 
however, and overrode all other privacy rights. 
383. 316 U.S. 535 ( 1942) 
384. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
385. J. NooNAN, supra note 365, at 90-95. 
386. Id. at 90. 
387. !d. Otherwise, the right is a mere "liberty to fertilize an ovum ... a good deal less than 
full freedom to procreate." !d. 
388. !d. at 90. 
389. !d. at 90-91 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)). 
390. !d. 
391. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
392. J. NooNAN, supra note 365, at 91. 
393. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69. 
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It might be argued that abortion is fundamentally different from 
these more limited rights and was, therefore, properly given greater 
protection. However, this undercuts the Roe privacy analysis. If the dif-
ference was that fundamental, then the Roe Court was in error in ad-
ducing these other privacy rights as precedent for the abortion right. 
Moreover, the Roe Court acknowledged the differences between the 
rights it cited as precedent and the abortion right, but indicated that 
these differences (including the interests of the unborn fetus) cut in 
favor of limiting the abortion right, not removing most limitations, as 
the Court has subsequently done. 394 
It might be argued that the intrusion of the state into the abortion 
decision is greater than the intrusion involved in an unwarranted 
search and seizure. The felon, incarcerated on the basis of evidence 
seized without a warrant, may have great difficulty in seeing the dis-
tinction. So, also, might the subject of a "Terry" search. 3911 Indeed, the 
Court has never articulated a principle to discriminate between various 
forms of governmental intrusion. It noted that Terry involved "a serious 
intrusion on the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indig-
nity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken 
lightly."396 
Of course, some women refused abortions experience hardship 
during pregnancy and childbirth. But abortion certainly involves a seri-
ous intrusion on the bodily integrity of the fetus, which is arguably 
greater than the hardships on its mother. Again, it seems that the pres-
ence of the fetus complicates the traditional privacy rights paradigm so 
as to justify greater state monitoring of the abortion right. 
Taken as a whole, these cases constitute a discrete right of privacy 
in certain relationships (marital and familial) and in certain places 
(primarily the home). This right may be overridden, given a suffi-
ciently important interest, and sufficient safeguards against abuse. 397 
The Roe Court never articulated the rationale for extrapolating the 
abortion right from these cases. Nor has the Court subsequently pro-
vided a principled rationalization for its disparate treatment of abortion 
and the more traditional privacy rights. 
394. "The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privary. She carries a ... fetus . 
The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy ... or procreation .... " Roe, 
410 U.S. at 159. The Court concluded that a "woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of 
privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly." /d. 
395. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
396. /d. at 17. 
397. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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3. Disparate substantive due process analysis 
The anomalous treatment of the abortion privacy right is also evi-
dent in the Roe Court's employment of its chosen constitutional analy-
sis; substantive due process. Following a cite to Griswold, the Court 
cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 398 one of the few Lochner-era due process 
cases still recognized as good law.399 However, the Meyer case held only 
that a statute forbidding the teaching of German to school children vio-
lated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by depriving 
Meyer of his liberty to engage in his occupation of teaching. 400 While, 
perhaps, lending support to the employment of substantive due process, 
Meyer cannot be precedent for an abortion right. 
The Griswold case itself, with its revival of substantive due pro-
cess, is at the core of the problem.401 As Judge Bork has demonstrated, 
the Constitution protects the rights of majorities in some areas-by 
leaving certain decisions to majority vote-and the rights of minorities 
in other areas-by forbidding majority rule.402 The role of the Supreme 
Court is to determine, by interpretation of the Constitution, whether a 
matter falls in the realm of majority or minority freedom. 403 "Society 
consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain 
enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the 
reach of majorities by, the Constitution."404 Thus, the Court only has 
legitimate power to employ theories given in the Constitution, and the 
imposition of Court members' own value choices is unconstitutional.40~ 
Logically, then, the selection of certain values as "fundamental,'' which 
are not constitutionally mandated, and extending constitutional protec-
tion to them, makes the Court a "perpetrator of limited coups 
d'etat. ''408 
However, even if substantive due process 1s employed by the 
398. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
399. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
400. As a result of subsequent distortion worked by cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 ( 1972), and Roe, many commentators have come to see Meyer as they see Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): A case standing for the broad principle of "freedom of choice 
regarding an individual's personal life" or at least for the idea that the "right to private decision 
making regarding family matters [is] inherent in the concept of liberty." J NowAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA, & J YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 685 (3d ed. 1986). Some dicta in Meyer may 
suggest the latter reading, but a fair reading of Meyer makes it clear that the only problem consid-
ered in Meyer was whether Meyer had a right to teach and whether the right was violated. See 
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 298-99. 
401. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
402. Bork, supra note 88, at 3. 
403. /d. 
404. /d. 
405. /d. 
406. /d. at 6. 
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Court, the abortion privacy right does not result from an application of 
the usual analysis. In effect, the Court employed an unconstitutional 
method of analysis, in violation of the usual rules of that analysis, to 
achieve the abortion privacy right. 
The Roe Court's citation of Palko v. Connecticut407 indicated a 
clear reliance on substantive due process. Substantive due process anal-
ysis first requires the finding of a fundamental right (to be weighed 
against the state interest in regulation). The Court noted the Palko test 
for "fundamental" rights: only those rights "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty" were "fundamental" and, thus, protected by the guar-
antee of personal privacy, rooted in the liberty concept of the fourteenth 
amendment. 408 This implied that "to abolish" the right to abortion 
would "violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' " 409 The 
Palko test served as a bridge between the Court's constitutional analysis 
and the lengthy historical survey that immediately preceded it-a sur-
vey apparently designed to show the fundamentality of abortion prac-
tice to liberal regimes!10 
407. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
408. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Palko, 302 U.S. at 325). 
409. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
410. The Court never explicitly identified the purpose of its historical survey. However, the 
Court did express the belief that its history of abortion afforded insight into appellant's argument 
that abortion was a right guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the 
penumbras of the Bill of Rights, or the ninth amendment. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129. See Tribe, 
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. Rt:v. at 3 
n.13. The prominence of the historical discussion and the constant straining to distinguish away or 
minimize evidence that the practice of abortion was disputed or condemned indicated that the 
Court meant this history to serve as a proof of fundamentality. 
Furthermore, under its own precedent, cited in Palko, the Court had a duty to demonstrate 
that abortion practice was "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental," Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 
(1934)) or that the abortion right was "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." /d. As 
observed by Justice White, "a free, egalitarian, and democratic society does not presuppose any 
particular rule or set of rules with respect to abortion." Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793 (1986)(White, J., dissenting). This, he noted, is rein-
forced by "the fact that many men and women of good will and high commitment to constitutional 
government place themselves on both sides of the abortion controversy." !d. Thus, the Court had 
the obligation to demonstrate that abortion rights had roots in our traditions and collective con-
science. The Court's own historical sketch in Roe refuted that argument. /d. The Court's failure 
to be more explicit about the purpose of its history has led to some confusion about the role of 
history in privacy jurisprudence as a whole. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (Black-
mon, J, dissenting); infra this section, the discussion of Bowers. 
The Roe Court concluded from its historical research that about any regime of ordered liberty 
worth recognizing (excluding the American regime for over a century before Roe) had provided 
abortion rights, at least in the initial stages of pregnancy, which had historically been somewhat 
limited by concerns for fetal life (i.e., the "quickening" distinction) and maternal health. Roe, 410 
U.S. at 139-42. Though the Court never explicitly linked the historical sketch to the rest of the 
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Interestingly, the Roe Court chose to rely on the older Palko lan-
guage, as a test of fundamentality, rather than that of the more recent 
(1968) case of Duncan v. Louisiana.'m In Duncan, the Palko question 
of whether the principle was "essential to a scheme of ordered liberty" 
was modified. The Duncan test was whether the principle was "neces-
sary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty."412 The Court 
did not expressly extend Duncan to substantive due process until the 
1977 case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 413 However, as John 
Hart Ely observed, Palko was of "questionable contemporary vitality" 
when Roe was decided.414 
The Palko test is somewhat artificial416 and difficult to apply. It 
requires the Court to imagine whether there would be a regime of or-
dered liberty if the particular right or procedure at issue did not exist. 
Of course, this almost always requires references to historical particu-
lars, but the analysis is free-wheeling and not tied to the history of any 
particular liberal regime. The Duncan case limited this to Anglo-
American practice and Moore further limited it to institutions "deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."416 
It should be noted that Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ull-
man417 is often cited in the Court's discussions of the test of fonda-
mentality. In Poe, Harlan wrote that the content of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment consisted of "the balance which our 
Nation ... has struck between ... liberty and the demands of organ-
ized society."418 It "is the balance struck by this country, having regard 
to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as 
well as the traditions from which it broke."419 Read as a whole, 
Harlan's opinion seems to consider American history as dispositive. 
Applying the Harlan or Moore420 tests to abortion, the proper 
analysis would have required the Court to determine how abortion has 
traditionally been treated in this country, including deeply-rooted 
opinion, it gave the strong impression that it felt it important that history and constitutional law 
be brought into close harmony. The Court's conclusions on history coincided rather conveniently 
with its constitutional conclusions. 
411. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
412. /d. at 149-50 n.14. 
413. 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 n.12 (1977)(noting the "abstract formula" of Palko, and the more 
restrictive, historically based test of Duncan). The Moore Court followed Duncan. /d. 
414. Ely, supra note 24, at 931 n.79. 
415. L. TRIBE, AMF.RICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § 11-2, at 773 (2d ed. 1988). 
416. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (emphasis added). 
417. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961). 
418. /d. at 542. 
419. /d. 
420. The test of Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), cited in Palko, 302 U.S. 
at 325, gives the same result. 
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American traditions which represented a break from Old World tradi-
tions. 421 A test rooted in American history, while it may not totally 
prevent "judges from roaming at large in the constitutional field,"422 
would at least "impose[] limits on the judiciary that are more meaning-
ful than any based on the abstract formula taken from Palko .... " 423 
Under the Court's own tests, if faithfully followed, it is impossible to 
make a case for an abortion right.'24 This nation's history will not al-
low it. A survey of the history shows Roe's illegitimacy.'26 
As the Roe Court's own evidence showed, from the mid-nineteenth 
421. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 790-91 (White, J., dissenting). 
422. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
423. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04 n.12. 
424. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 791-92 (White, J., dissenting). 
425. /d. As argued by the United States, "[d]ue process analysis ... must ... seek a connec-
tion with the intentions of those who framed and ratified the constitutional text." Brief for the 
United States, supra note 35, at 25. However, "the period between 1860 and 1880 witnessed 'the 
most important burst of anti-abortion legislation in the nation's history.'" /d. (quoting J. MoHR, 
ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POI.ICY, 1800-1900 at 
200 (1978)). Further, the laws were clearly aimed at protecting unborn life and not just maternal 
health. /d. at 26 (citing J. MoHR, supra, at 35-36). The United States' brief declared "that those 
who drafted and voted for the fourteenth amendment would have been surprised indeed to learn 
that they had put any part of such subjects beyond the pale of state legislative regulation." /d. at 
26. 
The historical context is very relevant to the interpretation of the due process clause in that it 
reveals the intent behind the clause. !d. This search for contemporaneous understanding has been 
conducted by the Court in establishment clause cases such as Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 
(1984). Similarly, the Court has employed historical analysis in eighth amendment evaluation of 
the death penalty, fifth amendment treatment of self-incrimination, and sixth amendment evalua-
tion of trial by jury issues. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 26-27. In contrast to the 
straightforward use of history in these cases, argued the United States, the use of history in Roe is 
unclear and "it reaches a conclusion in direct variance with the historical facts recited." /d. at 27. 
The United States, as amicus curiae, also noted the other ways history has been used. First, it 
has been "invoked . . to take account of developments in society and the law." /d. Under this 
approach history has been used as a vector showing the proper application of the original under-
standing to undreamed of developments such as wire-tapping. The original intent is used "for 
developing values implied and inchoate at the point of origin." /d. However, the brief argued that 
whether the vector pointed to a right to travel or a right to attend criminal trials, "the Court has 
always taken pains to trace its point of origin back to specific constitutional provisions by a route 
either inferential or historical." /d. By contrast, Roe omitted these connections. /d. Indeed, the 
fourteenth amendment has been shown to have arisen during a period of "particular stringency" 
in abortion laws. /d. (emphasis in original). Thus, the "historical trajectory" did not support Roe. 
/d. at 28. 
The inferential route, likewise, fails to support Roe. /d. The "germ of a theory" was missing 
from any constitutional passage to support a "general and fundamental right" to abortion. /d. 
Even such an "inferential extrapolation" must be "directly rooted in textually specified constitu-
tional values." /d. Griswold included the notion of a connection "to what went before." /d. (quot-
ing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)). By contrast, Roe was not "anchored 
in text, history, or precedent" but was "an abrupt departure from the Court's prior decisions." /d. 
at 28. All the cases purported to support a "privacy" right "were applications of accepted princi-
ples .... " /d. at 28-29. Therefore, Roe abandoned the normal use of history in constitutional 
analysis. 
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century forward, American statutory law began to break from the com-
mon law tradition in the abortion area.426 The states enacted stringent 
prohibitions on abortion which remained in effect until the Court's rul-
ing in Roe. 427 Even where the law was liberalized, it was much stricter 
than what the Court imposed in Roe. 428 Certainly, American abortion 
rights were not, in the language of Duncan, "fundamental in the con-
text of the criminal processes maintained by the American States."429 
Of course, even under the wider-ranging historical test of Palko, 
the case for the fundamentality of abortion fails. Virtually every aspect 
of the Court's recitation of history has been challenged, either for its 
factual accuracy or for the legitimacy of the inferences which the Court 
drew from its facts. The Court's view of history, as a whole, has been 
thoroughly refuted by a number of scholars. 430 
426. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139. 
427. /d. at 140. 
428. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 205 (1973)(citing MonEL PENAL ConE§ 230.3 (pro-
posed official draft, 1962)(reproduced as Appendix B)). 
429. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968). 
430. As one commentator has noted, "It was only by concentrating on ... the outdated and 
biologically incorrect notions of when human life begins held by our ancestors [the concept of 
"quickening"] that [the Roe Court] was led to assert that historically 'abortion was viewed with 
less disfavor than under most American statutes currently.' " D. Horan, Roe v. Wade: It's Facts 
and Logic Cannot Stand (no date)(unpublished manuscript on file at author's office). In addition, 
the Court relied on dated and skewed evidence of ancient attitudes on abortion. See S. KRASON, 
ABORTION: POLITICS, MoRALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 120-48, 441-83 (1984); Arbagi, Roe 
and the Hippocratic Oath, in ABORTION AND THE CoNSTITUTION: REVERSING Rm: V. WADE 
THROUGH THE CoURTS 159 (D. Horan, E. Grant & P. Cunningham ed. 1987). The Court cited 
Book V of Plato's Republic as authority for the proposition that abortion was commended by the 
ancients. Roe, 410 U.S. at 131. An actual examination of the passage and its context makes it 
doubtful that Socrates was even speaking of abortion, let alone endorsing it, in the argument cited 
by Plato. See S. KRASON, supra, at 124-31. In fact, an examination of Aristotle's argument in 
Book VII of THE LAWS shows he opposed abortion for population control, gave the right, when 
exercised, to the state, not the woman, and opposed it from the point at which his scientific under-
standing indicated that life had begun (40 days for males, 90 days for females). S. KRASON, supra 
at 130. 
The Supreme Court's discussion of historical Christian views and the common law suffered 
from similar defects. While a detailed critique of Roe's historical material is beyond the scope of 
this article, much material is available on the subject. A survey of this literature is sufficient to 
indicate the overwhelming evidence against the Roe Court's view of abortion history. See generally 
Connery, The Ancients and the Medievals on Abortion: The Consensus the Court Ignored, in 
ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: RF.Vt:RSING Rm: V. WADE THROUGH THt: CoURTS at 123; 
j. CONNERY, ABORTION: DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE (1977); S. 
KRASON & W. HaLLBERG, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF ABORTION: THE SUPREME CoURT 
REFUTED (1984); Brown, What the Supreme Court Didn't Know: Ancient and Early Christian 
Views on Abortion, I HuM. LIFE REv. 5 (Spring 1975); Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Su-
preme Court on Abortion, 41 FoRDHAM L. REv. 807 (1973); Dellapenna, The History of Abor-
tion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1979); Horan, Forsythe, & 
Grant, Two Ships Passing in the Night: An lnterpretavist Review of the White-Stevens Colloquy 
on Roe v. Wade, 6 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 229 (1987); Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value 
in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: Lt:GAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (j. 
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Even taking the Roe history at face value, however, there is still 
considerable doubt that it established abortion as fundamental. Under 
Palko, if the Court could imagine a scheme of ordered liberty that did 
not include the abortion right, the right was not fundamental. The 
American system discussed in the Court's history presented just such a 
scheme. Ely concluded that the Court's survey "surely d[id] not seem to 
support the Court's position, unless a record of serious historical and 
contemporary dispute was somehow thought to generate a constitu-
tional mandate. " 431 
However, the invocation of Palko enabled the Court to multiply 
examples of permissible abortion: to roll the constitutionally relevant 
history all the way back to ancient Greece. 432 This maneuver provided 
a few more allegedly pro-abortion precedents for the Court and bol-
stered the impression that approval of abortion had roots deep in West-
ern history. Moreover, the expansion of the relevant history enabled the 
Roe Court to portray the enactment of tough anti-abortion statutes, in 
effect in America for over a century before Roe, as freak developments 
in the history of ordered liberty. 433 
In sum, the Roe Court's substantive due process analysis, trun-
cated as it was, was anomalous in comparison with the application of 
the analysis in other privacy cases. This may also be seen from the 
Court's treatment of another privacy claim: Bowers v. Hardwick. 434 
4. Roe v. Wade contrasted with Bowers v. Hardwick 
In Bowers v. Hardwick, 436 the Court, employing a history of 
Western attitudes toward sodomy, concluded that there was no funda-
mental right to commit sodomy under either the Palko or the Moore 
test. 436 Yet, the historical case for the fundamentality of abortion is no 
more convincing than the historical case for sodomy. The Roe majority 
Noonan ed. 1970). 
431. Ely, supra note 24, at 925 n.42. See also Epstein, supra note 30, at 167; Thornburgh, 
476 U.S. at 793 (White, J., dissenting). 
432. It actually reached back to the Persian Empire, "where criminal abortions were severely 
punished." Roe, 410 U.S. at 130. But, since Persia was a "tyranny," its history was presumably 
irrelevant to any test concerned with "ordered liberty." 
433. The Court adduced contemporary opinions of elite groups, such as the AMA and ABA, 
as further evidence that the American practice regarding abortion before the 1970's was on the 
wrong side of history. Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-47. 
434. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
435. /d. 
436. ld. at 192. Cf The Supreme Court /985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 215 
(1986)("Hardwick indicates that rather than protecting an individual's freedom to make decisions 
fundamental to herself or himself, the right of privacy is limited to particular, traditional catego-
ries of private life."). 
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cited Plato's REPUBLIC as evidence of abortion's deep roots in our cul-
tural traditions!37 The Bowers majority apparently did not deem this 
sort of evidence as worthwhile!38 Plato's dialogues contain numerous 
allusions to the practice of homosexual sodomy among the ancients.439 
The Roe approach suggested that a shift of opinion, in favor of 
abortion, among selected elites and in a few states was constitutionally 
significant. The Bowers opinion saw little constitutional significance in 
the lack of enforcement of sodomy laws generally and repeal of such 
laws in many states.440 These trends did not indicate a fundamental 
right. The comparison of the historical analysis employed in Roe with 
that used in Bowers indicates that, if the Texas abortion law challenged 
in Roe were subjected to the same analysis as the Georgia sodomy stat-
ute in Bowers, the abortion law would have been upheld. The Bowers 
analysis was more rigorous than that of Roe. The grasping at historical 
straws besmirching Roe was absent in Bowers. The Bowers history was 
certainly not complete, but it was not glaringly inaccurate. Nor did it 
have to be complete. It need only have shown that the practice was not 
rooted in the traditions of this nation nor essential to a scheme of or-
dered liberty. 
The Bowers and Roe cases were inconsistent. in other respects. As 
demonstrated above, traditional privacy precedents placed limited pro-
tection around places where privacy could reasonably be expected. This 
protection was provided where the interest of the government in intrud-
ing in those places, without proper safeguards, was outweighed by the 
potential of abuse inherent in the intrusion. The privacy right claimed 
by the plaintiff in Bowers fit much more easily into this line of cases 
(e.g., Stanley, Katz, and Griswold) than the privacy right claimed by 
Jane Roe. 441 All other things being equal, the right to privacy cannot 
logically justify unlimited access to abortion and, nevertheless, permit 
local police to selectively enforce long dormant sodomy statutes by en-
tering into a private home. 
Under privacy jurisprudence as it now stands, the government 
may not involve itself in the abortion decision in any meaningful way. 
Yet, it may completely abridge the decision to engage in certain consen-
437. Roe, 410 U.S. at 131. 
438. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94 (no mention whatsoever of instances in ancient texts where 
the practice of homosexuality is condoned). 
439. See PLATO, PHAEDRUS. Cf Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A Constitu-
tional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1985)(employing a Roe and Bowers type of historical analysis 
to find no constitutional right to suicide despite some approval of the practice in some parts of the 
ancient world). 
440. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94. 
441. See id. at 195. 
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sua! sexual encounters-encounters that directly affect the legitimate 
interests of other non-consenting parties to a much lesser extent than 
the abortion decision. 
By any prudent measure, the state's interest in regulating abortion 
is at least as great as its interest in nabbing homosexuals in flagrante 
delicto. As the Roe Court noted, a responsible and responsive govern-
ment must necessarily be permitted to regulate abortion for a variety of 
compelling reasons. Government has a legitimate interest in protecting 
potential life, in maintaining medical standards, and in preserving ma-
ternal health, including mental and physical well-being. 
The social implications of the mass practice of abortion as an al-
ternative form of birth control are grave. The government is necessarily 
desirous of minimizing these ill effects. On the other hand, the practical 
reasons for upholding the Georgia sodomy law seem no more compel-
ling. True, upholding sodomy laws has a symbolic value. The health 
implications of sodomy practice are legitimate state concerns, but the 
Court gave these no overt consideration in the Bowers decision. More-
over, even if a sodomy right were declared a fundamental privacy right, 
the state would be free to show that these interests were compelling 
enough to justify abridgement of the right. 
It might be argued that the inconsistency between Bowers and 
abortion jurisprudence is more apparent than real. Four of the five 
members of the Bowers majority were dissenting in Thornburgh; the 
four Bowers dissenters have consistently voted to reaffirm Roe. It ap-
pears that only Justice Powell's position as a supporter of both a broad 
privacy right in Thornburgh and a circumscribed privacy right in Bow-
ers is inconsistent. 442 
However, the consistency of the dissenters in Bowers should not be 
readily presumed. It is interesting to note that the author of Roe, Jus-
tice Blackmun, who relied so extensively on history and the sanction of 
custom to justify that opinion, completely renounced the historical ap-
proach of Bowers. 443 He rejected the history of Anglo-American sod-
omy laws as irrelevant because of "[ t ]he theological nature of [their] 
origin."444 Since much Anglo-American law has a theological origin, it 
appears that, for the Bowers dissenters, Anglo-American legal history is 
442. !d. ill 197 -9R. 
44.1. In this, Justice Blarkmun was joined by Justices Brennan ilnd Marshall, two original 
subscribers to Roe, as well as Justice Stevens, a latecomer to the pro-abortion majority, but a 
strong defender of Roe. Justice Blackmun asserted, "I cannot agree that either the length of time a 
majority has hrld its conviction or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legisla-
tion from this Court's scrutiny." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210. 
444. !d. at 211-12 & n_(, 
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no guide to the determination of fundamental rights.446 
Another Bowers dissenter, Justice Stevens, has argued forcefully 
for an historical approach and has "conscientiously, indeed passion-
ately, sought to discern and apply the Framers' intent in construing a 
constitutional provision."446 One of three cases where he forcefully ar-
gued for such an approach, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 447 
was decided two weeks after the Thornburgh abortion case, in which 
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, ridiculed such an approach by 
Justice White in the abortion context. Thus, Justice Stevens is a pow-
erful advocate for interpretivism, except where it interferes with abor-
tion or homosexual practice. It has been observed that this inconsistency 
boils down to a "whose-ox-is-gored" approach, which "is neither a 
principle of constitutional construction nor a principled manner of in-
terpreting the Constitution."448 
Apart from these apparently anomalous rejections of the worth of 
historical analysis, other inconsistencies are present. In Bowers, Justice 
Blackmun rejected theologically based law as a guide. However, in Roe, 
he approvingly cited ancient religious attitudes as well as canon law 
treatment of the unquickened fetus as evidence of an historical accept-
ance of abortion, at least in the early stages of pregnancy.449 Moreover, 
the Roe opinion impliedly analogized from this history to the constitu-
tional conclusion that the abortion right cannot be abridged at all in the 
first trimester. 460 
In the light of Bowers, one wonders anew about the purpose of 
Justice Blackmun's historical survey in Roe. Did he believe it was rele-
vant? Was it simply an elaborate mystification disguised to cloak the 
real policy reasons for Roe and the lack of traditional constitutional 
analysis? There is some evidence for this. 
445. See H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE fORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION ( 1983). 
446. Horan, Forsythe, & Grant, supra note 430, at 263. 
447. 478 us 1 (1986) 
448. Horan, Forsythe, & Grant, supra note 430, at 267. 
449. Roe, 410 U.S. at 133-34, 160-61. 
450. Such "acceptance" of early abortion in the historical survey made the first trimester 
regulations seem normative. The Court failed to draw the logical conclusion from the quickening 
distinction that for centuries the unborn were protected from the earliest time when the science of 
the day indicated that human life existed. In the nineteenth century, when science discovered that 
life existed from conception, doctors led the way in persuading the legislatures to push abortion 
protection back to conception. This latter approach was consistent with the quickening distinction 
of the common law, as the Roe approach was not. The Court conveniently overlooked this power-
ful evidence that abortion laws were written to protect fetal life, and not just to protect maternal 
health. /d. Of course, the science of conception has not been altered. The underlying rationale of 
the abortion laws remains unchanged. However, the ruling members of the medical profession 
have altered their positions, apparently for reasons other than scientific facts. 
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First, the history in Roe does not prove what the Court suggests it 
proves. Second, the Court never explicitly says it is supposed to prove 
anything. Finally, in Bowers, Justice Blackmun claims that the princi-
ple linking abortion and other fundamental privacy rights is their cen-
trality to the lives and importance to "the happiness of individuals."41n 
In doing so, he implies that this factor is what makes these rights fun-
damental, not their importance in our history or collective conscience. 
Of course, the test for fundamentality has never been, and cannot 
be, the Supreme Court's own estimate of a right's importance. The 
right to an education is as important as these other rights, perhaps 
more important. Yet the Court has never recognized it as fundamen-
tal.4112 Other important needs, such as the need for economic security, 
have never been recognized as fundamental. 
Justice Blackmun's language in Bowers suggests that the most im-
portant part of the Roe Court's privacy analysis is the paragraph la-
menting the problems of unwanted pregnancy. Yet, the Supreme Court 
could never have submitted an opinion grounded solely on this reason-
ing. It needed a legal analysis that included an historical justification of 
the fundamental status of abortion. Since the analysis the Court 
achieved was insufficient, the Court left the purposes of the various 
parts of its argument vague. As noted above, the opinion does not rea-
son to a result as much as it evokes one. The upshot of this analysis is 
that Roe cannot stand without an historical argument of fundamentality 
and it cannot stand with one. The argument that Roe's historical analy-
sis was a result-oriented mystification seems compelled if we take Jus-
tice Blackmun's Bowers dissent seriously. 
It is clear that the position of Justice Blackmun and the other 
three who joined him in the Bowers dissent is no more consistent with 
the analysis of Roe than the position of the Bowers majority. The Bow-
ers opinion has compounded the problems of abortion jurisprudence. 
The Thornburgh opinion rendered the abortion right more incoherent, 
but Bowers expanded the analytical gulf between abortion jurispru-
dence and the privacy jurisprudence to which it is purportedly linked. 
Even more disturbing is the confusion over the proper test for 
fundamentality evident in Bowers-confusion likely stemming in part 
from the vagueness of Roe on this point. Is the Palko test appropriate? 
Is Moore? Or is history irrelevant, as the Bowers dissenters suggest? 
This confusion reminds us that the fundamentality of the abortion 
right has not been satisfactorily determined under any test. The argu-
451. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting). 
452. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973); cj: Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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ment put forward in Roe convinced none of the commentators. The 
analysis employed by the Bowers majority suggests that the abortion 
right could not have passed muster if Justice Powell had voted consist-
ently with Bowers. Finally, no satisfactory alternative rationale for the 
fundamentality of abortion has ever been offered by its Supreme Court 
defenders (nor by other writers). 
Indeed, a recent exhaustive analysis of abortion history and law 
demonstrated that an abortion right has never been "a liberty in Amer-
ican Law or tradition,"4~3 let alone a fundamental liberty. The writers 
of that analysis added, "To the contrary, it is the protection of the life 
of the unborn child as a human being that is 'deeply rooted' in Ameri-
can Law. Roe v. Wade cannot be supported by any values that are 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.""~" 
In light of this, the Court owes the country a re-evaluation of Roe 
with a plausible, reasoned justification and more principled guides to 
the regulation of the abortion right. Failing this, Roe should be over-
ruled and the regulatory authority over abortion should revert to the 
states. 
There is nothing in the Roe privacy analysis, or in the privacy 
jurisprudence as a whole, to justify continued adherence to Roe. The 
citation of cases in Roe, involving marriage, family, sex, and procrea-
tion, are insufficient to justify a fundamental right to abortion. The 
development of these rights has been so inconsistent with the develop-
ment of the abortion right that a rethinking of the current approach to 
abortion jurisprudence is now needed.u~ 
453. Horan, Forsythe, & Grant, supra note 430, at 311. 
454. !d. 
455. Perhaps the best illustration of the disparity between the traditionally cited privacy 
rases and abortion jurisprudence is found in the treatment of the family. As has already been 
noted, when the fundamental right of parents to direct the rearing of their children collided with 
the fundamental right of the child to have an abortion, the latter right prevailed. 
In abortion rontexts, the family has been painted in the bleakest possible terms to make the 
rejection of a parental consent or notice requirement seem reasonable. For example, in Hodgson v. 
Minnesota. 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir. 1987)(reh'g granted, vacated, 835 F.2d 1545, rescinded 835 
F.2d 1546) the Eighth Circuit recently held that a state may not require notification (whenever 
possible) of both parents, prior to their child obtaining an abortion. The appellate court upheld 
the district rourt's findings that there was a large number of divorces in Minnesota, that many 
minors did not live with their parents, that many minors were from "dysfunctional families [and] 
'live in fear of violence by family members,' " that notification would "only add to the magnitude 
of the problem of family violence,'' and that notifying a non-custodial parent could be harmful. /d. 
at 1198 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 768-69 (D. Minn. 1986)). 
Ironically, this bleak view of the family is in stark contrast to the rosy picture painted of the 
physician-patient relationship. The Supreme Court consistently rejects evidence that some abor-
tion-clinic dortors are greedy, unscrupulous, and unsafe. Instead, it consistently portrays the whole 
mediral profession in an idealistic fashion. 
A second stark contrast is the portrayal of the family in other contexts. In Parham v. J. R., 
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B. Fetal Rights in Legal Contexts Other Than Abortion Law 
The anomalies of abortion jurisprudence may also be seen by a 
comparison of the rights of the unborn in abortion law with their rights 
in other legal contexts. Before reviewing fetal rights in these other con-
texts, here is a brief criticism of the legal status of fetal life which Roe 
perpetuated. 
The Court referred to the legal status of fetal life in three contexts: 
( 1) An inconclusive history of the legal treatment of the fetus,456 (2) A 
discussion of personhood in the Constitution,457 and (3) An analysis of 
the legitimate state interest in protecting "potential" life. 458 Subsequent 
Supreme Court opinions concerning the legal status of fetal life in any 
of the three contexts have not been rigorously principled. Nor have they 
adequately given effect to that legal interest especially given the extent 
to which fetal rights are protected in tort, property and criminal law!119 
Furthermore, despite having imposed national guidelines on abortion, 
the Court has brought no rationality to laws regulating treatment of the 
fetus. On the contrary, it has made a consistent and principled policy of 
protecting unborn life almost impossible. The Court has quite possibly 
aborted the nascent trend toward legal recognition of the dignity of un-
born life. As Justice O'Connor has argued, the treatment accorded fetal 
life in abortion jurisprudence is illogical460 since the state's interest in 
442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Court rejected a district court's holding that an adversarial, judicial-type 
hearing was required by due process for parental commitment of minor children to mental institu-
tions. !d. at 607. The Court noted that such a hearing to challenge the parent's decision posed a 
danger of "significant intrusion into the parent-child relationship." !d. at 610. The Court added: 
"Pitting the parents and child as adversaries often will be at odds with the presumption that 
parents art in the best interests of their child." ld. This presumption seems non-existent in abor-
tion cases. 
Finally, the contrast is also observable in Bowen v. American llosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 
( 1986), in which the Court repeatedly referred to decisions for nontreatment by parents of handi-
capped newborns. !d. at 631-39. The Court evinced no concern over the right of parents to make 
such nontreatment decisions. !d. at 636 n.22. The notion of leaving the matter in the parents' 
hands, without governmental intrusion, underlay the whole opinion. 
Although such a "laissez-faire" approach is inappropriate in cases such as Bloomington's 
Baby Doe, uecause human life is at risk, the Court finds it appropriate. But, when parents might 
select a "nontreatment" of the pregnancy of their minor child, believing it to be in her best inter-
est, the privacy right of parents to rear their own children is no longer compelling. Even notifying 
the parents may be taboo, because parents who may be trusted to have their children's best inter-
ests at heart when deciding that they should not receive neonatal surgery, or when committing 
them to a mental institution, suddenly lose their competency to determine best interest when the 
subject is abortion. 
4 56. Roe, 410 U S. at 159-62. 
457. !d. at I 56-59. 
458. !d. at 154, 159, 16S. 
4S9. See infra section III-B-1, 2, & 3. 
460. Akron, 462 US. at 459 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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protecting life exists throughout pregnancy.461 
Back, then, to a discussion of fetal rights in other legal contexts. 
Not only is abortion jurisprudence internally incoherent in regard to 
the protection of fetal life, it is inconsistent with related areas of law as 
well. In these related areas fetal rights are given greater protection. 
Some jurisdictions even recognize pre-conception torts as well as the 
more usual variety of prenatal harms and interests. Although criminal 
and tort protection of the fetus is inadequate,462 the protection of "po-
tential" life in the abortion context seems uninformed by the protection 
offered in these related areas. 463 
1. Fetal rights in tort law 
The law of torts has seen a dramatic change in the past ninety 
years. The rights of the unborn child have moved from a position of 
little legal protection to a position where even preconception wrongs are 
recompensible. As duties to the fetus increase, the foundation upon 
which Roe sits erodes, turning it into the exception rather than the rule 
in defining the personhood of the fetus. 
The first American case which dealt with fetal injury was the cele-
brated opinion by then Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Dietrich 
v. Northampton. 464 Holmes interpreted the Massachusetts wrongful 
death act to preclude recovery for the death of a four to five month old 
fetus. 4611 He held that "the unborn child was a part of the mother at the 
time of injury" and that "any damage to [the fetus] which was not too 
remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her."466 Dietrich 
was widely followed by other courts until 1946.'67 Holmes' approach 
was buttressed by concern with problems of proving causation, and fear 
that allowing recovery would lead to fictitious claims.'68 
461. !d. at 459, 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
462. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of 
Human Life, 22 HARV. J. oN LEGIS. 97 (1985). 
463. Roe is sometimes read by lower court judges (and legislatures, too, no doubt) to preclude 
protettion of fetal life, not just prior to viability but in a variety of criminal law contexts as well. 
For example, some courts have concluded that Roe makes feticide during the first three months of 
pregnancy unpunishable. Another struck down a statute requiring disposal of fetal remains "in a 
manner consistent with ... other human remains" because, it reasoned, Roe does not permit the 
treatment of a fetus as a human being in any context. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 
221 (E.D. La. 1980)(striking LA.Rt:v.STAT.ANN. § 40:1299.35.14 (1977)). 
464. 138 Mass. 14 ( 1884 ). 
465. The fetus lived for "ten or fifteen minutes" after premature birth. Dietrich, 138 Mass. 
at 15. Nevertheless, the court referred to the newborn as an "unborn child." !d. at 17. 
466. !d. at 17. 
467. PROSSER AND Kt:t:TON ON TH~: LAW OF ToRTS 367 (W. Keeton ed. 5th ed. 1984). 
468. !d. See, e.g., Magnolia Coca Cola Bouling Co. v. Jordan, 124 T('x. 347,78 S.W.2d 944 
(1935). 
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Dietrich did not go uncriticized, however. In 1900, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois followed the reasoning of Dietrich in Allaire v. St. 
Luke's Hospital."69 Justice Boggs issued a strong dissent, attacking the 
idea that the fetus was a part of the mother: 
Medical science and skill and experience have demonstrated that at a 
period of gestation in advance of the period of parturition the foetus is 
capable of independent and separate life, and that though within the 
body of the mother it is not merely a part of her body, for her body 
may die in all of its parts and the child remain alive and capable of 
maintaining life when separated from the dead body of the mother.470 
Though medical knowledge of the separateness of the fetus from the 
mother was recognized at the turn of the century, the tort-related legal 
rights of the unborn were slow in coming. 
Recovery for prenatal injuries was finally allowed in 1946, in 
what William Prosser called "the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a 
well settled rule in the whole history. of the law of torts."471 In Bon-
brest v. Kotz, 472 a federal court allowed the plaintiff infant to recover 
for injuries sustained when he was negligently taken, as a viable fetus, 
from his mother's womb by the defendant doctor!73 The reasoning in 
Bonbrest (which closely followed that of Justice Boggs in his earlier 
dissent) stated: 
As to the viable child being 'part' of its mother-this argument seems 
to me to be a contradiction in terms. True, it is in the womb, but it is 
capable now of extrauterine life-and while dependent for its contin-
ued development on sustenance derived from its peculiar relationship 
to its mother, it is not a 'part' of the mother in the sense of a constitu-
ent element-as that term is generally understood. Modern medicine 
is replete with cases of living children being taken from dead mothers. 
Indeed, apart from viability, a non-viable foetus is not part of its 
mother.474 
As to the difficulty of proof of such claims, the court stated: 'The law 
is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical science cer-
tainly has made progress since 1884. We are concerned here only with 
the right and not its implementation."4711 
Since Bonbrest, every state has recognized prenatal harm as a le-
469. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). 
470. /d. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641. 
471. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971) 
472. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). 
473. /d. at 143. 
474. Id. at 140. 
475. /d. at 143. 
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gitimate cause of action for a child subsequently born!76 Compensation 
for prenatal injuries has also been allowed under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act in an action against the United States.477 Some states limit 
recovery to post-viability injuries, but the clear trend is toward recovery 
for all prenatal harm!78 
The justifications given for discarding the viability test vary. In 
Smith v. Brennan,479 the New Jersey Supreme Court found that age is 
not the only determinant of viability, and, in borderline cases, there is 
no principled way to determine viability!80 The court said: 
We see no reason for denying recovery for a prenatal injury because it 
occurred before the infant was capable of separate existence. Whether 
viable or not at the time of the injury, the child sustains the same 
harm after birth and therefore, should be given the same opportunity 
for redress. 481 
A New York appellate court in Kelly v. Gregort82 (the first court 
to reject the viability standard) focused on the issue of biological sepa-
rability: "[L]egal separability should begin where there is biological 
separability."483 Here, as in other related areas of the law, medical sci-
ence empowered the engine for legal change. The court noted such 
knowledge, especially that dealing with fetal development, as a factor in 
helping to lead to this rule. 484 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has dropped the viability test 
in favor of a causation test: "With us the test will not be viability but 
causation, and our inquiry will be whether the damage sustained is 
traceable to the wrongful act of another."485 This causation test seems 
more rational and logical than a viability test, which has been criticized 
476. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 467, at 368. 
477. Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960). A cause of action for prenatal 
injuries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) was recognized in Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. 
Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982). The Court held that, for purposes of§ 1983, a fetus was a "person" 
within the meaning nf the statute. Contra Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 
1981)(decided on virtually identical facts); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla 1974), 
ajj'd in part, 516 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1975); McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 
751 (W.O. Pa. 1972), affd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally Note, Douglas v. Town 
of Hartford: The Fetus as Plaintiff Under Section 1983, 35 ALA. L. REV. 397 (1984); Note, The 
Fetus Under Section 1983: Still Struggling for Recognition, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1029 (1983). 
478. PRoSSER AND KEETON, supra note 467, at 368-69; Note, The Law and the Unborn 
Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NoTRE DAME LAw. 349, 357 (1970). 
479. 31 N J 353, 1'i7 A.2d 497 (1960). 
480. 1d. at 367, 157 A.2d at 504. 
481. :d. 
482. 2H2 A.D. 542, 125 NY.S.2d 696 (1953) 
483. 1d. at 543, 125 N Y.S.2d at 697. 
484. 1d. at 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d at (,97-98. 
485. Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 79, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (1966). 
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as arbitrary and transient. 486 The disallowance of claims for injuries in 
the first trimester may well be the denial of the most meritorious and 
seriously harmful claims."'87 Though causation may be difficult to de-
termine, most courts seem to realize that such difficulty should not be a 
bar to the action, but something to be handled in the courtroom. Recent 
medical advances make proof of medical causation increasingly 
reliable."'88 
2. Fetal rights in wrongful death actions 
Under the language of most wrongful death statutes, recovery is 
only possible if the death was suffered by a "person."489 Since wrongful 
death is a statutory right, the nature of the right depends on the provi-
sions in the individual statutes. Most of the statutes are death acts 
which create a new cause of action for the death of a person "in favor 
of a representative and for the benefit of certain designated persons."490 
Other statutes are survival acts which preserve a cause of action for 
"damages resulting from the victim's death as well as damages accrued 
at the moment he died."491 These survival acts allow suits to be 
486. See, e.g., Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 131, 141-44 (1979); Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for In-
jury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Lzfe, 1978 DtrKF 
L.J 1401, 1414-20. 
487. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. RFv. 579, 589 (1965) 
488. PRoSSER AND KEETON, supra note 467, at 369. In the parent-child relationship, there 
has been substantial limitation on tort liability. Generally, an unemancipated minor child is im-
mune from tort liability for injury to his parents. See generally 67 A C.JS Parent & Child 
(1978). § 128. In addition, an unemancipated minor child has no right of action against a parent 
for the tort of the parent /d. at § 129; Annot, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated 
Child Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4TH 1066 (1981)(hereinafter Li-
ability of Parent). This intra-family immunity has been justified by the necessity for the protection 
of family peace and tranquility and by the concern that any change in the rule would interfere 
with the rights and obligations of parents with respect to the discipline, control, and care of their 
children. /d. at 1072. Some courts, however, have abrogated the intra-family tort immunity doc-
trine to allow a child to maintain an action against his parents for ordinary negligence, except 
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child or where it 
involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with regard to the provision of food. clothing. 
housing, medical and dental care. /d. at 1113. See, e.g., Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 
N.W.2d 169 ( 1972). In 1980, a Michigan court of appeals, in Grodin v. Grodin, indicated a 
woman would be liable to a child for taking medicine while pref(nant which caused the child's 
teeth to be discolored. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869. Whether the l\lichigan holding is 
followed or not, it is apparent that the unborn have strong and increasing rights in tort law. In the 
tort category of wrongful death actions the same trend may be seen. See infra. 
489. Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639, 
656 (1980). 
490. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 467, at 946. 
491. /d. 
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brought by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate.492 
States have both wrongful death and survival provisions, usually en-
coded in the same statutes.493 
Courts generally allow recovery under the wrongful death statutes 
where a viable unborn child is injured, born alive, and then dies.494 
This also seems to be the case for nonviable unborn children who are 
born alive and then die.m; The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, in Torigian v. Watertown News Co.,"96 allowed recovery on be-
half of an infant who died two and a half hours after birth as a result 
of injuries sustained in the fourth month of gestation. The court rea-
soned that there was no sound distinction between the viable and non-
viable situations, and that the "vast majority" of cases allowed tort re-
covery to children who were injured when nonviable. 497 The child was 
held to be a "person" within the meaning of the Wrongful Death 
Act."98 The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Wolfe v. Isbell," 99 granted 
an action to a nonviable child who was subsequently born alive and 
lived for fifty minutes. On the viability question, the court cited approv-
ingly a Wisconsin Supreme Court holding: 
[A] child is no more a part of its mother before it becomes viable that 
[sic] it is after viability, and ... it would be more accurate to say that 
the fetus from conception lived within its mother rather than as a part 
of her.~00 
The court then reasoned: 
It follows that the right to maintain an action for the wrongful death 
of an unborn child depends on the right of the particular child, if he 
had survived, to maintain an action for injuries sustained. 501 
A significant development in this area of tort law was the evolu-
tion of the right to maintain a wrongful death action where the injured 
child was stillborn. The first case to allow such an action, Verkennes v. 
492. /d. at 947. 
493. /d. at 950. 
494. Kader, supra note 489, at 642; Note, Tort Recoverv for the L'nborn, IS J FAM. L. 
276, 285 (197(>-77); Note, supra note 478, al 3'l8. 
495. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra nole 467, al 368-69 ("JWJhen actually fared with the 
issue for decision, most rourts have allowed recovery, even ... when the child was neither viable 
nor quick."). 
4%. 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967). 
497. /d. at 448, 225 N.E.2d at 927. 
49tl /d. 
499. 2')1 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973). 
500. /d. at 331, 280 So. 2d al 761 (riling Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 
N.W.2d I(,J (1959)). 
')01. /d. al 330, 280 So. 2d al 761. 
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Corniea, 502 held that because the unborn were persons a wrongful 
death claim would be allowed.503 Later courts have concurred, adding 
other justifications to this fundamental legal conclusion such as the bio-
logical independence of the fetus, 504 as well as the need to effect the 
remedial and policy purposes of the legislation.505 An argument made 
by the Ohio Supreme Court demonstrates a typical attack on the logic 
of the born-alive rule: 
Suppose ... viable unborn twins suffered simultaneously the same 
prenatal injury of which one died before and the other after birth. 
Shall there be a cause of action for the death of the one and not for 
that of the other? Surely logic requires recognition of causes of action 
for the deaths of both, or for neither. 508 
In Summerfield v. Superior Court, 507 a 1985 case allowing recov-
ery for a stillborn viable fetus, the Arizona Supreme Court noted a 
number of reasons for overturning its previous holding which disal-
lowed such actions. The court cited the medical evidence of the separate 
existence of mother and fetus, as well as the strong legislative policy of 
protecting the unborn child, as evidenced in the criminal code and 
property law of the state. 508 The court also noted that the overwhelm-
ing majority of jurisdictions allowed a cause of action for the stillborn 
viable fetus. 509 In 1985, Pennsylvania also joined the ranks of jurisdic-
tions allowing recovery for a stillborn, viable fetus, 510 as did South Da-
kota,511 in 1986, and North Carolina, in 1987.512 
Montana, in 1984,513 and Texas, in 1987,514 each disallowed a 
cause of action for wrongful death of a stillborn child. The Montana 
502. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). 
503. !d. at 366, 371, 38 N.W.2d at 839, 841. 
504. Kader, supra note 489, at 646 & n.29. E.g., O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 135, 188 
N.W.2d 785, 787 (1971 ). Cf Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 124, 87 
N.E.2d 334. 340 (1949)(holding contra to Roe that biological independence compels the conclusion 
that a fetus is a person). 
505. See Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So. 2d 354, 356 (1974) 
506. Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959). 
507. 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P2d 712 (1985)(en bane). 
508. !d. at 476, 698 P.2d at 721. 
509. !d. at 476 & n.5, 698 P.2d at 721-22 & n.5. Cf Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 
937-38 n.3, 483 C\!.E.2d 1142, 1147 n.3 (1985)(Jasen, J., dissenting)("The commentators on the 
subject of death actions for unborn children are virtually unanimous in favor . . ."). 
510. Amadw v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985). 
511. Farley v. Mount Marty Hasp .. 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986). 
512 DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987); see generally Comment. 
Wrong Without a Remedy-North Carolina and the Wrongful Death of a Stillborn, 9 CAMP-
BELL L. REV. 93 (1986). 
513 Kuhnke v. Fisher, 210 Mont. 114, 683 P.2d 916 (1984). 
514 Witty v. ,\merican Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987). 
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court held the legislature had occupied the field by defining a minor 
child as beginning at birth. Therefore, an unborn fetus could not be a 
minor child and could not fall within the statute.515 The Montana Su-
preme Court noted, "That there is a field here in which the legislature 
should act [to allow such actions] is beyond question. "516 
The Texas decision declared the issue to be one of legislative in-
tent and held that legislative silence on the matter indicated no intent to 
include stillborn children within the state wrongful death statute.517 It 
also interpreted Texas precedent to require a born-alive rule. 518 
In a powerful, cogent dissent, three members of the Texas Su-
preme Court rejected the majority's rationale. The dissent declared that 
the precedent, on which the majority relied for a born-alive rule, was 
incorrectly interpreted. 519 In prior cases the court had "consistently ac-
cepted" its "responsibility to interpret statutes" to prevent inequity, 
even absent expressed legislative intent. 520 The dissent also noted there 
was no expressed legislative intent excluding fetuses from the statute,521 
and that there were several precedents, both in Texas law and general 
common law, for including the unborn within the wrongful death 
statute. 522 
The current number of jurisdictions allowing a cause of action for 
the wrongful death of a fetus is thirty-six, while those not recognizing 
such an action are eight. 523 Roe has influenced many of these decisions, 
515. Kuhnke, 210 Mont. at 120, 683 P.2d at 919. 
516. !d. 
517. Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 505. 
518. !d. at 505-06. 
519. !d. at 507 (Kilgarin, J., dissenting). The debated precedent, Yandell v. Delgado, 471 
S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971 ), dealt with the sole issue of "whether a fetus had to be viable at the time 
an injury was sustained in order for the injury to be actionable." Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 507 (Kil-
garin, J., dissenting). "Furthermore, in Yandell, the fetus survived and the suit was brought for 
personal injuries, not wrongful death. The live birth issue in a wrongful death context could not 
have been before the Yandell court because there was no death involved." !d. at 507-08 (citation 
omitted). The majority cited Yandell as authority for a born-alive rule. !d. at 505-06. 
520. Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 507, 511-12 (Kilgarin, J., dissenting). The dissent cited several 
such cases involving the Texas wrongful death statute. !d. at 507. 
521. !d. 
522. !d. at 508-11. A prior decision had reserved the very issue in this case. !d. at 510. 
523. Thirty-six jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn 
child. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Summerfield v. Superior 
Ct., 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985)(en bane); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 
224 A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); 
Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394 (D.C. 1984); Porter v. Lassiter, 
91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Yolk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); 
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. 
App. 487,277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983); Hale v. 
Manon, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Danos 
v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981 ); State ex rei. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 
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often with confusing and contradictory results. First, courts have used 
Roe to support the argument that there should be no recovery because 
the fetus is not a person within the fourteenth amendment. Second, Roe 
has been cited for the proposition that viability is the point where the 
state interest becomes compelling and, therefore, the statute should ap-
ply only at viability. Finally, Roe has been cited as supporting the state 
interest in prenatal life, thereby supporting extension of the wrongful 
death action to cover the unborn. 624 
Actually, only one sentence and a footnote in Roe apply directly. 
Justice Blackmun wrote: "In a recent development, generally opposed 
by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child 
to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal inju-
ries."626 The footnote referred to only two commentators: a note in No-
71 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354,331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O'Neill v. Morse, 
385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 
(1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 
904 (Mo. 1983)(en bane); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. Mac-
Donald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619 
P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1980); DiDonato v. Wortman 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987); Hopkins 
v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 
1053 (1985); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 
258, 518 P.2d 636 (!974)(en bane); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985); Presley 
v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 
S.E.2d 42 (1964); Farley v. Mount Marty Hosp., 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986)(applying S.D. 
CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-1 (1985 Supp.) which expressly includes a fetus); TENN. CoDE 
ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980)(legislatively overruling Hanby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 
1977)); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Moen v. Han-
son, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975)(en bane); Baldwin v. Butcher, ISS W.Va. 431, 184 
S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 
(1967). 
Eight jurisdictions deny recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. Justus v. Atchi-
son, 19 CaL 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 CaL Rptr. 97 (1977)(en bane); Hernandez v. Garwood, 
390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Kuhnke v. Fisher, 210 Mont. 114, 683 P.2d 916 (1984); Smith v. 
Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 387 N.W.2d 490 (!986); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 
303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (1985)(citing 
with approval Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969)); 
Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S. W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987); Lawrence v. Craven Tire 
Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969). 
The Supreme Court of Utah stated, in dictum, that "the death of a viable fetus should be 
considered as much a ground for damages as would a miscarriage." Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 
1075, 1077 (Utah 1975). Though it cited a 1942 case stating there was no wrongful death cause of 
action for a fetus, since the issue was moot, it declined to reconsider the issue, saying, "Whether or 
not [death of a viable fetus] gives a different basis for recovery [from causing a miscarriage] can be 
determined when liability has been found in a proper case." /d. at 1077-78. A federal district 
court in the Virgin Islands has reportedly upheld a cause of action for wrongful death of a viable, 
unborn child. Recent Cases, LEX VITM:, Spring, 1987, at 2 (citing Maynard v. Maynard, (D.V.L 
May, 1987)). The authors have been unable to obtain a copy of the opinion or locate it on any 
database. 
524. Kader, supra note 489, at 652. 
525. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
181] RIGHT TO ABORTION 255 
TRE DAME LAWYER and Prosser's treatise on torts. 526 The former did 
not oppose recovery for wrongful death but opposed abortion as incon-
sistent with the rights of the unborn, including the wrongful death ac-
tion which it supported.527 In fact, the NoTRE DAME LAWYER article 
declared: 
The law of torts provides even more striking examples. Will the preg-
nant woman who is hit by a negligent driver while she is on her way 
to the hospital to have an abortion still have a cause of action for the 
wrongful death of her unborn child? If so, how is it possible for the 
law to say that a child can be wrongfully killed only hours before he 
can be rightfully killed? Absurd as it may seem, this is the present 
state of the law in some jurisdictions, and it does no good to say that 
the inconsistencies can be abated simply by refusing all recovery for 
prenatal injury or death because negligent death or injury to a child 
whose mother does not want an abortion clearly is a recognizable 
wrong for which there must be just compensation. 
Is the unborn child any less a person when, instead of being 
killed by an automobile, he is killed by a doctor in the performance of 
an abortion? Seldom has the law been confronted by such an obvious 
contradiction. 528 
The other reference in the Roe footnote, to Prosser, was appar-
ently in error as well. 1129 Prosser simply stated the development of the 
law, and in no way opposed recovery. 113° Footnotes to Prosser's text did 
indicate some disagreement, but here even Prosser was in error. He 
implied that some articles opposed recovery for stillborns when they did 
not,1131 and he omitted several articles and the key material cited in 
Verkennes v. Corniea which favored recovery. 532 The Supreme Court 
also overlooked persuasive arguments and the clear trend of cases be-
tween 1971 (the date of Prosser's work) and 1973 (the date of Roe). 1133 
Thus, Roe's discussion of wrongful death actions for unborn chil-
dren was "largely inaccurate, and should not be relied upon as the cor-
rect view of the law at the time of Roe v. Wade. " 1134 Despite this fact 
and Roe's silence as to whether such actions for wrongful death were 
consistent with the abortion ruling, some cases have mentioned Roe in 
526. /d. at 162 n.65. 
527. Note, supra note 478. 
528. Id. at 369. 
529. Kader, supra note 489, at 653. 
530. W. Prosser, supra note 471, at 338. 
531. Kader, supra note 489, at 654-55. 
532. 229 Minn. at 370, 38 N.W.2d at 841. Kader, supra note 4B9, at 654-55. 
533. Kader, supra note 489, at 654-56. Four of the five cases decided in this period favored 
recognizing the cause of action. Id. 
534. /d. at 653. 
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exammmg or re-examining the question of recovery for the wrongful 
death of a stillborn fetus. Interestingly, some have done so with no 
mention of Roe. 
For those states denying recovery for the unborn in wrongful 
death actions, Roe has been seen as supportive authority. In Justus v. 
Atchison, 11311 the California Supreme Court said it was "not so naive" as 
to believe the legislature could have entertained any idea of the fetus as 
a person when the wrongful death acts were passed in 1862 and 
1872.1136 This was a clear reference to Roe's finding of no personhood 
for the fetus in the fourteenth amendment, which arose in the same 
time period. 1137 Of such circular logic, Kader made the following 
observation: 
There is a certain circularity in all of this, perhaps inevitable. Roe v. 
Wade relie[ d] upon nineteenth century legislation for evidence that 
the fetus was not considered nor intended to be a "person" in the law, 
and modern prenatal death decisions in turn cite the conclusion of 
Roe v. Wade for the same proposition. 538 
535. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977)(en bane). 
536. Id. at 571, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 101. 
537. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. 
538. Kader, supra note 489, at 658. Ironically, it is precisely during this period that science 
was recognizing that fetuses were fully human from conception. As Victor Rosenblum has 
observed: 
Only in the second quarter of the nineteenth century did biological research ad-
vance to the extent of understanding the actual mechanism of human reproduction and 
of what truly comprised the onset of gestational development. The nineteenth century 
saw a gradual but profoundly influential revolution in the scientific understanding of 
the beginning of individual mammalian life. Although sperm had been discovered in 
1677, the mammalian egg was not identified until 1827. The cell was first recognized 
as the structural unit of organisms in 1839, and the egg and sperm were recognized as 
cells in the next two decades. These developments were brought to the attention of the 
American state legislatures and public by those professionals most familiar with their 
unfolding import-physicians. It was the new research findings which persuaded doc-
tors that the old "quickening" distinction embodied in the common and some statutory 
law was unscientific and indefensible. 
The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. /58 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the 
Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (statement of Victor Rosenblum, Pro-
fessor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern Univ.); see also, Dellapenna, supra note 430, 
at 402-04. About 1857, the American Medical Association led a "physicians' crusade" to enact 
legislation to protect the unborn from conception. J. MoHR, supra note 425, at 147-70. The 
resulting legislation was designed primarily to protect the unborn and not, as Justice Blackmun 
claimed, solely to protect maternal health. Id., See Roe, 410 U.S. at 151 & n.48. Contrary to 
Justice Blackmun's assertion, eleven state decisions explicitly affirmed protection of the unborn 
child as a purpose of their abortion statute (nineteenth century), and nine others implied the same. 
Gorby, The "Right" to an Abortion, the Scope of Fourteenth Amendment "Personhood," and the 
Supreme Court's Birth Requirement, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. I, 16-17. Furthermore, twenty-six of 
thirty-six had laws against abortion by the end of the Civil War, as did six of the ten territories by 
1865. Dellapenna, supra note 430, at 429. This flatly contradicts Justice Blackmun's statement 
that such legislation did not become widespread until after the Civil War. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139. 
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The California Supreme Court also cited Roe as authority for the 
nonpersonhood of the unborn.539 The court noted that any change must 
come from the legislature, which had occupied the field. 54° California 
appellate courts had rejected the cause of action before Roe was de-
cided, so Roe was used to support pre-established California law. 541 
The justus opinion figured prominently in the recent rejection of a 
wrongful death action for the unborn in Texas. 542 
Roe also influenced the Florida Supreme Court in the 1980 case of 
Hernandez v. Garwood. 543 The court cited Roe as authority that a fe-
tus was not a person and that equal protection of the fetus was not 
violated if it were excluded from the wrongful death act unless born 
alive. 544 There was no Florida rejection of the cause of action for 
stillborns before Roe. In 1977, the Florida Supreme Court first refused 
the cause of action in Stern v. Miller. 545 It noted that a change must be 
made by the legislature, since legislative intent was the issue.546 How-
ever, the court noted that the weight of authority favored the cause of 
action, the reasons were "compelling," and the commentators "sp[ oke J 
in one accord ... and urge[d] recovery."547 No reference to Roe was 
made in the Stern opinion, nor in a brief opinion affirming it in 
1978.548 However, the attitude shifted, as noted, in Hernandez with an 
explicit reliance on Roe. 
Tennessee also denied a cause of action in wrongful death actions 
for the unborn. It had denied the action before Roe in 1958, stating that 
the fetus was not a person.549 In 1977 in Hamby v. McDaniel, the 
court employed an extended quotation from Roe to support its position 
This material indicates that legislatures at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the nineteenth century abortion laws, and the nineteenth century wrongful death statutes 
were not so naive as the California Supreme Court implied in its statement. that it was "not so 
naive" as to believe the legislature could have entertained any idea of the fetus as a person when 
the wrongful death acts were passed in 1862 and 1872. Such legislatures could have included the 
unborn (from conception) in their understanding of the term "person'' In fact this seems likely, 
since legislators were the specific targets of the national 'physicians' crusade." Interestingly, Jus-
tice Blackmun was aware of this crusade, for he cited material from it, Roe, 410 U.S. at 141, but 
failed to apply its implications. 
539. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 577, 565 P.2d at 130-31, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06 (including the 
erroneous assertion that commentators generally opposed the causr of action for stillborn children). 
540. !d. at 575, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at !04. 
541. !d. at 581, 565 P.2d at 133, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 108. 
542. Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1987). 
543. 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980). 
544. !d. at 359. 
545. 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977) 
546. !d. at 308. 
547. !d. at 306. 
548. Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978). 
549. Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1')58). 
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against the rising tide to the contrary. 11110 The legislature has smce 
amended the Tennessee code to allow a wrongful death action for a 
viable fetus. 11111 
The Utah Supreme Court reserved the issue of a wrongful death 
action for a stillborn in Nelson v. Peterson. 11112 Certain dicta indicate a 
sympathy for such an action. 11113 However, in Nelson, the court said that 
it was not prejudicial for a jury to hear of the illegitimacy of the de-
ceased unborn child because it would help in calculating the mother's 
damages for mental anguish, since "many women undergo abortions in 
such a situation .... " 11114 Thus, Roe's influence was present although it 
should be noted that the first case holding there was no cause of action 
for an unborn child in Utah was decided before Roe. 111111 
Nebraska,11 ~'>6 New Jersey,11117 New York,~'>58 and Virginia11119 cases 
deciding wrongful death actions for unborn children made no mention 
of Roe. However, these cases were all decided before Roe or were based 
on prior cases that were. Montana only mentioned Roe in its discussion 
of California's rule, which it distinguished, and went on to say it was 
"beyond question" that the legislature should act to allow the cause of 
action. 560 Thus, in the cases denying recovery in wrongful death actions 
for the unborn, it is clear that Roe has had a negative effect on the 
growth of the law in certain states. Nevertheless, the trend continues to 
the present to reject the Supreme Court's holding in Roe that a fetus is 
not a person and allow a cause of action for the unborn. Ideally, "per-
son" should mean the same in constitutional and statutory contexts. 
However, Roe is the exception to the rule, which was clear even in 
1973, and any change ought to be in its holding, not in the tort law. 
Roe is increasingly out of step with this area of the law. 
The Arizona Supreme Court stated the problem well in its 1985 
rejection of the born-alive rule: 
The theoretical underpinnings of the Dietrich rule have been eroded, 
550. 559 S.W.2d 774, 777-78 (Tenn. 1977). 
551. TENN. Com: ANN.§ 20-5-106(b)(1980). 
552. 542 P2d 1075 (Utah 1975). 
'l53. See supra note 523. 
554. Nelson, 542 P 2d at 1077. 
555. Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P.2d 114 (1942) 
556. Smith v. Columbus Community llosp., 222 Neb. 776, 387 N.W.2d 490 (1986); Egbert 
v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 573-74, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977)("We express no opinion with 
respect to the existence of the fetus as a person in either the philosophical or scientific sense."). 
557. Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.j. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964). 
558. Tebbutt v. Virostrk, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (1985)(riting its rule in Endresz 
v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1%9)) 
559. Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 1(/J S.E.2d 440 (1969). 
560. Kuhnke v. Fisher, 210 Mont. 114, 120, 683 P 2d 916, 919 (1984). 
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and both it and Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901), 
the other early case which gave support to the rule of non-recovery, 
have been overruled by the very courts which decided them .... The 
majority finds no logic in the premise that if the viable infant dies 
immediately before birth it is not a 'person' but if it dies immediately 
after birth it is a 'person.' 
We take note, further, that the magic moment of 'birth' is no 
longer determined by nature. The advances of science have given the 
doctor, armed with drugs and scalpel, the power to determine just 
when 'birth' shall occur. ~61 
259 
Roe has also been cited as authority for allowing recovery in 
wrongful death actions for stillborn children because of the state's inter-
est in potential life. 562 In Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 563 the Supreme 
Court of Alabama employed such an approach, as did the Oregon Su-
preme Court in Libbee v. Permanente Clinic. 564 The Oregon court 
noted that Roe held a fetus not to be a person under the fourteenth 
amendment, but decided the term meant something different under the 
Oregon Constitution. 565 Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court also cited 
Roe as supporting the protection of potential life and, therefore, recog-
nizing a wrongful death action for the unborn was "entirely consistent 
with Roe. " 566 The Supreme Court of Arizona also recognized a right of 
recovery for a stillborn child in 1985.567 It argued that such an action 
"may further the policy of Roe" by protecting the woman's right to 
continue a pregnancy. 568 The Arizona court noted that, aside from pro-
tection of the right to continue one's pregnancy, Roe really was irrele-
vant in the wrongful death context, because voluntary termination of a 
pregnancy was quite distinguishable from termination "against the 
mother's will." 569 
Roe has also been influential in arguments for limiting recovery in 
wrongful death actions to the unborn who were viable. Georgia was the 
only pre-Roe state to allow recovery for a previable, stillborn fetus, al-
lowing recovery for an unborn, "quick" child. 570 In 1976, Rhode Island 
561. Summerfield v. Superior Ct, 144 Ariz. 467, 477, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (1985)(en bane). 
Also note the discussion of permissible judicial action in a developing area of the law created by 
statute. /d. at 472-73, 479, 689 P.2d at 717-18, 724. 
562. Roe, 410 US at 162. 
563. 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So. 2d 3S4, 357 (1974). 
564. 268 Or. 258, 26 7, 518 P.2d 636, 640 ( 1974). 
565. /d. 
566. Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 49, 476 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1985). 
567. Summerfield v. Superior Ct, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985)(en bant"). 
568. /d. at 478, 698 P.2d at 723 (citing Kader, supra note 489). 
569 /d. (emphasis in original). 
570. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955). 
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abandoned any viability test in allowing recovery for stillborn infants, 
stating: 
[V]iability is a concept bearing no relation to the attempts of the law 
to provide remedies for civil wrongs. If we profess allegiance to rea-
son, it would be seditious to adopt so arbitrary and uncertain a con-
cept as viability as a dividing line between those persons who shall 
enjoy the protection of our remedial laws and those who shall become, 
for most intents and purposes, nonentities. It seems that if live birth is 
to be characterized, as it so frequently has been, as an arbitrary line 
of demarcation, then viability, when enlisted to serve that same pur-
pose is a veritable non sequitur. 571 
While the majority in the Rhode Island opinion never explicitly men-
tioned Roe, the harsh criticism of the viability test may betray a distaste 
for the Supreme Court's viability criterion. A concurring opinion does 
cite Roe as support for a viability dividing line. 572 
There is no logical reason why viability should be a criterion for 
recovery in a wrongful death action for a stillborn child. The viability 
requirement is no longer applied where the child is born alive. David 
Kader has stated: "[I]t is probably both desirable and inevitable that 
the viability requirement will likewise be abandoned to allow recovery 
by the beneficiary of a stillborn, notwithstanding any implications of 
Roe v. Wade to the contrary."573 However, the implications of Roe 
show signs of stalling the progress predicted by Kader. In Toth v. Go-
ree574 a Michigan appeals court denied recovery for a three month old, 
nonviable fetus. The court said that any precedent "must be read in 
light of more recent developments in the case law. Roe v. Wade has had 
a considerable impact on the legal status of the fetus. " 575 The court 
stated that there would be an inherent conflict if a person could be held 
liable under a wrongful death statute for the death of a child whom the 
mother could abort. 576 Of course, since the abortion right has developed 
to allow virtual abortion on demand throughout the pregnancy,577 the 
Michigan court's reliance on the viability distinction may be misplaced. 
In 1975, it was still generally believed that states could effectively pro-
hibit abortion after viability. Now it is apparent that a wrongful death 
571. Presley v. Newport Hosp, 117 R.I. 177, 188,365 i\.2d 748, 753-'14 (1976). 
572. !d. at 192. 365 A.2d at 756 (Bevilacqua, C.J, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
573. Kader. supra note 4H9, at 660. 
574. 65 Mich. App. 2'!6, 237 N.W.2d 297 (1975). 
575. /d. at 303, 237 N.W.2d at 301 (citation omitted). 
576. /d. 
577. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
( 1986)(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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action is inconsistent with the abortion right before and after viability. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has also noted the inherent 
contradiction with Roe: 
We remark in passing that it would be incongruous for a mother to 
have a federal constitutional right to deliberately destroy a nonviable 
fetus, Roe v. Wade, and at the same time for a third person to be 
subject to liability to the fetus for his unintended but merely negligent 
acts. &78 
In the most recent cases, Roe's viability emphasis is evident. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Amadio v. Levin, said, "(t]he reason-
ing of the Court in Roe has been subject to widespread criticism and, at 
least as to the protectability of 'viable' unborn children, suffers from 
internal inconsistency."1179 Thus, the Pennsylvania court makes no 
mention of viability as a part of its rule. This probably indicates a 
rejection of a viability test. 1180 The Ohio Supreme Court, in Werling v. 
Sandy, 1181 specifically cited Roe as support for a viability standard, 
which it adopted. 1182 The Arizona Supreme Court, in Summerfield v. 
Superior Court, claimed Roe was irrelevant but followed the majority 
in establishing a viability criterion.1183 The Supreme Court of North 
Dakota made no mention of Roe but followed the majority viability 
rule. 1184 
Thus, it seems that the present trend is to require viability in a 
cause of action for wrongful death. Roe has certainly reinforced this 
trend. Interestingly, the viability line is seen as arbitrary by some 
courts who adopt it anyway because of the "weight of authority." 11811 It 
makes little sense to abandon one arbitrary line for another, although 
moving to a viability criterion is a step in the right direction. Roe's 
illogical line drawing at viability will, unfortunately, have enduring ef-
fects in this area. 
3. Fetal rights in equity 
Equity is increasingly invoked to protect the rights of the unborn. 
It has taken on new dimensions with the recent development of fetal 
578. Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675, 679, 421 A.2d 134, 137 (1980) (citation omitted). 
579. 509 Pa. 199, 225 n.5, 501 A.2d 1085, 1098 n.5 (1985) (Zappala, J., concurring). 
580. Most likely this is the case. /d. at 207, 501 A.2d at 1089 ("[T]he recovery afforded the 
estate of a stillborn is no different than the recovery afforded the estate of a child [born alive]."). 
581. 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985). 
582. /d. at 49, 476 N.E.2d at 1056. 
583. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 478, 698 P.2d 712, 723 (1985). 
584. Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984). 
585. See, e.g., Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 477, 698 P.2d at 722 ("We acknowledge ... that 
this, too, is an artificial line .... "). 
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surgery1186 and increased concern about preventing injury to the unborn 
child through the negligence of the mother.1187 While a fetus may not 
have a right to be born, under Roe, the right to be born with a sound 
mind and body has increasingly been recognized.1188 
A number of decisions have recently protected the unborn's right 
to life or health, even against maternal desire or convenience. These 
decisions are in marked contrast to the lack of protection for the fetus 
in abortion cases. Nowhere is the anomalous nature of the abortion 
right more visible. 
Decisions which protect the unborn's right to life or health involve 
the right and obligation incidental to being a parent: the right and obli-
gation to be the natural guardian of one's child.1189 This "private realm 
of family life" is protected from unwarranted state interference.1190 
Family autonomy is not absolute, however,1191 and may be limited 
where "it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or 
safety" of their children.1192 As a result, courts have acted to permit 
essential and necessary treatment of a child,1193 such as a blood transfu-
sion119' or vaccination,11911 despite parental refusal to consent to the treat-
ment. Courts have ordered medical treatment over parental objections 
based on religious1196 and non-religious grounds.1197 
In some instances, pregnant women have refused medical treat-
ment for themselves, which poses a serious risk to the life and health of 
their unborn children. While generally a person has a right to refuse 
medical care,1198 the state's interest in the welfare of children will justify 
compelling medical care when necessary to preserve the life of an un-
586. Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging Rights as a Personr, 9 AM. J.L. & Mm. 1 
(1983). 
587. Note, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Healthr, 58 IND. L.J. 531 (1983). 
588. Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits of State Intervention on 
Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J.L. & PuB. Pm.'v 19 (1985). 
589. Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 553, 180 N .E. 508, 511 (1932). 
590. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
591. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978). 
592. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
593. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962). 
594. Brooklyn Hosp. v. Torres, 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
595. Mannis v. State, 240 Ark. 42, 398 S.W.2d 206, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966). 
596. Jehovah's Witnesses of Washington v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 
1967), ajj'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). See generally Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public 
Agency to Order Medical Treatment over Parental Religious Objections for Child Whose Life is 
not Immediately f.'ndangered, 52 A.L.R.3D 1118. 
597. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978). See generally Annota-
tion, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical Treatment for Child Over Paren-
tal Objections Not Based on Religious Grounds, 97 A.L.R.3D 421. 
598. See generally Annotation, Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to 
Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R. 3D 67. 
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born child.1199 
In two pre-Roe cases, Hoener v. Bertinato600 and Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 601 a New Jersey juve-
nile court and the state's supreme court justified, under their parens 
patriae power, authorizing a hospital to give lifesaving blood transfu-
sions to save the life of a child, even though the parents objected on 
religious grounds. In Hoener, the court authorized a blood transfusion 
to the child immediately after birth to correct an Rh factor problem 
that caused the death of the woman's previous child. It remained for 
the Anderson case to extend this principle to the child yet unborn. 
In Anderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided whether a 
pregnant Jehovah's Witness could be compelled, against her religious 
beliefs, to take a blood transfusion. The court unanimously held that 
the thirty-two week old child was entitled to the law's protection and 
ordered the transfusions, stating: 
In State v. Perricone we held that the State's concern for the 
welfare of an infant justified blood transfusions notwithstanding the 
objection of its parents who were also Jehovah's Witnesses, and in 
Smith v. Brennan we held that a child could sue for injuries negli-
gently inflicted upon it prior to birth. We are satisfied that the un-
born child is entitled to the law's protection and that an appropriate 
order should be made to insure blood transfusions to the mother in 
the event that they are necessary in the opinion of the physician in 
charge at the time. 602 
This was the first case in which a court ordered procedures which in-
vaded a mother's bodily integrity to benefit the unborn fetus. 603 The 
court determined that the child's right to live outweighed the woman's 
constitutionally protected right to practice her religion, as well as her 
right to refuse medical treatment and her right to bodily integrity. The 
court noted that the fact that the child and woman "are so intertwined 
and inseparable"604 made the decision easier to make than if it were 
just an adult involved, underscoring the paramount status of the inter-
est in protecting the child in the decision. Here the child was viable. 
Roe would have at least recognized the state's interest in the child's 
potentiality of life. 
599. In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & 
C.2d 619 (1973); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (juv. Ct. 1961). 
600. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (juv. Ct. 1961). 
601. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). 
602. /d. at 423, 201 A.2d at 539 (citations omitted). 
603. Lenow, supra note 586, at 21. 
604. Anderson, 42 N.J. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538. 
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In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority,m the 
Georgia Supreme Court approved more intrusive measures. A pregnant 
women suffered from complete placenta previa (a condition where the 
placenta covers the opening of the birth canal). A ninety-nine percent 
chance of fetal fatality was predicted if a natural birth was attempted. 
The physicians also predicted a fifty percent chance that the mother 
would die with natural birth. Both had excellent chances of surviving a 
Caesarian section. The court upheld an order requiring the woman to 
submit to a sonogram, blood transfusions, and a Caesarian section 
should they be found necessary to sustain the life of the thirty-nine 
week old child, even though Mr. and Mrs. Jefferson opposed the oper-
ation on religious grounds. The order provided for custody of the un-
born child to be granted to the state for the purpose of requiring sur-
gery. The court stated that Roe indicated the state had a compelling 
interest in the life of the fetus after viability. Justice Hill concurring in 
the per curiam opinion, said: 
[W]e weighed the right of the mother to practice her religion and to 
refuse surgery on herself, against her unborn child's right to live. We 
found in favor of her child's right to live.606 
As it turned out, a subsequent ultrasound revealed that the placenta 
had shifted-a very rare occurrence-and the Caesarian was 
unnecessary. 607 
A recent survey indicated that courts in eleven states have ordered 
Caesarian deliveries to protect fetuses. 608 Only one of these cases was 
reported; most even elude the newspapers.609 After surveying the cases, 
one author wrote, "In the cases of which I am aware, every judge but 
one who has ruled on an application for nonconsensual Cesarean deliv-
ery has granted the request. 610 
In November, 1987, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia continued this trend. In the case of In re A.C., the court held 
that the interests of an unborn child and the state outweighed the right 
of a pregnant woman against bodily intrusion.611 The mother was ter-
minally ill, in extremis, lucid only at intervals, and with only hours to 
live; the fetus was twenty-six weeks old and experiencing oxygen depri-
605. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981 ). 
606. /d. at 90, 274 S.E.2d at 460. 
607. Lenow, supra note 586, at 21 n.l23. 
608. Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1194 (1987). 
609. Rhoden, Cesareans and Samaritans, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 118 (1987). 
610. /d. at 118 (footnote omitted). 
611. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 
1988). 
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vation. 612 The court-ordered Caesarean delivery was per-
formed-mother and child died soon after.613 
In the 1983 case of Taft v. Taft, 614 the issue of court-ordered sur-
gery to protect the fetus was raised before the tv1assachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court. The woman was four months pregnant. Her husband 
sought a court order to force her to submit to a "purse string" opera-
tion, so her cervix would hold the pregnancy.615 The woman wanted 
the child, but she refused to undergo the surgery for religious reasons. 
The lower court appointed a guardian ad litem for the unborn child 
and granted the husband authority to consent to the operation. On ap-
peal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed. It stated that 
"[no] case has been cited to us, nor have we found one, in which a court 
ordered a pregnant woman to submit to a surgical procedure in order 
to assist in carrying a child not then viable to term. " 616 The court re-
served judgment on whether the state's interest in the unborn was com-
pelling enough to allow such overriding of the mother's privacy and 
right to "free exercise" of religious beliefs. 617 
The Taft court, however, did not close the door to ordering surgi-
cal procedures to protect the unborn. The court specifically noted the 
sparse record regarding necessity "as a life saving procedure" or likeli-
hood of success.618 The court added that the state's interest "might be 
sufficiently compelling" if the state's interest were "established. " 619 
Significantly, the Taft decision involved a previable fetus. Interest-
ingly, the court made no mention of Roe. However, the inference was 
clear that the viability point, which was significant in the original abor-
tion cases, played no role in the consideration of imposed treatment on 
behalf of the unborn. Obviously, the viability criteria is arbitrary, 
meaningless, and contrary to reason. It was rightly not considered. 
The prevention of disabilities is a strong state interest, with which 
many are sympathetic. Many of these disabilities are preventable by 
proper prenatal care.620 This is a growing area in the establishment of 
fetal rights. In a 1980 case, In Re Baby X, 621 a newborn had demon-
strated symptoms of narcotics withdrawal within a day of birth. The 
612. !d. 
613. !d. 
614. 388 Mass. 331, 446 l'i.E.2d 395 (1983). 
615. !d. at 332, 446 N.E.2d at 396. 
616. !d. at 334 n.4, 446 N.E.2d at 397 n.4. 
617. !d. at 334, 446 N.E.2d at 397. 
618. !d. at 335, 446 N.E.2d at 397. 
619. !d. al 334-35, 446 N.E.2d at 397. 
620. Parness, The Duty to Prevent Handicaps: Laws Promoting the Prevention of Handi-
caps to Newborns, 5 W NEw ENG. L. REv. 431 (1983). 
621. 97 Mich. App. 111,293 N.W.2d 736 (1980). 
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court held that evidence of the mother's prenatal drug use constituted 
abuse and neglect. The court took temporary custody of the child. 
However, since the same court had previously held a fetus not to be a 
person under the child custody statute, the state's equitable powers to 
protect the unborn are limited. In an unreported case,622 a court en-
joined a pregnant woman from using drugs and ordered a weekly 
urinalysis to protect the fetus. 
It is unclear how far the states will go in ordering fetal surgery or 
medical procedures to protect the life of the unborn child. The court in 
Jefferson used a viability standard, as per Roe, but what happens when 
medical advances push back the stage of viability? And what effect will 
the trends and forces which have engineered the expansion of prenatal 
tort law have upon this area of the law? Will previable unborn chil-
dren become the subject of court ordered fetal surgery against the 
wishes of a mother? 
The growth of fetal treatment capabilities and litigation will force 
further consideration of the rights of the unborn. Surely, some criteria 
must be established. The early returns indicate that fetal rights are be-
ing recognized in the balance with the mother's rights. This is appro-
priate. Hopefully, the influence of Roe will not halt this growing trend. 
While women's rights must be placed in the balance, it is certainly 
equitable that unborn fetuses be allowed to develop without preventable 
handicaps and injuries.623 
622. Boston Globe, April 27, 1983, at 8, col. 1. 
623. See id.; Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DuQ. 
L. Rt:v. I (1984); Note, Informed Consent: An Unborn's Right, 48 ALB. L. REv. 1102 (1984). 
Contra Johnson, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to 
Liberty, Privacy, and /<.'qual Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986). As indicated in the text above, 
a pregnant woman's duty to her unborn child includes the duty to provide life-saving medical care. 
The failure to provide medical care for a child can also carry criminal penalties. See generally 
Annotation, Failure to Provide Medical Attention for Child as Criminal Neglect, 12 A.L.R.2o 
1047 Thus, a father could be guilty of a misdemeanor for failure to furnish medical attention to 
an unborn child, People v. Sianes, 134 Cal. App. 355, 25 P.2d 487 ( 1933), as long as it is shown 
that the child. as distinguished from the mother, is adversely and substantially affected by the lack 
of medical attention. People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 298 P 961 ( 1931 ). 
In a number of different contexts, courts have ruled that the unborn is a member of the 
family and a dependent. A California court has held that an unborn child had a right to support 
from his or her father and ordered the father to fulfill his duty. Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 
122, 100 P.2d 806 (1940). Accord People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 298 P. 961 (1931); 
Metzger v. People. 98 Colo. 133, 53 P.2d 1189 (1936). The primary duty of a parent to a child is 
to provide the child with support and protection. See generally, Annotation, Propriety of Decree in 
Proceeding Between Divorced Parents to Determine Mother's Duty to Pay Support for Children 
In Custody of Father, 98 A.L.R.3n 1146. In this regard, the duty to support may not be con-
tracted away, even when the child is unborn. Wilson v. Wilson, 251 Ky. 522, 65 S.W.2d 694 
(1933). The obligation of a parent to support his or her children may be enforced by an action at 
any time during the child's minority, see, e.g., Strecker v. Wilkinson, 220 Kan. 292, 552 P 2d 979 
(1976), and may be brought on behalf of a child not yet born. See, e.g., McCov v. People ex rei. 
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The significant point, however, IS the strong protection given the 
[MinorJ Child, 165 Colo. 407, 439 P.2d 347 (1968) (en bane). In addition, an order of support 
may be modified for the purpose of making allowance for the support of a child born since the 
filing of the original proceeding, even when the decree provided for the support of the child while 
unborn. See, e.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 188 Neb. 80, 195 N.W.2d 227 (1972). 
Most states have made the nonsupport of a child a criminal offense. See generally 67 A C.J.S. 
Parent & Child § 165. These statutes include an unborn child, who has been held to be a minor 
child within the meaning of a statute declaring willful nonsupport of a minor child to be an 
offense. People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 298 P. 961 ( 1931 ). In this regard, the support 
is to be furnished through the mother. Where nothing at all in the way of food, clothing or shelter 
is furnished by the father to the expectant mother, a breach of duty to provide for the unborn child 
is shown. !d. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court allowed an unborn child to bring an action to prove paternity, 
which would entitle the child to support and heirship. Malek v. Yekani-Fard, 422 So. 2d 1151 
(La. 1982). Such derisions rest on the long recognized rights of the unborn in property and family 
law. Other related rights and obligations arise from the parent-child relationship as applied to 
unborn children. One substantial right is the presumption of legitimacy of birth. This presumption 
is "one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law," In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 
N.E. 471 (1930), and extends to a child conceived in wedlock but born after the termination of the 
marriage. See generally Annotation, Presumption of Legitimacy of Child Born after Annulment, 
Divorce, or Separation, 46 A.L.R.3n 158. As a result, a child conceived by artificial insemination 
of the wife during a valid marriage has been held to be a legitimate child, entitled to all the rights 
and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 
74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973). Further, a surrogate mother, impregnated by artificial 
insemination with semen of a man not her husband, has been held unable to terminate her paren-
tal rights in the child and have custody of the child transferred to the biological father. In re Baby 
Girl, FAM. L. REP. 2348 (1983). 
In Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance v. Pigott, 393 So. 2d 1379 (Ala. 
1981 ), the Alabama Supreme Court held that the unborn grandson of the insured was a member 
of the family of the insured for the purpose of being covered by the uninsured motorist clause in 
the named insured's policy. See also Peterson v. Nationwide 1\lut. Ins., 175 Ohio St. 551, 197 
N.E.2d 194 (1964). In Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that a posthumously born illegitimate child was entitled to his late father's 
social security survivor benefits. The test to qualify for the benefits was whether the support by 
the father for the unborn child was commensurate with the needs of the unborn child at the time 
of the father's death. See also Wagner v. Finch, 413 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1969); Moreno v. Rich-
ardson, 484 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1973). Also, in S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation 
Board, 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971 ), a posthumously born child had the right of recovery for work-
men's compensation death benefits, even though the father was unaware of the pregnancy at the 
time of his death. See also Fontenot v. Annelida Acres, Inc., 302 So. 2d 690 (La. Ct. App. 1974). 
In addition, for purposes of inheritance and trust laws, the unborn has long been recognized 
as a child with full rights as any born child. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *130 ("An 
infant . in the mother's womb .. is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold 
estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited 
to its use, and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually born."). As a 
result, an unborn child ran, among other things, inherit and own an estate, Hall v. Hancock, 32 
Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834); Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 560 (1869), be a tenant-in-common 
with his brothers and sisters, Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907), or with his own 
mother, Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1882), be an actual income recipient prior to birth, 
Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 A. 467 (1938), and take property by deed from 
an inheritance. Mackie v. Mackie, 230 N.C. 152, 52 S.E.2d 352 (1949). By 1941, a New York 
court, In re Holthausen, 175 Mise 1022,26 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1941), summed up the law concerning 
property rights of the unborn child as follows: 
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unborn. This is out of step with the inadequate protection of fetal 
rights in abortion law. 
4. Fetal rights in criminal law 
"The criminal law historically has afforded the unborn child a 
substantial amount of protection," noted David Louisell in 1969.624 
The effect of Roe has been to strip away much of this protection. While 
the criminal law gave some of the unborn legal rights as "persons," 
Roe's declaration that they were not persons, for purposes of the four-
teenth amendment, has spilled over into areas beyond abortion. Theo-
retically, the Court's holding for fourteenth amendment purposes has 
no bearing on personhood for homicide laws, but some state courts 
seem unable to grasp the distinction. Perhaps what is at work is the 
intuitive notion underlying stare decisis, that the law should be consis-
tent. In other words, persons who have been "persons" under the crim-
inal law should remain so or have no rights at all. Apparently, it is felt 
that the Court has taken such a radical step in stripping the unborn of 
their personhood in Roe that it cannot have meant to leave personhood 
in place for other purposes. Also, it is felt by some abortion advocates 
that the growth and maintenance of fetal rights in such an analogous 
area as homicide undercuts Roe and so must be inhibited. 6211 
Such reasoning has brought about the astonishing result in the 
California cases regarding homicide of an unborn child. A murder in-
dictment had been brought against a man for killing an unborn child. 
He had shoved his knee into his pregnant ex-wife's abdomen, saying, 
"I'm going to stomp it out of you." In 1970, the California Supreme 
Court reversed the murder indictment in Keeler v. Superior Court, 626 
applying the born-alive rule. 627 Within the same year, the legislature 
It has been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common-law courts in respect of 
estate matters for at least the past two hundred years that a child en ventre sa mere is 
'born' and 'alive' for all purposes for his benefit. 
!d. at 1024. 26 NY S 2d at 143. 
With regard to the disposition of an inheritance, a guardian ad litem may be appointed where 
the alleged father of the unborn had died and his estate was pending. In re Thomas, 118 Misc. 2d 
456, 460 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1983). Similarly, with regard to the law of trusts, an unborn beneficiary 
cannot he bound by the consent of living beneficiaries, In re Estate of Allen, 35 Haw. 501 ( 1940), 
and a guardian ad litem can he appointed by the court to consent to a modification or revocation of 
the trust. Hatch v. Riggs Nat'! Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Thus, with few limitations, 
the unborn child is considered the child of his parents with the full rights of a born child and to 
which the parents owe substantial duties. 
624. Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA L. 
RFv. 233, 238 (1969). 
625. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 623. 
626. 2 CaL 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 CaL Rptr. 481 (1970) (en bane). 
627. The born-alive rule is an ancient relic from the fourteenth century, when proof 
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promptly redefined homicide to include the killing of a fetus. 628 In the 
197 6 case of People v. Smith, 629 the state appealed the dismissal of a 
homicide charge for a man who allegedly murdered a nonviable fetus. 
The appellate court held that Roe had removed the protection of a non-
viable fetus: 
The underlying rationale of [Roe], therefore, is that until viability is 
reached, human life in the legal sense has not come into existence. 
Implicit in [Roe] is the conclusion that as a matter of constitutional 
law the destruction of a non-viable fetus is not a taking of human life. 
It follows that such destruction cannot constitute murder or other 
form of homicide, whether committed by a mother, a father (as here), 
or a third person. 630 
The Smith court failed to distinguish between the fourteenth 
amendment context and the homicide context. Amazing as the result in 
Smith seems, the underlying notion that the legal treatment of the un-
born ought to be consistent is sound. However, the only satisfactory 
way to make the law logically consistent is to give the unborn protec-
tion in all contexts. If the courts refuse such complete protection, then 
they ought to distinguish recognition of personhood for different con-
texts and at least provide protection to the unborn when abortion is not 
at issue. Under the clear influence of Roe, California chose the worst 
possible result-no protection at all. 
A similar result was reached in Louisiana. In State v. Gyles, 631 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the unborn were not included as 
"human beings" for the purposes of the homicide statute. The court 
noted that the legislature could amend the criminal code, in keeping 
with Roe's restrictions.632 An amendment was adopted the next year, 
making the term "person" denote "a human being from the moment of 
fertilization and implantation. "633 Yet, the same court in State v. 
Brown, 634 where the defendant had beaten a woman and her unborn 
child to death, held the amendment did not expand homicide to include 
feticide. The court cited a need for greater clarity and less confusion 
than the word "person" reflects and a need to remain "within the lim-
problems resulted from medical limitations in determining causation. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 
Mass. 799, 805, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (1984). 
628. CAL PENAL CooE § 187 (West 1988). 
629. 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976). 
630. /d. at 755, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502. 
631. 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975). 
632. /d. at 802. 
633. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7) (West 1986). 
634. 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1979). 
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its fixed in Roe v. Wade. " 636 
These decisions were clearly misguided under a correct analysis of 
Roe. No privacy interests were involved on the part of the woman. The 
legislative intent was clear, and the state had strong interests in 
preventing assaults on unborn children, preventing their physical im-
pairment and death, and protecting a woman's fundamental right of 
choosing to carry her child to term.636 
The result of such decisions, in both California and Louisiana, has 
been noted by one commentator: 
The irony of the Keeler decision is that, had the defendant's as-
sault on the unborn child been somewhat less severe or even less accu-
rate so that the child was born alive before she died from the injuries, 
the crime would clearly have been murder. [A footnote indicated that 
under the born-alive rule the child need only have lived a short time 
after birth to have established homicide.] It is therefore to the defend-
ant's advantage to be sure that he has killed, rather than merely in-
jured, the child in utero. One would have to search long and hard to 
find a better example of inverse justice at work.637 
The Keeler case has had widespread influence. It is regularly 
quoted in cases following its result. For example, Minnesota, in 1985, 
denied a cause of action on behalf of a viable eight and a half month 
fetus under its vehicular homicide statute.638 It cited Keeler twice.639 
Also in 1985, a New York court followed Keeler's lead, prominently 
citing "Keller [sic]."640 In 1984, West Virginia held that the killing of 
a thirty-seven week fetus did not constitute homicide.6n Keeler was 
given special mention. 642 Also in 1984, an appellate court in Florida 
cited Keeler and Roe in holding that the killing of a fetus did not con-
stitute DWI manslaughter nor vehicular homicide.643 This case was re-
markable because, at the time of the automobile accident, the mother 
was in labor with a full-term viable fetus. 644 Further, the legislature 
had expressed its will in the criminal area by including willful feticide 
within the crime of manslaughter.6411 Arguing strict construction, the 
court refused to abandon the born-alive rule for the nonwillful crimes 
635. !d. at 918. 
636. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977). 
637. Note, supra note 478, at 367-68. 
638. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985). 
639. !d. at 628 n.7, 630. 
640. People v. Joseph, 130 Misc. 2d 377, 496 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Orange City Ct. 1985). 
641. State v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W.Va. 1984). 
642. !d. at 808 n.3. 
643. State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
644. !d. at 876. 
645. !d. at 877. 
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charged.646 In 1983, the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided that a 
fetus was not protected by the murder statute in the case of Hollis v. 
Commonwealth. 647 Hollis reportedly took his estranged wife from her 
parents' home to their barn.648 She was twenty-eight to thirty weeks 
pregnant.649 He "told her he did not want a baby, and then forced his 
hand up her vagina intending to destroy the child and deliver the fe-
tus."6110 The court discussed Roe extensively, concluding, "It is funda-
mental that this Court has no authority to disagree with a decision of 
the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Federal 
Constitution. " 6111 
Another widely cited case which followed Keeler was the 1980 
Michigan case of People v. Guthrie. 6112 In 1983, Justice Ryan of the 
Michigan Supreme Court, dissenting in the vacating of leave to appeal 
the case, noted that the full-term infant in that case was "ready for 
birth," and was killed when the mother's vehicle was struck head-on by 
a pickup truck which had "crossed four lanes, including the center-
line."6113 It was the "day before she was scheduled to enter the hospital 
for a Caesarean Section delivery."6114 The Michigan courts applied the 
born-alive rule despite earlier state court recognition of the unborn as 
within the state homicide statute. Instead of resorting to such precedent, 
the Michigan court relied on the outmoded common law born-alive 
rule. 61111 Had the infant been scheduled for delivery a day earlier, and 
been riding home in an infant seat, it would have qualified for protec-
tion under the negligent homicide act. Such results, dependent on the 
vicissitudes of scheduling, are illogical. As dissenting Justice Ryan 
noted: 
The 'rule' is generally understood to derive from the impossibil-
ity, 300 years ago, of determining whether and when a fetus was liv-
ing and when and how it died, and the consequent necessity to pre-
clude the fundamental inquiry whether a fetal death was a human 
death. 
To hold as a matter of law in the waning years of the twentieth 
century that the question of the personhood or humanity of a viable 
646. /d. 
647. 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983). 
648. /d. 
649. /d. 
650. /d. 
651. !d. at 63. 
652. 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), appeal dismissed, 417 Mich. 1006, 334 
N.W.2d 616 (1983) 
653. People v. Guthrie, 417 Mich. 1006, 334 N.W.2d 616 (1983) (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
654. /d. 
655. /d. at 1008-9, 334 N.W.2d at 618-19. 
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unborn child in the ninth month of gestation is governed by a com-
mon law rule of proof invented by the venerable but fallible Sir Ed-
ward Coke in the seventeenth century, to accommodate the medical 
and scientific impossibility of then proving the viability of a fetus, is 
disingenuous reasoning in the extreme.656 
Medical testimony at the preliminary examination indicated that proof 
of life, viability, and cause of death were no longer the problems envi-
sioned in the antiquated born-alive doctrine.657 
In 1982, a New Mexico appellate court also followed Keeler in 
State v. Willis658 by rejecting a vehicular homicide indictment for the 
killing of a fetus. In 1981, New Jersey reached the same conclusion in 
State ex rel. A. W.S., 659 citing Keeler and Guthrie. 
Another widely quoted case is People v. Greer, decided by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court in 1980.660 The court followed Keeler by holding 
it was not murder to kill an eight and a half month fetus by beating.661 
In 1986, Connecticut decided that an unborn, viable fetus was not 
a "human being" within the meaning of the state murder statute, in 
State v. Anonymous. 662 Keeler was heavily relied upon in that 
decision. 663 
Thus, it is evident that Roe and Keeler have been very influen-
tial.664 As discussed above, the reliance on Roe in this context is totally 
unfounded. Keeler presents a more persuasive precedent. It was de-
cided, as were many of the subsequent cases, on the basis of stare deci-
sis, strict construction, and the due process concern of giving adequate 
notice to defendants. 
As this article argues, stare decisis serves important functions. 
However, when the rationale for a precedent is outmoded, such as it is 
for the born alive rule, common sense dictates that the precedent no 
longer be followed. This principle has been widely applied in the anal-
ogous areas of wrongful death statutes and tort law. It is widely ac-
656. /d. at 1007, 334 N.W.2d at 617 (citation omitted). 
657. /d. 
658. 98 N.M. 771, 652 P.2d 1222 (1982). 
659. 182 N.J. Super. 278,440 A.2d 1144 (App. Div. 1981). 
660. 79 Ill 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980). 
661. /d. 
662. 40 Conn. Supp. 498, 516 A.2d 156 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986). 
663. /d. at 500, 516 A.2d at 158-159. In 1987, in the case of Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 
105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987), the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that reckless killing of a viable 
fetus was not within the state manslaughter statute. Arkansas was unique in having an early 
feticide statute which had been expressly repealed. /d. at 587. From this, the court decided that 
legislative intent did not include the unborn within the manslaughter statute. /d. 
664. Another case preceding Roe excluded fetuses from vehicular homicide statutes. State v. 
Dickinson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971). 
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knowledged by the courts that medical science has progressed and the 
law should be "presumed to keep pace with the sciences."665 There 
really is no serious issue here, since even courts which exclude the un-
born from homicide statutes acknowledge the outdated rationale of the 
rule. For example, in Guthrie, 666 the court wrote: 
This panel agrees that the "born alive" rule is outmoded, archaic and 
no longer serves a useful purpose. Modern medical practice has ad-
vanced to the point that, unlike the situation when the rule was first 
developed, the vast majority of viable fetuses will, in the absence of 
some unexpected event, be born alive and healthy. Further, medical 
technology can now accurately determine the stages of fetal develop-
ment and viability. This being so, birth itself in terms of emergence 
from the mother's body should no longer be determinative. We fur-
ther acknowledge that for purposes of actions in tort for wrongful 
death, recovery may be had even if a viable fetus was yet unborn. 667 
Thus, an application of stare decisis here is a brittle, mechanical 
application of the doctrine. Even worse, it works injustice. It is instruc-
tive to compare the rigid way that this precedent has been applied with 
the inflexible/flexible approach used in abortion jurisprudence. In the 
latter, the only inflexible point is that women may have abortions. Eve-
rything else is limply pliable. Here, while denying the validity of the 
rationale, the courts continue to apply the rule. Clearly, the unborn are 
deserving of more protection.668 Even Roe indicated the compelling 
state interest in fetal life where women's privacy interests were not op-
posed.669 Apparently, the explanation for this negative trend of feticide 
law lies somewhere beyond the realm of mere stare decisis. It lies 
largely in the negative influence of Roe. 
The courts denying homicide actions for the unborn also cite the 
due process right of defendants to have notice of what constitutes un-
lawful conduct.670 It is difficult to believe that a defendant who inten-
tionally sought to "stomp" a baby out of the womb,671 or tear it out 
vaginally,672 or stab its mother in the abdomen when she was full-
665. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (1946). 
666. 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), appeal dismissed, 417 Mich. 1006, 334 
N.W.2d 616 (1983). 
667. !d. at 232, 293 N.W.2d at 778. This passage was quoted approvingly in New Jersey's 
rejection of homicide protection for the fetus as well, in 191>1. State ex ref. A.W.S., 182 N.J. 
Super 278, 281,440 A.2d 1144, 1146 (App. Div. 1981). 
668. Parness, supra note 462. 
669. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
670. See, e.g., State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444, 445, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984). 
671. Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481. 
672. Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983). 
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term673 would not believe he was acting criminally. The cases would 
give him notice that, if the child were born and lived only briefly, he 
would be liable for homicide. It seems incredible then to say that he 
had no notice. How was he to be certain the child would not survive to 
draw a breath? Or are we seeking to reward the lethally efficient, who 
make no mistakes? It may be somewhat of a legal fiction to imagine 
that a man in the act of stabbing his wife in her pregnant womb is 
counting on the rule that he is absolved of criminal liability if he suc-
ceeds in killing the child. At least, he should be on notice of the doc-
trine of transferred intent;674 if he attacks the mother with malice and 
kills the unborn child unintentionally, he should be liable for having 
intended the act.675 
Furthermore, with the rapid growth of fetal rights in tort law, 
especially wrongful death, it should come as no great surprise to an 
intentional killer of an unborn child if some state decides he has mur-
dered a person. This is especially true in a state like Minnesota which 
has been active and well-known for advancing fetal rights in its much-
publicized case, Verkennes v. Corniea, 676 where it recognized the un-
born as persons.677 
Finally, there is a simple solution to the concern with notice. 
While it works tragic injustice in an initial case, the employment of a 
holding with prospective effect only solves the dilemma easily. This so-
lution was found satisfactory in Commonwealth v. Cass678 and in State 
v. Horne. 679 
The remaining argument of the majority680 is the doctrine of con-
struing criminal statutes strictly. The purposes behind the rule are fair-
ness681 and avoidance of judicial usurpation of the legislative func-
tion.682 In Cass, Massachusetts decided that fairness to the defendant 
(notice) was really the central issue of narrow construction and resolved 
it, as discussed above, by prospective application of its rule. 683 Of 
course, the principle of fairness is one that should be considered both as 
(,n State 1 Horne. 282 S.C 444, :l19 S.E.2d 703 (1984) 
1>74. !d. at 446-47, .119 S.E.2d at 704. 
(,7S. !d. 
(,7(, 229 !\linn. y,s_ :l8 N.W.2d 8:l8 (1949). 
1>77. Unfortunately, Minnesota rejected this argument in State v. Soto, .17H N.W.2d 625 
(1-.linn 1'!85) 
(,78 392 \Ltss. 7')'), 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984). 
67'!. 282 S.C. 444, :ll9 S.E.2d 703 (1984). 
(>80. The born-alive rule, in criminal cases, has been followed by 24 of the 26 jurisdictions 
which have considered it. Solo, :l78 N.W.2d at 628 (including Solo in the sum). 
681. Cass, 192 Ma.". at 804, 467 N.E.2d at 1327. 
682. Solo, :l78 N.W. at 627-28. 
68:l. Ca.1.1, :l92 Mass. at 807-08, 467 N.E.2d at 1329. 
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it relates to the alleged criminal and to the victim. Clearly, the victim's 
rights have received short shrift in most courts. 
The other foundation of the narrow construction rule involves the 
nature of the judicial function. The Soto court argued: "The rule of 
strict construction of criminal statutes is essential to guard against the 
creation of criminal offenses outside the contemplation of the legisla-
ture, under the guise of 'judicial construction.' " 684 
Two courts have stood against the trend denying fetal protection 
under homicide statutes and have discussed the rules of strict construc-
tion of criminal statutes. These will be examined to determine if their 
logic is compelling. Do they properly address the issue of common law 
development of criminal statutes? Of course, the nature of the statutes 
will affect the outcome in individual cases. However, general themes 
are transferable among the codes and cases. 
In the 1984 case of State v. Horne,68~ South Carolina announced 
that a viable fetus would henceforth be a person for purposes of the 
homicide law. In its rationale, it first set forth a stare decisis argument 
based on consistency: "It would be grossly inconsistent for us to con-
strue a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purpose.s of imposing civil lia-
bility while refusing to give it a similar classification in the criminal 
context."686 Then the court noted prior changes made in the criminal 
law by the South Carolina Supreme Court itself: 
This Court has the right and the duty to develop the common 
law of South Carolina to better serve an ever-changing society as a 
whole. In this regard, the criminal law has been the subject of change. 
The fact this particular issue has not been raised or ruled on before 
does not mean we are prevented from declaring the common law as it 
should be. Therefore, we hold an action for homicide may be main-
tained in the future when the state can prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the fetus involved was viable .... 687 
The more famous case of Commonwealth v. Cass688 was also de-
cided in 1984, by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Mas-
sachusetts had the advantage of a prominent case, extending wrongful 
death rights to the unborn,689 published a year before the vehicular 
homicide statute was passed. Thus, the court could reasonably argue 
that the legislature was presumed to be aware of state court develop-
684. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1985). 
685. 282 S.C 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984). 
686. /d. at 445, 319 S.E.2d at 704. 
687. /d. (citations omitted). 
688. 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984). 
689. Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975). 
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ments, and so must have intended the definition of a "person" in Mone 
to apply to the new statute.690 
Despite a similar sequence of case and statute, Minnesota recently 
rejected the Cass approach.691 The court noted that the two courts 
which had rejected the born-alive rule were "common law" jurisdic-
tions, while Minnesota was a "code state," i.e., the l'vfinnesota legisla-
ture specifically abolished common law crimes.692 The Minnesota court 
noted its authority to construe the law, but said a change of such mag-
nitude in the criminal law was "within the province of the legisla-
ture."693 This is the common argument of the majority, which follows 
Keeler. 694 
In analyzing this argument, it should be acknowledged at the out-
set that the general rule is correct. More judicial restraint is to be en-
couraged. It is troubling, however, when courts, including the United 
States Supreme Court, can "legislate" freely to strip the unborn of per-
sonhood, but suddenly cannot do so to grant it. In addition, the legisla-
tures need to act clearly and unambiguously to protect the state interest 
in the unborn. However, where they have attempted to do so, as in 
California and Louisiana, the courts have offered a hostile reception.6911 
Legislators must wonder if the effort will be effective. The kind of pre-
cision the courts apparently desire is time consuming, as the whole code 
must be overhauled. Minor adjustments have been rejected. 696 Of 
course, legislatures are busy with many other matters, as well, which 
may seem more pressmg. 
With this in mind, is there any way the courts can provide justice 
in this area? Surely, one who would intentionally beat a fetus to death 
must be deterred from such conduct. The answer lies in the nature of 
the born-alive rule itself. The born-alive rule is based on medical limi-
tations and is rooted in the common law. The medical proof problems 
are largely gone. The question remains whether the legislatures in-
tended to incorporate in their statutes the common law meaning of 
terms as a static concept or as a dynamic concept. Did the term "per-
son" or "human being" in the statute mean whatever the common law 
would incorporate therein when applied, or what it meant at the time 
690. Cass, 392 Mass. at 801, 467 N.E.2d at 1326. The principle is the same as the presump-
tion that the legislature adopted common law definitions extant at the time a statute was 
promulgated. 
691. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 629-30 (Minn. 1985). 
692. /d. at 630. 
693. /d. 
694. Minnesota, likewise, cites Keeler for this argument. /d. 
695. See supra text accompanying notes 626-35. 
696. /d. 
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passed, even if based on changed scientific facts? 
The principle was established in Bonbrest that "[t]he law is pre-
sumed to keep pace with the sciences .... "697 Every state has adopted 
that principle by allowing a tort action for prenatal harm.698 If such a 
presumption is at work, then the legislative intent must be to adopt a 
dynamic concept of the common law. In other words, the definition 
under the presumption would be one based on current legal and scien-
tific understanding, not that of hundreds of years past, which is no 
longer appropriate. Even "code states" use common law definitions of 
terms not defined in the code. These definitions should be allowed to 
develop with the common law, and not be frozen in time because a 
legislature chose to use them. Of course, the courts should not violate 
the clear intent of the legislature,699 but where the legislature has not 
precluded reasonable development of the law, it should be allowed. 
There is a clear distinction between the judicial actions in Roe and 
in Cass. In Roe, the Supreme Court was interpreting the Constitution, 
which historically has entailed an analysis of the intent of the framers 
of the original document or the drafters of its amendments. The Su-
preme Court had no other legitimate authority than to perform such 
analysis. It was not authorized to create law as a common law court. In 
Cass, the court was acting properly within the common law tradition. 
Thus, for a common law court, it is wholly appropriate to apply the 
principle of keeping pace with science. When courts in code states em-
ploy common law interpretations of terms left undefined by the legisla-
ture, that, too, is a proper function of the courts. 
However, when the Supreme Court in Roe700 and in Akron701 de-
clared that science is the controlling factor, over the intent of the fram-
ers or judicial precedent, it has usurped the role of the framers in the 
same way that a common law court would if going contrary to the 
express intent of a legislature in enacting a statute. 
For example, if a legislature has defined death as the cessation of 
respiration or heart function, even if science has moved to a brain activ-
ity definition of death, the court may not legitimately adopt a brain 
death test against the will of the legislature. The legislature alone is 
authorized to make such policy decisions. However, if statutory law 
does not define death, but employs common law definitions, the judici-
697. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 143. 
698. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 467, at 368. 
699. This was done in California and Louisiana under the guise of strict construction. See 
supra text accompanying notes 626-35. 
700. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 163. 
701. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,434 (1983) (legislatures 
may not "depart from accepted medical practice"). 
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ary may keep pace with science. Judge-made law-as the common law 
is-may legitimately be altered by judges. The Constitution, of course, 
is not judge-made law. It may not be altered by the Supreme Court-at 
least not under constitutional authority. 
However, within legitimate authority to construe statutes and de-
velop common law, courts retain a duty to so construe statutes to avoid 
inequity. Our judicial system is based on the common law tradition, 
which influences even "code states." This tradition is a dynamic one, 
particularly suited to changing circumstances. Judicial "activism" 
within limits is a part of its genius. One hears cries of "judicial activ-
ism" by the dissent in Cass102 and by the dissent in Doe v. Bolton. 703 
The abortion cases, Roe and Bolton, were a dangerous sort of activism, 
clearly usurping the role of the legislatures, invalidating the legislative 
determinations of "a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the ma-
jority sentiment in those States,"704 on the basis of a right nowhere 
mentioned in the Constitution, nor easily found among the shadows 
("penumbras") thereof. 706 
By contrast, decisions such as Mone and Cass were a positive sort 
of "activism."706 They represent the common law at work. In such situ-
ations, where the legislature has failed to act, injustice is being done, 
and precedents from collateral areas indicate a change is due, it is es-
sential that the courts act. Keeton favorably argued for an expansion of 
such judicial involvement as legislatures are increasingly involved with 
other matters. 707 
[T]he continuing accumulation of precedents tends to narrow some-
what the area of interstitial creativity and to increase the need for 
candid breaks with precedent .... [I]t is never a satisfactory answer 
to an argument for judicial creativity that the need for change is one 
702. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 810,467 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (1984) (Wilkins, 
]., dissenting) (calling the majority opinion an "exercise of raw judicial power"). 
703. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist,]. dissent-
ing)(calling the majority opinion "an exercise of raw judicial power"). 
704. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
705. /d. at 152. 
706. This assertion of good and bad forms of judicial "activism" is not inconsistent. An excel-
lent concise discussion of the uses of the historical context of the due process clause in its interpre-
tation is contained in the United States' brief in Thornburgh. Brief for the United States, supra 
note 35, at 25-29. One of the uses of history set forth is "to take account of developments in society 
and the law." /d. at 27. However, "the Court has always taken pains to trace its point of origin 
back to specific constitutional provisions by a route either influential or historical." /d. In Roe, the 
"connections by either route were wholly missing." /d. The brief continued, "The story traced by 
the Court does not show a steady and growing acceptance of a point of view until the practice in a 
few jurisdictions can be characterized as anomalous." /d. The decisions in Mone and Cass are of 
this latter type, well supported by the "historical trajectory." !d. at 28. 
707. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 463, 484 (1962). 
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that could be accomplished by statute. Where a need for reform is 
clear but no reforming statute has been enacted, courts must choose 
among the unsatisfactory precedent and other rules open to judicial 
adoption . . . . 708 
279 
This flexibility has made the common law system immensely prac-
tical. Since legislators cannot foresee every possible situation when en-
acting a law, there remains need for judicial interpretation. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court comprehended the 
need and correctly asserted its right and duty, in such a situation, to 
interpret the statutory term dynamically, in light of changed circum-
stances. It is no coincidence that the court quoted Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, an earlier member of the same court, who dictated the rule of 
no rights for the unborn: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and 
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. 709 
Thus, Massachusetts has come full circle. Whether others will follow is 
unclear. What is clear is that the unborn have been stripped of protec-
tion and the courts and legislatures need to act to restore it. 
The protection which was afforded the unborn before Roe was 
primarily provided by the state abortion statutes rather than homicide 
laws. When the United States Supreme Court in the 1973 Roe and 
Bolton decisions declared the abortion laws of Texas and Georgia un-
constitutional, it removed the shield around the unborn. 
The protection had been in place for some time. As early as the 
thirteenth century in England, the killing of a quickened710 fetus was a 
homicide, according to a contemporary commentator, Henry de 
Bracton.711 William Blackstone noted this view, along with the subse-
quent view of Edward Coke, that such an act was only a "heinous 
misdeme[a)nor."712 In 1803, the Miscarriage of Women Act was 
promulgated in England, increasing the crime for willful killing of a 
fetus to a felony and pushing protection back to quickening.713 
708. !d. 
709. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 805-06, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (1984) (quot-
ing Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897)). 
710. The law has historically protected the unborn from the beginning of life, as understood 
by the science of the day. This protection was pushed back to conception with the discovery of cell 
development in the early nineteenth century. See supra note 538. 
711. 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (S. Thorne ed. 1968) 
(cited in Roe, 410 U.S. at 134 n.23). 
712. I W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 129-30. 
713. LORD Eu.t:NBOROUGH's AcT, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58, §§ 1-2. 
280 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 3 
The United States followed the English pattern.714 In 1821, Con-
necticut prohibited causing the miscarriage of a quick child.716 New 
York in 1828 extended the protection to those not yet quickened.716 
Most states followed suit with felony statutes protecting even the un-
quickened.717 Even though penalties were increased over time, legisla-
tors were apparently affected by the born-alive rule, resulting in "a 
gross disparity in the protection of potential life and of continued 
life."718 Still, criminal prosecution and penalties were generally availa-
ble, especially for willful feticide, until the abortion statutes were de-
clared unconstitutional by Roe and Bolton. 719 While Roe applied only 
to consensual abortions, it removed the abortion statutes leaving the un-
born without protection. Although the states had already expressed 
their intent to protect the unborn from attack by the criminal abortion 
statutes, the courts have been generally unwilling to further this intent 
by applying the legislative intent when interpreting homicide statutes. 
Since the legislatures have been slow to act, the unborn may be killed 
willfully, without fear of criminal sanctions, in most jurisdictions. 
Perhaps the best hope for fetal protection in the criminal area lies 
in comprehensive legislation to protect the unborn in non-abortion con-
texts. Three states are leading the way in this area. In 1987, North 
Dakota enacted such a comprehensive statute,720 joining Minnesota721 
and Illinois.722 In 1987, the Eleventh Circuit declared a Georgia feti-
cide statute as constitutional and not conflicting with Roe. The criminal 
defendant, Smith, shot a pregnant woman and killed her unborn 
child.723 He contended the feticide statute was unconstitutional "be-
cause there [was] no unlawful taking of human life, and because the 
statute contradicts ... Roe. " 724 The court declared the first contention 
"frivolous" and the second "without merit. " 726 The fact that Roe de-
clared a fetus not to be a "person" was "immaterial" where the state's 
interests did not conflict with a woman's right to abort. 726 In 1987, in 
714. Parness, supra note 462, at I 08. 
715. See J. MoHR, supra note 425, at 21 (citing CoNN. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 14, 16, at 152, IS3 
(1821)). 
716. /d. at 26-27 (citing N.Y. REv. STAT. pt. IV, ch. I, tit. II, §§ 8, 9 at 550). 
717. Parness, supra note 462, at I 09. 
718. /d. 
719. /d. at 110. 
720. N.D. CENT. ConE§ 12.1-17.1 (Supp. 1987). 
721. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609. 
722. See, e.g., ILL REv. STAT., ch.36, § 9-1.1. 
723. Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386, 1388 (lith Cir. 1987). 
724. /d. 
725. /d. 
726. I d. at 1388 & n.2. 
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the case of State v. Wickstrom, 727 the conviction of a man who beat and 
kicked a pregnant woman's abdomen, causing fetal death, was upheld 
under the state's criminal abortion law.728 Such prosecutions may be 
possible elsewhere, but the need for comprehensive legislative action is 
clear. 
We see then, that in the criminal setting, Roe's denial of per-
sonhood to the unborn violated the principles of stare decisis by creat-
ing instability, promoting logical inconsistency, and inhibiting predict-
ability and fairness. It destroyed legal protection for unborn children 
from homicide and inhibited the growth of alternative protection. Such 
inhibition was not mandated by Roe-which recognized the state inter-
est in potential life where the mother's privacy rights do not con-
flict-but it was inevitable, from the shoddy reasoning and inadequate 
protection of the unborn in Roe, that other courts would follow its lead. 
5. Laws relating to respect 
Recognition of the dignity of human life is important to create a 
climate where life is respected and, thus, not readily taken. Some states 
have passed laws promoting this dignity for the unborn. These laws are 
in keeping with Roe's recognition of the state interest in protecting "po-
tential" life. 729 The laws take two forms. First, some statutes relate to 
the humane disposal of fetal remains. Second, other statutes proscribe 
fetal experimentation, except to preserve fetal life. 
The first type of statute, requiring humane disposal of fetal re-
mains, has been adopted by a number of states.730 Such a statute was 
overturned for vagueness in Akron. 731 The Akron Court found that a 
"decent burial" might be intended, rather than prevention of "mindless 
dumping" as the City of Akron argued. 732 However, in Akron, the 
Court left open the possibility of clear legislation which did not burden 
the mother's right of privacy.733 
In Leigh v. Olson, 734 a district court overturned a statute requiring 
the woman seeking abortion to select a method of disposal, even though 
727. 405 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. App. 1987). 
728. /d. at 10. 
729. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
730. Parness, supra note 462, at I 02 & n.12. 
731. Akron, 462 U.S. at 451. 
732. /d. 
733. /d. 
734. 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980). Cf Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Cincinnati, 822 
F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1987); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir. 1987), reh 'g granted 
and opinion vacated, 835 F.2d 1545 (8th Cir. 1987), reinstated and (en bane) reh 'g granted, 
835 F.2d 1546 (8th Cir. 1987), reversed, 853 F.2d 1452, petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 
2105 (U.S. Feb 3, 1989) 
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one choice was to let someone else decide. 735 The court found this to be 
too great a burden on the privacy right. No financial cost need have 
been involved and the state had a legitimate interest in promoting re-
spect for life, including an aborted fetus. 736 However, in the court's 
mind, the psychological burden proved too great. There is, however, 
substantial room here for the states to promote the dignity of the 
fetus. 737 
Fetal experimentation has been barred by some states, unless it 
would save fetal life.738 According to one commentator, such statutes 
"suggest that in contemporary American society, the fetus is sometimes 
accorded the same dignity as a human being born alive."739 Such pro-
tection reflects "significant sentiment" on the part of legislators that the 
unborn are entitled to respect. 740 
The fetal disposal and experimentation statutes reflect a respect 
for the unborn which is out of step with the approach taken in Roe. 
Thus, despite the dictates of Roe, the people through their elected rep-
resentatives continue to express their belief in the essential humanity of 
the unborn. 
6. Summary 
The holding of Roe has been shown to be out of step with the rest 
of the law as it relates to the unborn. The long legal history of fetal 
rights has been one of significant and expanding scope. The develop-
ment of medical technology has solved problems of providing proof 
which existed in former centuries. This has led to a dramatic turn-
around in tort law. However, Roe has inhibited this growth in the area 
of criminal protection by stripping the fetus of personhood and the pro-
tection of the abortion laws. The inhibiting effect of Roe flies in the 
face of logic, medical technology and the consistency principles of stare 
decisis. 
While Roe and its progeny offer little protection to the postviable 
fetus,741 other areas of the law offer protection back to conception and 
even before. These protections in other areas are much stronger than 
the weak protection offered in Roe. Clearly Roe is out of step with the 
735. Leigh, 497 F. Supp at 1351-52. 
736. Parness, supra note 462, at 146. 
737. /d. 
738. /d. at 102 (giving examples in Louisiana, Illinois, and the report National Comm'n for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Researrh, U.S. Dep't of Health, 
Educ. & Welfare, Report and Recommendations: Research on the Fetus 61-62, 67, 74 (1975)). 
739. Parness, supra note 462, at 102. 
740. /d. 
741. The "mother's health" exception has been interpreted very broadly. 
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long-established and developing fetal rights in the rest of the law. 
While Roe was wrong in its analysis of fetal rights in 1973, abortion 
jurisprudence deviates even further from the rest of the law since Roe. 
C. Medical Regulations 
In his majority opinion in Roe, Justice Blackmun acknowledged 
that the abortion controversy raised philosophical, moral, religious, and 
medical questions.742 The Court's ruling focused primarily on the med-
ical aspect. The trimester scheme was based on medical concepts, defi-
nitions, determinations, and technological capabilities. A key player in 
the scheme was the attending physician. The woman was to make her 
decision in consultation with her doctor. 743 The doctor was given great 
leeway in exercising his virtually unassailable discretion. 744 
However, the medical criteria employed in the Roe trimester 
scheme were faulty and inadequate as a basis for a constitutional right. 
The unfettered discretion and deference afforded physicians in the 
abortion context is anomalous in light of the extensive regulation of 
medical practice. Also, the treatment of the informed consent doctrine 
in the abortion context is out of step with the current trend of the law 
and regresses to a widely-rejected model of the physician-patient rela-
tionship. Even reasonable recording and reporting requirements cannot 
withstand the Court's attack. These are the topics of this section. 
I. Trimester medical criteria 
The Court in Roe decided that the state could not regulate abor-
tion in the first trimester, as abortion was considered safer than contin-
uing the pregnancy during that period. 7411 In reaching this conclusion, 
Justice Blackmun referred to medical data from the appellant and 
amici briefs. 746 The studies cited supported the proposition that abor-
tion was safer during this period.747 However, a review of opposing 
amici briefs reveals contradictory data ignored by the Court. 748 The 
742. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116-17. 
743. ld. at 163 
744. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191 (1973). 
745. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 163. 
746. /d. at 149. The Court's trimester scheme should not be confused with the mcdic;d divi-
sion of pregnancy into three three-month periods. See Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 1>31. 635 
(W.D. Ky. 1974), affd, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Speciall'ro;ect, Sun•q of Abortion Law, 
1980 ARIZ. St. L.J. 67, 139-42. 
747. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149. 
748. See Brief for Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of tht· American Collee;e of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology at 33-50, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brief for Robert L. 
Sassone at 25-36, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Court gave undue deference to certain segments of the medical commu-
nity over others. Moreover, the asserted facts were in reality opinions of 
certain medical groups. 
Even the Court's language in Roe indicated the uncertainty of the 
data. The Court stated initially, "Mortality rates for women undergo-
ing early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low 
as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth."749 Later the Court 
referred back to this statement, concluding, "This is so because of the 
now established medical fact, referred to above at [prior quotation], 
that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less 
than mortality in normal childbirth."7110 Subsequent articles and studies 
have supported the argument that the Roe Court's medical fact was 
really ill-founded medical opinion. 7111 The Roe Court's extreme defer-
ence to such opinions, and to what were basically legislative facts, was 
unwarranted.7112 With this foundation removed, the first trimester rule 
is without a basis. Moreover, as medical technology changes, the rela-
tive safety of abortion and childbirth will remain a mobile guideline. 
The Roe Court also relied on medical factors in drawing the line 
between the second and third trimesters, which was placed at viability. 
At viability, the state's interest in fetal life was to become compel-
ling.7113 However, determining viability is a difficult task, leaving legis-
7 49. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added). 
750. !d. at 163 (emphasis added). 
751. These analyses have further demonstrated that the opinions on v1hich the Court relied 
were based on very questionable data. See Hilgers & O'Hare, Abortion Related Maternal Mor-
tality: An In-Depth Analysis, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 69-91 (T. Hilgers, 
D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1981) (application of more accurate formulas produced a finding that 
natural pregnancy is safer than legal abortion in both the first and second twenty weeks of preg-
nancy). See also Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amend-
ment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 1295-03 (1975). 
752. See generally Destro, supra note 751, at 1295-03. Such reliance on legislative facts is 
especially problematic in cases involving fundamental constitutional questions. Opinions on medi-
cal restrictions of abortion are particularly prone to predisposition. While adjudicative facts may 
be challenged at the trial level and are subject to the rules of evidence, legislative facts are usually 
presented at the level of flat assertions with little or no chance for rebuttal. Thus, the basic precept 
of the adversary system was neglected. See generally Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the 
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. 
Rtv. 1187 (1975). 
The Court's heavy reliance on Cyril Means' article in Roe was particularly inappropriate in 
this respect. Roe, 410 U.S. at 135 n.26, 136, 140-41; Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: 
Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Lfgisla-
tive Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y. L. F. 335 (1971). Subsequent 
studies have soundly criticized the accuracy of much of the information contained in his article. 
See, e.g., Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FoRDHAM L. REV. 
807 (197"\); Destro, supra note 751, at 1267-92; Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-
Century Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 29 (1985). 
753. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. 
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latures with an almost insurmountable task in asserting their declared 
compelling interest in fetal life and doctors in the precarious position of 
having possible criminal penalties flow from an erroneous judgment of 
nonviability. The result has been more litigation, resulting in a wide 
berth being required of legislatures when legislating around the point 
of viability, and virtually unchallenged discretion being allowed physi-
cians in making the determination of viability.7114 As with the line be-
tween the first and second trimesters, the viability line is a function of 
advances in medical technology. 
In sum, while much of the medical data used in Roe was suspect 
at the time, medical technology has continued to alter the landscape, 
making the trimester scheme almost unrecognizable in its present form 
and on a certain "collision course with itself' in the future. 71111 The 
resounding criticisms of the creation of a constitutional right, which 
will vary year-by-year, have already been given and need not be 
repeated. 7116 
2. Physician discretion 
The unchecked discretion granted to physicians in the abortion 
context is also inappropriate. Consistent with its view of abortion as 
primarily a medical matter, the Court has placed great emphasis on the 
physician-patient relationship. In Roe, for example, the woman in her 
first trimester was declared free, in consultation with her physician, to 
choose an abortion.7117 Later in the opinion, the Court reiterated the 
point that ''the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and 
primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest 
with the physician."7116 
Subsequent opinions have shielded the physician from scrutiny. In 
Bolton, a scheme was invalidated which required review of the physi-
cian's decision by other physicians and a hospital committee. 7119 The 
754. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 63-65. Danforth stressed the flexibility of the Roe viability 
concept in upholding abortion legislation. /d. at 65. In Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) 
the Court struck down a state statute very similar to Danforth's. The fatal flaw was vagueness. 
/d. at 393. It is ironic that attempts to make the viability concept more definite have been struck 
down as too restrictive, while the formula, or very similar ones, used by the Court are inherently 
vague. The result is that little protection of the compelling state interest in fetal life is extant. The 
testimony in Danforth produced a wide range of definitions of viability. /d. at 396 n.15. See 
generally Note, Current Technology Affecting Supreme Court Abortion jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 1221 (1982). 
755. Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
756. See supra section 11-A-3 of this article. 
757. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 163. 
758. /d. at 166. 
759. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197-200. 
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physician-patient decision has also been shielded from familial veto,760 
regulation of the viability determination,761 regulation of the informed 
consent dialogue,762 regulation of the abortion method,763 all but very 
limited recordkeeping,764 and various standards of care imposed to pro-
tect fetal life. 765 
This extreme deference to the medical profession is also evident in 
the language of the Court's opinions, which evince a high degree of 
trust and faith in the medical profession. Of course, this view is not 
shared by many legislatures, which repeatedly attempt to regulate phy-
sicians' discretion in performing abortions. The Court, by contrast, re-
fers "to the conscientious physician, particularly the obstetrician, whose 
professional activity is concerned with the physical and mental welfare, 
the woes, the emotions of his female patients."766 The Court has ex-
pressed its belief that most physicians are "good" and that they will 
have sympathy and understanding for the pregnant patient.767 Former 
Chief Justice Burger exhibited this sort of respect in his concurrence to 
Bolton. He said "that the vast majority of physicians observe the stan-
dards of their profession, and act only on the basis of carefully deliber-
ated medical judgments. "768 
This is hopefully true. However, criminal statutes are not gener-
ally rejected by the Court on the basis that most people are law abid-
ing. Furthermore, the picture painted by the Court is anachronistic. 
The Court portrays the physician as carefully consulting with the wo-
man about possible medical and psychological harms, as well as long-
range effects on her family and future. 769 Unfortunately, this is often 
unrealistic, as depicted in the award-winning series in the Chicago 
Sun-Times, The Abortion Profiteers. 770 More than fifty-five percent of 
the approximately one and a half million abortions performed annually 
are done in abortion clinics.771 Many of these clinics operate at a high 
volume and doctors working there have an interest in the profits of the 
760. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52, 67-75. 
761. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388-90 (1979). 
762. Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-47; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764. 
763. Danforth, 428 US. at 75-79. 
764. !d. at 79-81. 
765. See, e.g., id. at 81-83. 
766. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 196. 
767. !d. at 197. 
768. !d. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
769. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
770. See infra notes 1035-56 and accompanying text. See also Goldsmith, J<;arly Abortion in 
a Family Planning Clinic, 6 FAM. PLAN. P~:RSP. 119 (1974). 
771. Henshaw, Forrest & Blaine, supra note 238, at 120 table 1. 
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clinic. 772 Often the doctor does not even see the patient until she is on 
the operating table.773 Justice Stewart took note of such practice in his 
concurrence in Danforth: 
The counseling ... occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be 
performed .... It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that 
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another .... 
The physician takes no part in this counseling process .... Counsel-
ing is typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possi-
ble complications, and birth control techniques .... 774 
Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Akron, called attention to the 
"fact that the record [in Akron] show[ ed] that the [physician-patient] 
relationship [was] nonexistent."7711 She cited Judge Cornelia G. Ken-
nedy, who declared "that the decision to terminate a pregnancy was 
made not by the woman in conjunction with her physician, but by the 
woman and the lay employees of the abortion clinic, the income of 
which is dependent upon the woman's choosing to have an abortion."776 
With good reason, therefore, the states have endeavored to regulate 
perceived abuses and to assert their allegedly compelling interests. 
Under traditional rules, this ought to have been permitted. 
a. Substantive due process. Indicative of the imprecision in abor-
tion jurisprudence is the confusion over whose right is fundamental. 
While the abortion right seems to be the woman's, certain issues, such 
as informed consent requirements, have been decided on the basis of 
their effect on the physician.777 This emphasis on the physician's free-
dom to practice medicine unfettered by the state is not consistent with 
traditional rules governing regulation of the medical profession. 
Historically, the states have had the recognized authority under 
their police power to regulate the practice of medicine. 778 For a brief 
time, during the heyday of substantive due process, the Court recog-
nized a right to practice medicine as guaranteed by the fourteenth 
amendment. 779 
772. See infra notes 1035-56 and accompanying text. 
773. Wardle, supra note 19, at 245. 
774. 428 U.S. at 91 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for the Appellants at 43-44, 
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976)(omissions by Stewart,].)). 
775. Akron, 462 U.S. at 773 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
776. 651 F.2d at 1217 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
777. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763; Akron, 462 U.S. at 445; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8; 
Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, 
106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986). ' 
778. An excellent article, tracing the rights of physicians in relation to the doctrine of in-
formed consent, is Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CASE W. REs. L. 
Rt:v. 329, 351-56 (1988). 
779. /d.; Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60. Cf Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, Ill, 115 
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As substantive due process was rejected, so too were such claims 
for the medical profession. In the same year that Roe was decided, the 
Court overruled Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 780 a 1928 case which had 
upheld the property rights of pharmacists in their pharmacy business 
against state regulation. 781 The overruling Court declared that substan-
tive due process rights in medical matters were ended, and that "states 
have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices 
in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws 
do not run afoul of some specific constitutional prohibition, or of some 
valid federal law .... "782 Subsequent cases have likewise rejected a 
substantive due process claim by the medical profession.783 In response 
to claims of "unduly oppressive and unwarranted restrictions"784 on the 
dental profession, one circuit court remarked that "[ t ]he courts have so 
often sustained identical legislative provisions"78~ that it was "sur-
prised"786 at the contention. 
Thus, no longer is a right to practice medicine free from regula-
tion recognized.787 That the Supreme Court has revived such a notion 
in abortion jurisprudence is further evidence of the inconsistency be-
tween abortion and ordinary case law. 
Since the Court has never explicitly held that physicians have a 
right to practice abortions free from state interference,788 it should cease 
relying on such a concept. The current sub silentio recognition of the 
right in the abortion context is anomalous.789 Thus, there is no consti-
tutional basis for the extreme deference of the Court to the medical 
profession, and the unassailable discretion accorded abortion doctors is 
inappropriate. 
b. Police Power. Outside of the detour into substantive due 
processa in abortion case law, he right of the states to regulate the prac-
tice of medicine has been largely unquestioned. Of course, constitu-
tional requirements must be observed, but the state's police power has 
(1928) 
780. 278 U.S. 105 (1928). 
781. North Dakota State Bd. v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973). 
782. /d. at 165 (quoting Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949)). 
783. Jipping, supra note 778, at 349-51 (citing Semler v. Oregon Bd. of Dental Examiners, 
294 U.S. 608 (1935) and Johnston v. Board of Dental Examiners, 134 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1943) 
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 758). 
784. Johnston v. Board of Dental Examiners, 134 F.2d 9, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1943). 
785. /d. at 11. 
786. /d. 
787. Jipping, supra note 778, at 351. 
788. /d. at 349. 
789. Further confusion is caused by the failure of the Court to precisely define the right. Is it 
a right to an empty womb, a dead fetus, control of one's own body, control over certain derisions, 
an abortion, or merely a choice between abortion and birth? /d. at 339. 
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traditionally governed medical regulation.790 Thus, the medical profes-
sion is subject to regulation to secure the people "against the conse-
quences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and 
fraud," 791 especially in matters "which closely concern the public 
health. " 792 In fact, declared the Court, "[ t ]here is perhaps no profession 
more properly open to [state] regulation than that which embraces the 
practitioners of medicine."793 
Exercise of state police power has led to licensing requirements,794 
ongoing supervision,7911 revocation of licenses,796 regulation of the com-
mercial aspects of medical practice,797 and defining the content of prac-
tice itself.798 In areas analogous to abortion, such as sterilization and 
warning labeling of contraceptives, regulation has been commonplace. 
For example, many states have sterilization statutes incorporating re-
quirements of age, written consent, and what information will consti-
tute informed consent.799 Parental consent may be required for minors 
to be sterilized,800 a second physician may be required for consulta-
tion,801 and spousal consent has been required.802 Some states require a 
waiting period after written, informed consent is required.803 This is in 
recognition of the permanent and generally irreversible nature of the 
procedure and the potential psychological sequelae. Similarly, an abor-
tion is a permanent and irreversible termination of one's offspring, po-
tentially fraught with similar ills. Surely a waiting period would be 
within the state power. However, even a twenty-four hour waiting pe-
riod was struck down by the Akron Court.804 
Ironically, the reasoning in Akron was that "[ t ]he decision 
790. /d. at 351-52. 
791. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) 
792. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910). 
793. /d. 
794. Jipping, supra note 778, at 353. 
795. /d. at 353-54. 
796. /d. 
797. /d. at 354-55. 
798. /d. at 3S'i-56. 
799. Cow. REv. STAT. § 25-6-102(6) (1982); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78q (West 
1981); DEL Com. ANN. tit. 16, § 5702 (Supp. 1988); GA. Com: ANN. § 31-20-2 (1985); Kv 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 212.345 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); ML RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 
7004 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT § 90-271 (1986); OR. REv. STAT.§ 435.305 (1985); TENN. Com 
ANN.§ 68-34-108 (1986); Ur. CooE ANN.§ 64-10-3 (1987); VA. Com ANN.§ 54-325.9 (1982); 
W VA. Com. ANN. § 16-11-1 (1985). 
800. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. § 25-6-1 02(6) (1982) 
801. GA. CoDE ANN. § 31-20-2 (1985). 
802. /d. 
803. Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212.347 (Michie/Bobbs-Mcrrill 1983) (24 hrs.); VA. CoDE 
ANN. § 54-325.9 (1982) (30 days for persons who are neither natural nor adoptive parents). 
804. Akron, 462 U.S. at 450. 
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whether to proceed with an abortion is one as to which it is important 
to 'affor[d] the physician adequate discretion in the exercise of his med-
ical judgment.' " 8011 The Court added, "In accordance with the ethical 
standards of the profession, a physician will advise the patient to defer 
the abortion when he thinks this will be beneficial to her."806 
c. Nature of abortion. One commentator has noted that, while 
abortion is a medical procedure in that a physician must perform it, it 
is not medically indicated in ninety-eight percent of abortion cases.807 
Thus, despite the fact that abortion is one of the most common surgical 
procedures today, in only a small fraction of cases is it indicated for 
physical or psychological health reasons. 808 It most correctly compares 
to elective surgery.809 As noted by one writer, the result of this is that 
"the physician's special training and judgment are obviously less im-
portant in the abortion context than with most other medical 
procedures. " 810 
The Court has recognized the generally non-medical reasons for 
abortion in its opinions. In Bolton, the Supreme Court gave the concept 
of health a very broad definition to include such items as family and 
work concerns-whatever related to "well-being."811 Thus, in finding 
reasons for women to have abortions, the Court has given health the 
broadest possible interpretation. By contrast, when considering health 
in the context of the state's compelling interest in protecting the health 
of women considering or procuring abortions, the Court has adopted a 
very narrow view of health. This "dichotomous definition of 'health' 
lies at the heart of [the Supreme Court's] inappropriate review of in-
formed consent statutes."812 
Before proceeding to the topic of informed consent, it should be 
observed that the nature of abortion as predominantly an elective proce-
dure, in the usual sense of the term, makes the extreme deference to the 
special diagnostic and treatment skills of physicians inappropriate. In 
the context of assembly line clinics, the physician is often a mere tech-
nician, not the noble healer depicted in the portrayals by the Supreme 
Court, in need of wide discretion to ply his profession. In any event, the 
great deference and discretion provided is inconsistent with the usual 
805. /d. (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 ( 1979)). 
806. !d. Surely the Court's viewpoint ignores the prevalence of abortion dinirs run with a 
profit motive. 
807. Jipping, supra note 778, at 372. 
808. !d. at 373. 
R09. /d. 
810. /d. at 373-74. 
811 Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192. 
812. Jipping, supra note 778, at 374. 
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state police power in contexts other than abortion. 
3. Informed consent 
As noted in Section 11-C of this article, Pennsylvania passed provi-
sions requiring neutral information to be provided to women seeking 
abortions concerning such things as potential risks and the availability, 
if desired, of materials explaining alternatives to abortion and fetal 
characteristics at various stages. The appellate court in the case of 
Thornburgh invalidated all of these provisions on the basis of Akron. 813 
The Supreme Court likewise struck down the statutes, claiming 
they were designed to persuade women to withhold consent,814 that 
they "intrude[d] upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's physi-
cian,"815 that the material depicting fetal development at two-week 
stages was overinclusive,816 and that it was contrary to "accepted medi-
cal practice."817 The Court declared the provisions could not "be saved 
by any facts that might be forthcoming at a subsequent hearing."818 
In Danforth, the Supreme Court said a state may require in-
formed, written consent to an abortion.819 The opinion said the allow-
able information requirement consisted of "what would be done and its 
consequences."820 In Akron, the Court limited the state by saying it 
may not require the physician to deliver information designed to influ-
ence the woman's choice.821 The Akron Court went on to say that "the 
state legitimately may seek to ensure that [the decision] has been made 
'in light of all the attendant circumstances-psychological and emo-
tional as well as physical-that might be relevant to the well-being of 
the patient.' " 822 The Akron Court also indicated that statutes describ-
ing the information to be disclosed in general terms would be 
permissible.823 
The Pennsylvania statutes, at issue in Thornburgh, clearly fit 
within the permissible range allowed by the Supreme Court's prior de-
cisions. There was no speculation on when life begins, nor over the 
813. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 
295-96 (3d Cir. 1984) rev'd 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, 462 US. 416, 444-45 (1983). 
814. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764. 
815. /d. at 762. 
816. /d. 
817. /d. 
818. /d. at 764. Thornburgh was on appeal from a granting of a preliminary injunction. 
819. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). 
820. /d. 
821 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983). 
822. /d. at 443 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S 379, 387, 394 (1979)). 
823. /d. at 445, 447. 
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probable characteristics of a specific fetus, nor was abortion presented 
as a particularly dangerous surgery. These were the problems found 
objectionable in Akron. 824 The Pennsylvania regulations required the 
presentation of objective, verifiable, and relevant information. Specifi-
cally, Pennsylvania required that a woman be informed of who will 
perform the abortion. 8211 This was a reasonable requirement. Another 
section required that a woman be advised "that there [might] be detri-
mental physical and psychological effects which were not accurately 
foreseeable." 826 This provision was carried forward from a prior stat-
ute, which was upheld against this same attack, by the Supreme Court, 
in Franklin v. Fitzpatrick. 827 The order in Fitzpatrick specifically 
cited Danforth as controlling. Pennsylvania also required that a woman 
be given "medically accurate" information about the risks of abortion 
and childbirth.828 This seems a mere codification of what the Court 
specifically allowed in Danforth and Akron. A woman was also to be 
advised of the probable gestational age of her fetus. 829 This is non-
judgmental, relevant information which is certainly not objectionable 
under the Akron test. Finally, information of assistance available for 
the childbirth option was to be offered to the woman. 830 Her receipt 
and reading of this material was purely optional and obviously relevant 
to her choice.831 
As Justice White stated in his dissent, "One searches the major-
ity's opinion in vain for a convincing reason why the apparently laud-
able policy of promoting informed consent becomes unconstitutional 
when the subject is abortion."832 He rejected the majority reliance on 
Akron as controlling in striking down the provisions, because the provi-
sions were fundamentally different.833 The other three reasons the ma-
jority cited were equally uncompelling to Justice White. 
First, the fact that the information might be irrelevant to some 
decisions was not controlling.834 Legislators are allowed rational gener-
alizations where there is no impingement on a fundamental right. 8311 In 
this case, there was no infringement, because the woman's right to 
824. !d. at 443-44. 
825. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN.§ 3205(a)(1)(i) (Purdon 1983). 
826. !d. § 320S(a)(1)(ii). 
827. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). 
828. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1)(iii) (1983) 
829. !d. § 3205(a)(l)(iv). 
830. Id. § 3205(a)(2)(i) & (ii). 
831. /d. § 3205 (a)(2)(iii). 
832. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 799 (White, J., dissenting). 
833. /d. at 799-800 (White, J., dissenting). 
834. /d. at 800 (White, J., dissenting). 
835. !d. (White, J., dissenting) 
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choose was in no way affected.836 
Second, the majority was concerned with anxiety and the possibil-
ity that the regulations might influence the woman.837 As Justice White 
put it, "This is in fact their reason for existence, and . . . it is an 
entirely salutary reason."838 The doctrine of informed consent requires 
that, if a woman would be influenced by information in making her 
decision, then she must have that information.839 The purpose of Roe 
was "not maximizing the number of abortions, but maximizing 
choice."84° Furthermore, Justice White adds, "[O]ur decisions in 
Maher, Beal, and Harris v. McRae all indicate that the State may 
encourage ... childbirth ... and the provision of accurate information 
regarding abortion and its alternatives is a reasonable and fair means of 
achieving that objective. " 841 
Third, the majority said that the informed consent provisions in-
truded on the physician's discretion.842 However, as Justice White 
pointed out that "the government is entitled not to trust members of a 
profession to police themselves .... "843 Further, the "regulation of the 
practice of medicine, like regulation of other professions and of eco-
nomic affairs generally, was a matter peculiarly within the competence 
of legislatures, and ... such regulation was subject to review only for 
rationality," argued Justice White. 844 Interestingly, the Court recently 
held that attorneys could be required to disclose more information than 
they were accustomed to or desirous of doing in advertising. 845 The 
normal rules were laid aside when it came to abortion and the medical 
profession. 
The majority argued that the "anti-abortion character" of the reg-
ulations was evident, because the Commonwealth did not similarly re-
quire "disclosure of every possible peril" of other surgery.846 However, 
were a legislature to do so, it would doubtless be upheld, especially 
where there were findings of abuse by the medical profession.847 Evi-
836. /d. at 800-801 (White, J., dissenting). 
837. !d. at 763. 
838. /d. at 801 (White, J., dissenting). 
839. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064; 
Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician's Role 
in Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 183, 211 (1985). 
840. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 801 (White, J., dissenting). 
841. /d. at 801-802 (White, J., dissenting). 
842. /d. at 764. 
843. /d. at 803 (White, J., dissenting). 
844. /d. at 802 (White, J., dissenting). 
845. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
846. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764. 
847. The Commonwealth was prepared to give such testimony at the trial of Thornburgh. 
Brief for Appellants at 45-48, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747. See also Brief for Gans, Carlson & 
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dence of abuse existed and should have been considered by the Court. 
Only a super-protected right would cause the Court to say that no evi-
dence could change its mind.848 
Further evidence of the super-protected nature of the abortion 
right is the fact that the Court was willing to reject the whole modern 
trend of informed consent law to strike down the Pennsylvania regula-
tions.849 The Supreme Court followed the "physician paternalism" 
model of informed consent, which allows physicians great discretion to 
disclose or not to disclose, based on the physician's perceptions of the 
patient's needs. s&o This model is particularly suspect in situations 
where the physician has a strong monetary interest in a particular out-
come, such as in an "abortion mill."8&1 In 1972, the widely respected 
and followed case of Canterbury v. Spence8 &2 brought a newly emerg-
ing model into prominence. This new model featured patient autonomy, 
which is, ironically, an interest allegedly at stake in Roe. The "patient 
autonomy" model was summarized in the Canterbury opinion as 
follows: 
[T]he patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty 
to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient 
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice. The 
scope of the physician's communications to the patient, then, must be 
measured by the patient's need, and that need is the information ma-
terial to the decision. Thus the test for determining whether a partic-
ular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's 
decision.853 
The deep respect and deference to the medical profession, which 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed,8&4 is not reflected in the 
informed consent decisions of the states. Twenty-eight of the jurisdic-
Dewing, Amici Curiae, at 2-5, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (testimony of women who had abor-
tions and experienced medical misconduct in communication of information). 
848. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764 ("These statutory defects cannot be saved by any facts 
that might be forthcoming at a subsequent hearing."). 
849. Brief for Gans, Carlson & Dewing, Amici Curiae, supra note 847, at 18-21. 
850. !d. 
85 I. There is also evidence that the decision to withhold information may not always be 
grounded in practical experience: 
Available evidence indicates that the physicians' decisions to withhold information are 
based on hearsay rather than on actual experience with the effects of full disclosure and 
that the physician's own emotional reluctance to confront the patient with stark diagno-
ses and risks often prevents disclosure. 
Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy For the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 
YALE L.j. I 533, I 566 (1970). 
852. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
853. /d. at 786-87. 
854. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113, Akron, 462 U.S. 416. 
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tions that have confronted the issue have rejected the pure "physician 
paternalism" model adopted by the Court.855 The clear trend is to re-
quire the physician to inform patients of the facts, so that the patients 
may make the choice of whether to have treatment rather than have the 
doctor decide for them.856 
Pennsylvania had firmly adopted the "patient autonomy" 
mode\. 857 As many states have done, Pennsylvania even rejected a 
"therapeutic" exception, which would otherwise permit the physician 
to withhold certain information, if the physician thought the patient 
should not hear it. 868 This sound rejection of paternalism would seem 
especially appropriate in the "women's rights" area of abortion. The 
Court's imposition of its own paternalism and that of doctors' strikes a 
dissonant chord in this setting. 869 
Since the state has a legitimate interest in the "potential life" of 
the fetus,860 since several decisions have allowed the state to encourage 
childbirth,861 and since the abortion right is "a negative one," not to be 
encouraged for its own sake,862 the Court's talk of informed consent 
discouraging women from abortions seems strange. If there is some-
thing in the nature of the truth about the matter that discourages 
women from having abortions, perhaps the right itself ought to be 
questioned. It is certainly not something about which one should decide 
without all the facts. A woman who is told that the life within her is 
simply a mass of cells has not been afforded the opportunity to make an 
informed decision about abortion.863 The right to bear a child is at least 
as fundamental as the right to an abortion, according to Maher v. 
Roe. 86" Informed consent provisions, such as Pennsylvania promul-
855. Brief for Gans, Carlson & Dewing, Amici Curiae, supra note 846, at 20. 
856. /d. 
857. /d. 
858. /d. at 26. 
859. Because abortion involves the taking of a life, it is an emotionally troubling issue. How-
ever, this does not justify deception regarding the true nature of the decision. Such deception 
deprives a woman of the right to make a truly informed choice. Yet, the evidence indicates that 
women are often not told the basic facts. Bellotti, 499 F. Supp. at 219. In Planned Parenthood 
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 489 n.12 (1983), Justice Powell cited The Abortion Profiteers, a 
Pulitzer Prize-winning newspaper series on the abuses and manipulation found in the medical 
profession practicing abortions. See supra notes 1035-56 and accompanying text. 
860. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
861. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 801 (White, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, our decisions in 
Maher, Beal, and Harris v. McRae all indicate that the State may encourage women to make 
their choice in favor of childbirth .... "). 
862. /d. at 797 (White, J., dissenting). 
863. See, e.g., Brief for Gans, Carlson & Dewing, supra note 847, at 2-5 (where the unborn 
child was called "a mass of cells," the "product of conception," and other euphemisms avoiding its 
true nature). 
864. 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977). 
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gated, preserve the choice. Amazingly, the Court has rejected this core 
right established by Roe. 
Chief Justice Burger, who was moved to leave the majority and to 
call for the reexamination of Roe by the extremity to which the Court 
has gone, put the matter well: 
[T]oday the Court astonishingly goes so far as to say that the State 
may not even require that a woman contemplating an abortion be 
provided with accurate medical information concerning the risks in-
herent in the medical procedure which she is about to undergo .... 
Can anyone doubt that the State could impose a similar requirement 
with respect to other medical procedures? ... 
. . . Can it possibly be that the Court is saying that the Constitu-
tion forbids the communication of such critical information to a wo-
man? We have apparently already passed the point at which abortion 
is available merely on demand. If the statute at issue here is to be 
invalidated, the "demand" will not even have to be the result of an 
informed choice. 86~ 
Finally, because of the generally elective nature of abortion de-
scribed earlier, the patient autonomy model is especially appropriate in 
the abortion context. The Court's heavy emphasis on the role of the 
physician "is misplaced since so much of what goes into and results 
from the abortion decision is non-medical in nature," observed Thomas 
Jipping in an article entitled Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refine-
ment. 866 He continued, "[T]he Court's hostility to state measures 
designed to ensure informed consent to abortion is inappropriate" for 
several reasons, including the fact that "it looks at the physician's dis-
cretion rather than the woman's decision."867 
Justice Stevens declared in Danforth, that "even doctors are not 
omniscient; specialists in performing abortions may incorrectly conclude 
that the immediate advantages of the procedure outweigh the disadvan-
tages .... " He added, "In each individual case factors much more 
profound than a mere medical judgment may weigh heavily in the 
scales."868 
The reasons why the patient autonomy model is especially appro-
priate in the abortion context may be briefly summarized. The nature 
of abortion supports the reasonable patient model of informed consent 
for at least two reasons. The factors that prompt women to consider the 
865. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
866. Jipping, supra note 778, at 378. 
867. /d. 
868. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 104 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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abortion option are almost exclusively non-medical in nature869 and, 
therefore, the physician's particular skill and exclusive knowledge are 
not implicated. Second, the abortion right itself, though not based on an 
absolute right of control over one's own body, nonetheless is a right of 
personal choice. Autonomy of decisionmaking is the most important 
facet of that right. This is the very basis of the reasonable patient 
model. 870 
The Supreme Court's rejection of the states' police power to regu-
late the practice of medicine, and the rejection of the patient autonomy 
model of informed consent, in an area where it is particularly appropri-
ate, is truly out of step with the rest of the law. Even within abortion 
law, a glaring disparity may be seen between the concept of health em-
ployed to allow abortions and the same concept when considered in the 
context of giving informed consent. Such inconsistent treatment may 
also be seen in the Court's treatment of recordkeeping. 
4. Records 
The Thornburgh case provided another example of the Supreme 
Court's invasion of the states' traditional police power to regulate the 
medical profession. As with the informed consent usurpation, the one 
involving recordkeeping was without warrant. 
The Pennsylvania Act, at issue in Thornburgh, required physi-
cians to provide reports with a variety of data for statistical purposes. 871 
Required information included: physician's name, location of facility, 
woman's age, race and marital status, type of abortion procedure, and 
any complications.872 Also included was a report of the basis for the 
physician's determination that the fetus was not viable "or that the 
abortion was necessary to preserve maternal health."873 The court of 
appeals invalidated these requirements, because they were too extensive 
and complicated, and, hence, were likely to increase the cost of an abor-
tion and possibly have a chilling effect on physicians' willingness to 
perform abortions.874 The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, 
but on a different rationale. It found that "[i]dentification [was] the 
86'.1. Torres & Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. Pt:RSPECT. 169 
(1988) 
870. See Jipping, supra note 778, at 377-78. 
871. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 3214 (Purdon 1983). 
872. /d. 
873. /d. § 3211. 
87 4. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 
301-02 (3d Cir. 1984) rev'd 476 U.S. 747 (1986). But see Brief for the United States, supra note 
35, at 9-10. 
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obvious purpose of these extreme reporting requirements."876 
There was nothing in the record to support such a finding. 876 In 
fact, the statute required the avoidance of identification by requiring 
that, although the reports were to be made available to researchers for 
public inspection, they were to be "made available ... in a form which 
[would] not lead to the disclosure of the identity of any person filing a 
report."877 The district court had specifically "found that 'the require-
ments of confidentiality ... regarding the identity of both patient and 
physician prevent[ed] any invasion of privacy which could present a 
legally significant burden on the abortion decision.' " 878 
Rather than finding flaws in the district court's conclusion, the 
Court merely substituted its own finding. 879 This was a clear violation 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Unless the trial court's find-
ing of fact is clearly erroneous, the reviewing court ought to defer to the 
trial court's finding. 880 Even the Supreme Court ought to be bound by 
these rules. 881 To do otherwise is to introduce more inconsistency and 
unpredictability into the law. 
The Court not only erred procedurally, by going to the merits and 
refusing to defer, but it erred substantively as well. As Justice White 
stated, it is "implausible that a particular patient could be identified .. 
. . "
882 The true purpose of the reporting was to ensure that physicians 
were not doing post-viability abortions except where medically indi-
cated (as specifically allowed in Roe),883 and to further its interests in 
maternal and fetal health by accurate record keeping. 884 Under the 
Court's prior opinions, record keeping provisions were plainly constitu-
tional. This was evident in Danforth886 and Planned Parenthood Asso-
ciation of Kansas City v. Ashcroft. 886 The required information, at is-
sue in Thornburgh, was of the type that doctors performing abortions 
would have readily available. 887 The material all fit on a single page 
875. Thornburgh. 476 U.S. at 767. 
876. /d. at 805 (White, J , dissenting). 
877. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(e)(2) (Purdon 1983). 
878. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 805 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh, 552 F. Supp. 
at 804). 
879. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 805 (White, J., dissenting). 
880. FED. R. Ctv. P. 52(a). 
881. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 805-06 (White, J., dissenting). 
882. !d. at 806 (White, J., dissenting). 
883. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. 
884. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 807-10 (White, J., dissenting); Brief for Bowes, M.D., and 
Schmidt, M.D., Amici Curiae, at 4, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
885. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (197!>). 
886. 462 U.S. 476, 486-90 (1983) (plurality opinion) (pathology reports). 
887. Brief for Bowes and Schmidt, supra note 884, at 14. 
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form,888 and was a virtual adaptation of material used for reporting by 
the Centers for Disease Control.889 
That the state may not further its compelling interests in fetal and 
maternal health by the use of standard demographic and medical cate-
gories in reports, where confidentiality is mandated890 and cost would 
be minimal,891 indicates again the extremes to which the Court is will-
ing to go in "protecting" the abortion right. 
In sum, as in every other area, the Court's treatment of the regu-
lation of the medical profession by the states is anomalous. This special 
treatment confirms again the super-protected status of abortion. 
D. Procedural and Adjudicatory Issues 
The anomalies of abortion jurisprudence are also evident in the 
area of procedural and adjudicatory issues. The Supreme Court seems 
more eager to intervene in abortion cases than in other contexts.892 
Therefore, standard procedural rules and canons of adjudication are 
often treated differently in abortion cases. Epstein discussed this in his 
critique of Roe, focusing on the Roe Court's unorthodox handling of 
standing and mootness issues.893 More recently, Justice O'Connor, in 
her Akron dissent, noted that the Court violated traditional principles 
of adjudication by reaching out to invalidate provisions of the Akron 
ordinance before they were construed by a state court. 894 In Thorn-
burgh, Justice O'Connor devoted nearly her entire dissent to the major-
ity's willingness to go to the merits before a trial was ever held or the 
facts developed.89~ 
888. Brief for Appellants at 55a (addendum shows sample form). 
889. Brief for Bowes and Schmidt, supra note 884, at 11. 
890. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(e)(2) (Purdon 1983). 
891. Brief for Bowes and Schmidt, supra note 884, at 11. In Ashcroft, regulations producing 
an estimated increase in cost of $19.40 per abortion were constitutionally permissible. Ashcroft, 
462 U.S. 476, 490 (1983) 
892. The Court seems especially eager to intervene in order to strike down restrictions on 
abortion. However, it ran apply the procedural rules quite strictly and mechanically when not 
involved in eliminating restrictions. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). In Dia-
mond, the Court held that an intervenor (physician) had no standing to appeal a case overturning 
abortion laws, where the state had not continued the appeal. While the derision seems reasonable, 
it stands in stark contrast to the Oexible application of the rules when the Court needs to reach 
beyond the usual limits to consider a rase to overturn abortion laws. This Oexible approach is 
traceable throughout abortion jurisprudence and leaves one with the impression of result-orienta-
tion. See infra section III-D-3-(a). 
893. Epstein, supra note 30, at 160-67. 
894. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 468-70 (1983) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
895. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 
(1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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Such looseness by the Supreme Court sets bad precedent for lower 
courts. As amicus curiae in Thornburgh, the United States noted that 
the lower courts have violated principles of sound adjudication in much 
the same manner as the Supreme Court.896 For example, the courts 
commonly strain for unconstitutional interpretations of disputed stat-
utes rather than seeking constitutional ones as required by the normal 
rule. 897 
This creates an impression that abortion jurisprudence is both re-
sult-oriented and policy-oriented. Moreover, it undermines procedural 
rules that serve a useful and important function. 
1. Standing in Roe 
The pattern for the approach of the abortion cases to procedural 
matters and principles of adjudication was set by Roe. 898 The Roe opin-
ion discussed at length the standing of the parties and the question of 
mootness. 899 In the process, it deviated significantly from the norm. 
The Court began by setting forth the standards and applying them 
to Jane Roe. As to standing, the Court asked whether Roe had "estab-
lished that 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' that in-
sure[d] that 'the dispute sought to be adjudicated [would] be presented 
in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of 
judicial resolution.' " 900 
Ir. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, the Court decided that 
there was "little dispute" that Roe's case, at the time of filing, 
"presented a case or controversy" and that as a "pregnant single wo-
man thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws [she] had standing 
to challenge those statutes."901 Justice Blackmun further noted that 
"[t]he 'logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to 
be adjudicated' and the necessary degree of contentiousness [were] both 
present. " 902 
896. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 3. 
897. ld. at 13-14. 
898. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
899. ld. at 123-29. 
900. Roe, 410 U.S. at 123 (citation omitted) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
732 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 C.S. 83, 101 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 l! S 186, 204 (1962)). 
901. Roe, 410 U.S. at 124. 
902. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968); Golden v. 
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969)). A widely recounted story that Jane Roe was pregnant as a result 
of a gang rape has been recanted by Norma McCorvey, the woman using the Roe pseudonym, 
who now declares she was pregnant "through what [she} thought was love." USA Today, Sept. 9, 
1987, at 4A. Similarly, a U.S. District Judge in Georgia recently ordered the records unsealed in 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), revealing that a woman named Sandra Rae Bensing Cano 
was the Jane Doe in that case. Ms. Cano declares that she was used by Atlanta attorney Margie 
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The real question, according to the Court, was whether Roe's case 
was moot. 903 The normal rule for federal cases requires that "an actual 
controversy must exist at all stages of appellate or certiorari review, 
and not simply at the date the action is initiated," wrote Justice 
Blackmun.904 
The Court easily bypassed the usual rule, however, by placing 
Roe's case within the exception for matters " 'capable of repetition, yet 
evading review.' "906 The Roe majority then concluded that Jane Roe 
had standing, a justiciable controversy, and no problem with 
mootness. 906 
Pitts Hames, who argued the case before the United States Supreme Court, for Ms. Hames' own 
purposes. Cano declared that she never wanted to abort her pregnancy at the time. In fact, she 
gave birth to a daughter and placed her for adoption. Ms. Cano's goal in getting the records 
unsealed was to aid her credibility as the true Jane Doe in order to further her efforts to halt 
legalized abortion. Identity of Woman in Abortion Ruling Revealed, San Francisco Banner, Jan. 
6, 1989, at 4, col. 1-3. 
903. Roe, 410 U.S. at 124-25. 
904. Jd. at 125. 
905. Jd. (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). 
906. /d. Epstein has challenged the Court's finding that Roe's case was not moot. "[T]o all 
appearances her case [was] one of classic mootness," he observed. Epstein, supra note 30, at 162. 
He argued that if, despite the ambiguity of the pleadings, Roe once had standing, it had been 
mooted by the termination of her pregnancy. She was no longer pregnant by the time the Court 
heard her appeal. According to the Court, "The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual 
controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the 
action is initiated" Roe, 410 U.S. at 125 (citations omitted). 
An exception to the mootness doctrine has been carved out by the Court. In Southern Pacific 
Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at 515, the Court established an exception for events "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review." Roe applied this, without further analysis, to pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. 
at 125. Epstein argued that the earlier cases, on which the Court relied, had construed this excep-
tion to require a necessity element. Epstein, supra note 30, at 163. He claimed that only if "there 
was a danger that the Court could not deal with issues raised if the present plaintiff were 
unable to proceed" would the Court utilize the exception. /d. at 163 & n.15. 
There was no such danger in Roe as the issues could have been raised by a physician defend-
ing against criminal abortion charges, such as Dr. Hallford. Jd. at 164. By the Court's prior 
decision, the physician might also raise jus tertii: 
These doctors would not have interests in all respects identical with those of pregnant 
women, but since they too would seek to upset the statute on its face, it is hard to see 
what arguments would not be available to them that would be available to the women, 
particularly since the doctors could assert the rights of their patients in support of their 
own case. 
ld. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)). 
Another available alternative was the Does. Roe, 410 U.S. at 127. The Court said they were 
unnecessary in view of the decision on Roe's standing and the identity of their interests. ld. How-
ever, the Court proceeded to analyze their standing anyway. The Court painted the Does' claim as 
speculative and resting on possible future events. ld. at 128. 
It has been argued by Epstein that, under United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S 669 ( 1973), the 
Does might have been granted standing. Epstein pointed out a new test of standing that the Court 
had just developed in 1970. Epstein, supra note 30, at 166. This new test, developed in a decision 
about the Administrative Procedure Act, had two aspects: (1) The plaintiff must show an "injury 
in fact, economic or otherwise," and (2) "[T]he interest sought to be protected by the complaint 
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The Roe Court next turned to the standing of Dr. Hallford, a 
plaintiff-intervenor. The Court decided that, since he had already been 
indicted under the Texas abortion law, he must make his constitutional 
arguments in the state court. 907 The doctor sought to avoid the applica-
tion of the abstention doctrine by distinguishing his present status from 
his status as a "potential future defendant" and assert only the latter. 908 
The Court rejected the distinction and dismissed the doctor's appeal.909 
The Court finally considered the Does, a childless married 
couple.910 They asserted that their physician had warned the wife to 
avoid pregnancy for health reasons.911 They argued that the Texas law 
inhibited normal marital relations for them because, were she to be-
come pregnant, there would be no abortion readily available. 912 The 
Court rejected standing for the Does, because Mrs. Doe was not preg-
nant (and was childless), and any future possibility of harm or present 
marital unhappiness was either too speculative or too indirect. 913 
By the prior standards of the Court, Jane Roe ought not to have 
been granted standing. As Justice Rehnq uist noted, there was nothing 
in the record to indicate that Roe was in her first trimester at any time 
"during the pendency of her lawsuit."914 She conceivably could have 
[was] arguably withi:1 the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitu-
tional guarantee in question." Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970). 
As to the first question, regarding damages and the remoteness problem, Epstein cited the 
case of SCRAP. Epstein, supra note 30, at 166; SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 669. As SCRAP was decided 
in the same year as Roe, it should provide an accurate contemporary indication of the Court's 
thinking as to remoteness. In SCRAP, the Court decided a group of students had standing, because 
an ICC rate increase for railroads hauling goods, which could include recyclable materials, might 
lead to increased preference for nonrecyclable containers, which could lead to an increase of litter, 
which could lead to clutter in the Washington parks, which would offend the sensibilities of these 
students. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 669-70. In that case, the Court also noted that a "trifle" would be 
adequate for an "interest." !d. at 689 n.14. The Does arguably had a trifle of an interest. As to 
the second part of the test, the Does fell within "the class of persons whose interests [were] argua-
bly regulated by the statute." Epstein, supra note 30, at 167. But, as· now Justice Antonin Scalia 
argued in 1983, SCRAP itself was wrongly decided. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an 
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFFOLK U.L. Rt:v. 881, 890-898 ( 1983). 
It is generally accepted, however, that an exception to the mootness doctrine, for events "ca-
pable of repetition yet evading review," is necessary. Pregnancy is certainly such an event. The 
present problem is that the Court no longer examines the issue. It should at least explain the 
application of the doctrine to cases involving statutes which do not actually ban abortion, such as 
fetal disposal and parental notification (for minors) statutes. The doctrine may have no applicabil-
ity in such contexts. 
907. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125-26. 
908. /d. at 126. 
909. /d. at 127. 
910. /d. 
911. /d. 
912. /d. at 128. 
913. /d. 
914. /d. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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been in her last trimester when the complaint was filed. 9111 Under Roe, 
the state could proscribe abortion after viability, except for a pregnancy 
threatening the health or life of the mother, which was not alleged. 
Thus, Jane Roe may never have come within the constitutionally pro-
tected realm where she had a fundamental right to choose an abortion. 
The Court used this "hypothetical lawsuit"916 as "a fulcrum" 917 to 
strip any significant abortion restrictions from the first trimester.918 By 
so doing, the Court played fast and loose with the standing rules. It 
also violated another important principle. As Justice Rehnquist noted, 
"the Court depart[ ed] from the longstanding admonition that it should 
never 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required 
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.' " 919 
Richard Epstein has argued that "the 'concreteness' which compli-
ance with the standing requirement is said to bring to a lawsuit" was 
contrary to the Court's sweeping intent for its pronouncement.920 He 
noted the Court's view of "constitutional litigation as a means of set-
tling the great conflicts of the social order."921 With this "level of aspi-
ration," he reasoned, "the 'concreteness' of a factual situation may well 
prove to be an embarrassment that can only work to limit the compre-
hensive sweep of the Court's pronouncements, for the details of a case 
could well reveal narrow grounds for a decision on the merits."922 He 
concluded that the only way to tell that the standing requirement was 
met, was "because it [was] there."923 That is hardly the sort of reason-
ing one is entitled to expect from the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
The impression left by the treatment of standing in Roe was that 
ends were more important than means. Careful craftsmanship was 
lacking in this area, as it was elsewhere in the opinion. 
Unfortunately, this established a precedent of procedural laxity 
often followed by the lower courts and by the Supreme Court itself. 
The Fifth Circuit observed that "the Supreme Court has visibly re-
laxed its traditional standing principles in deciding abortion cases," and 
proceeded to employ the lowered standards itself.924 Likewise, the Sixth 
915. /d. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
916. !d. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
917. /d. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
918. /d. at 171-72 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
919. /d. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
920. Epstein, supra note 30, at 161. 
921. /d. 
922. /d. 
923. /d. at 162. 
924. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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Circuit cited the Supreme Court's laxity in procedural matters as au-
thority for its own laxness in applying standing principles to abortion 
cases. 92 ~ This use of precedent to justify procedural laxity and the vio-
lation of other procedural precedents IS umque to abortion 
jurisprudence. 
2. A subsequent pattern 
The Roe approach to procedural matters was followed in many 
subsequent Supreme Court and lower court cases. A brief overview of 
some recent irregularities will indicate the pattern.926 
In Thornburgh, the pervasive eagerness to strike down abortion 
regulations was clearly visible. Justice O'Connor criticized the Court's 
willingness to go to the merits on an appeal from a preliminary injunc-
tion.927 She concluded: "If this case did not involve state regulation of 
abortion, it may be doubted that the Court would entertain, let alone 
adopt, such a departure from its precedents."928 Of course, this irregu-
larity originated with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, indi-
cating that the trend extends to the lower courts.929 
In addition, Thornburgh violated the usual rule of construing stat-
utes in a constitutional manner where possible. It seemed rather to 
place the worst possible construction on the statute. For example, the 
Pennsylvania statute required the attendance of a second physician at 
abortions after viability.930 It contained no explicit exception for medi-
cal emergencies. A like provision in Ashcroft had no such explicit sec-
tion either.931 In Ashcroft, the Court inferred such an exception and 
upheld the statute.932 The Third Circuit refused to do so in Thorn-
burgh, despite an initial provision in the same section providing a 
"complete defense to any charge" under "this section," if "the abortion 
was necessary to preserve maternal life or health. "933 The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. 934 
92S. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1190, 1396 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1987). 
926. Of course, individual courts and cases may be exemplary in handling these matters. 
What is argued here is a pattern of greater laxity' regarding abortion cases in the interest of 
striking down regulatory statutes. 
'!27. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, SIS 
( 1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
'!28. !d. at 826. 
929. American College of Obstetricians and Gynemlogists v. Thornburgh, 717 F.2d 283, 290 
(3d Cir. 1984), affd, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
930. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 3210(c) (Purdon 1983) 
931. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 l,).S. 476, 485 & n.8 H 983). 
932. !d. 
933. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3210(a) (Purdon 1983) (emphasis added) 
934. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretirs & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 771 
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The 1983 case of Akron contained a variety of irregularities. The 
Court noted the abstention doctrine but refused to follow it.935 Rather, 
it chose to assume that the Ohio state judiciary would impose an un-
constitutional construction on the parental notification ordinance for 
minors. As the dissent noted, this was inappropriate because it violated 
the independence of state courts.936 In violating the abstention doctrine, 
the Court abandoned its more principled approach in Bellotti v. Baird 
(Bellotti (1)). 937 In Bellotti (/), the Court held that the district court 
should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of a parental 
notification statute until the state supreme court had construed it.938 
The Akron Court also declined to follow the rule requiring consti-
tutional construction of statutes where fairly possible. The Akron ordi-
nance required physicians to "insure that the remains of the unborn 
child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner."939 The Court 
of Appeals found the word "humane" impermissibly vague and de-
clined to sever it. 940 The Supreme Court affirmed. 941 The city of Akron 
argued that its intent was merely to prevent dumping of fetuses on gar-
bage piles. Such a construction clearly was possible from the terms of 
the statute and from Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpat-
rick, 942 where a humane disposal provision was upheld.943 
The development of other examples below will further demon-
strate the pattern. For example, the employment of such doctrines as 
vagueness to strike down abortion regulations is quite remarkable in its 
pervasiveness. 
3. General rules and special abortion rules 
As John Hart Ely proclaimed in 1973, the Supreme Court has 
granted the abortion right a "super-protected" status.944 The following 
discussion demonstrates that "super-protected" status as it is evidenced 
in three areas: (1) standing, (2) constitutional adjudication, and (3) the 
judicial rush to judgment. In each section, the general rules will be 
compared with their usage in abortion jurisprudence. 
(1986). Further examples of this pattern in Thornburgh will be found below. 
935. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 440-41 (1983). 
936. /d. at 470 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
937. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
938. /d. at 151. 
939. Akron, 462 U.S. at 451. 
940. /d. 
941. /d. 
942. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975), summarily affd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 
428 US. 901 (1976). 
943. /d. at 573. Further discussion of this matter may be found in text below. 
944. Ely, supra note 24, at 935. 
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a. Standing. As set forth in detail above, the Roe Court found 
standing for Jane Roe. She had not alleged that, at any time during the 
pendency of her lawsuit, she was within a period of her pregnancy 
which the state could not regulate by proscribing abortion (except for 
health reasons, which were not alleged). Nevertheless, the Court 
granted her standing. This violated the general rule that one must at 
some time during the legal proceeding come within the constitutionally 
protected realm in order to have standing. 9411 
The standing of physicians to challenge laws restricting abortion 
has been automatic since Doe v. Bolton. 946 In Bolton, the district court 
had denied the physicians standing, relying primarily on Poe v. Ull-
man. 947 In Poe, only one prosecution had taken place since the passage 
of the challenged contraceptive regulation statute in 1897.948 Enforce-
ment of the more recent Georgia abortion statute at issue in Bolton had 
been more active. 949 Therefore, the Bolton Court held that the case was 
more like Epperson v. Arkansas, 9110 where a school teacher was al-
lowed to challenge an anti-evolution statute, though she was not yet 
criminally charged. 9111 
More troubling was the Supreme Court's decision to allow physi-
cians to assert the rights of their patients in abortion suits. The 
problems with this include a potential conflict of interest between the 
physician and his patient, and a violation of the usual rules for assert-
ing jus tertii (the right of a third party). Singleton v. Wulff 112 decision 
demonstrated the problem clearly. 
In Singleton, the Court allowed physicians to raise the rights of 
their patients in an action challenging Missouri's refusal to fund abor-
tions not "medically indicated" under its Medicaid program.9113 A weak 
plurality was mustered with four justices favoring jus tertii standing 
945. The Court in Roe allowed or disallowed standing for women based upon whether they 
were pregnant. Thus, Jane Roe had standing because of her pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 124. 
However, since the Does were not expectant parents, their claim was rejected as too speculative or 
too indirect. !d. at 127-28. This minimal requirement of pregnancy has been followed by the 
lower courts when considering the standing of women to challenge abortion regulations. See, e.g., 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (N.D. Ohio 1986) 
(denying standing to a minor female who did not allege her pregnancy in challenging a parental 
notification statute). For a good exposition of the standing rules, see Haskell v. Washington 
Township, (,35 F. Supp. 550, 551-55 (S.D. Ohio 1986). 
946. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
947. !d. at 188; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
948. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 188. 
949. /d. at 188-89. 
950. 393 U.S. 97 (1968) 
951 Bolton, 410 U.S. at 189. 
952. 428 U.S 106 (1976). 
953. /d. at 108. 
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and one concurring only because the physicians already had standing of 
their own (while questioning the logic of the other four). 9114 
Justice Blackmon, writing the plurality opinion, noted the rule 
that "[f]ederal courts must hesitate before resolving a controversy ... 
on the basis of the rights of third persons .... " 91111 His first reason was 
that unnecessary adjudication of such rights should be avoided and the 
holders of the rights might not wish to assert them or might be able to 
enjoy them regardless of the litigation outcome.9116 His second reason 
was that the best defenders of jus tertii were usually the third parties 
themselves.9117 Third parties might have a preference for defending their 
own rights, as they would be bound by stare decisis. 9118 
Justice Blackmon noted that from these two considerations came 
the general rule: "Ordinarily one may not claim standing in this Court 
to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party."9119 However, 
noted Justice Blackmon, a general rule should not be applied when its 
underlying rationale is missing. 960 There are two elements the Court 
examines to determine if an exception should be made. First, the Court 
examines the relationship of the litigant and the third party to see if the 
latter's "right is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant 
wishes to pursue."961 Second, the Court determines whether "some 
genuine obstacle" exists to prevent the third party from asserting its 
own right.962 
The first test, regarding the relationship of the parties, eliminates 
the possibility that jus tertii will not be affected by the result of the 
lawsuit. 963 It may also show that the litigant will be fully (or nearly) as 
effective a proponent of the third party's right as the third party would 
be.964 As authority, the Court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 9611 where 
physicians were allowed to assert the privacy rights of married persons 
to receive advice on contraceptives. Griswold emphasizes the "confiden-
tial" relationship and the likelihood that the married couple's rights 
954. /d. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
955. !d. at 113. 
956. /d. at 113-14 (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)). 
957. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114. 
958. /d. 
959. /d. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953), quoting Barrows v. Jack-
son, 366 US. 420, 429 (1961); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 n.20 (1968)). 
960. /d. at 114. 
961. /d. 
962. /d. at 116. 
963. /d. at 115. 
964. /d. 
965. 381 us. 479 (1965). 
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would "be diluted or adversely affected" if not asserted in the suit.966 
The Singleton Court also cited Eisenstadt v. Baird, 967 which focused 
on the "advocate" relationship and the effect on the third party,968 and 
Barrows v. Jackson, 969 which allowed a property owner to raise jus 
tertii in challenging a racially restrictive covenant. Justice Blackmun 
also observed that Doe v. Bolton, 970 which allowed physicians to assert 
the rights of their patients, would be controlling were Bolton not based 
on a criminal statute.971 Applying this principle, Justice Blackmun ar-
gued that a physician was essential to a safe abortion and a poor wo-
man could not obtain a physician unless the state paid for one.972 
Moreover, the abortion decision was to intimately involve the physician, 
under Roe. 973 Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded, the physician 
was uniquely qualified to litigate the right of the patient to make the 
abortion decision.974 
The second test is whether a genuine obstacle exists to the third 
party's own assertion of the right. 975 Such an obstacle suggests that the 
third party's absence from court is not an indication that his right is not 
truly at stake.976 Justice Blackmun cited NAACP v. Alabama977 as an 
example.978 There the Court held that to require NAACP members to 
litigate their own rights would violate the right to anonymity for associ-
ation members which was at issue in the case.979 Justice Blackmun also 
cited Eisenstadt960 and Barrows961 as supporting this point.982 
Applying this principle in Singleton, Justice Blackmun found two 
obstacles. First, a woman might be chilled from asserting her right by a 
desire to protect her privacy.983 Second, a woman's claim suffered from 
"imminent mootness, at least in the technical sense. " 984 Justice Black-
mun acknowledged that these "obstacles" were not insurmountable, as 
966. /d. at 481; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1976). 
967. 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972). 
968. /d.; Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115. 
969. 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953), Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116. 
970. 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973). 
971. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115. 
972. /d. at 117. 
973. /d.; Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-56. 
974. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117. 
975. /d. at 115-16. 
976. /d. at 116. 
977. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
978. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116. 
979. /d.; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459. 
980. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 438, 446 (1972). 
981. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953). 
982. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116. 
983. /d. at 117. 
984. /d. 
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evidenced by the frequent use of pseudonyms, the Roe doctrine regard-
ing events "capable of repetition yet evading review ,"985 and the em-
ployment of class actions.986 Nevertheless, he decided that the physician 
could assert the rights of his patients.987 
Justice Stevens was unconvinced by this logic but concurred, con-
stituting a plurality to allow jus tertii assertion.988 He did so because 
the doctors already had standing on their own.989 
Four members of the Singleton Court forcefully rejected Justice 
Blackmun's argument. Justice Powell, author of the leading case on the 
matter, Warth v. Seldin, 990 wrote for the dissent. He argued that be-
yond the Article III question of power (present here) lay the prudential 
question of whose rights might be asserted.991 The plurality, he noted, 
acknowledged the general jus tertii rule but purported to find an excep-
tion.992 Justice Powell analyzed the plurality's precedents and rejected 
its result. 993 
In Barrows, 994 NAACP, 995 and Eisenstadt, 996 he observed, there 
was more than a "genuine obstacle," as the plurality had argued.997 
Rather, the facts of the cases indicated that assertion of jus tertii was 
appropriate when third party litigation was "in all practicable terms 
impossible."998 
Moreover, Justice Powell argued, using the plurality's own "genu-
ine obstacle" test did not result in proper assertion of the rights of a 
third party.999 He pointed out the plurality's own confession that the 
obstacles were not insurmountable and, thus, were not significant 
enough to allow an exception to the general rule. 1000 
The Singleton plurality's primary reliance on the "confidential re-
lationship" was also attacked by Justice Powell. He interpreted the 
985. Roe, 410 U.S. at 124-25 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 
575 (1911)). 
986. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117. 
987. /d. at 118. 
988. !d. at 121-22. 
989. /d. 
990. 422 U.S 490 (1975). 
991. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 124 & n.3. 
992. /d. at 125. 
993. /d. 
994. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
995. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
996. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
997. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 125-26. 
998. /d. at 126. See Comment, Singleton v. Wulff r,'xtension of the Right of Privacy 
Through Standing, 55 DENVER L.J. 331, 339-42 ( 1978). 
999. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 126. 
1000 Id. at 126-27. 
310 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 3 
precedents cited by the plurality as only authorizing assertion of jus 
tertii where the state "directly interdicted the normal functioning of the 
physician-patient relationship by criminalizing certain procedures."1001 
Here, he argued, there was no direct interference, as neither patient 
nor doctor was forbidden to engage in abortions. 1002 Furthermore, the 
primary emphasis on the relationship in Singleton was in "marked 
contrast" to the subordinate position given the relationship in Eisen-
stadt. 1003 Justice Powell suggested this shift resulted "from the weak-
ness of the argument that this litigation [was J necessary to protect 
third-party interests." 1004 
Rather than being logically related to Barrows, 10011 Eisenstadt, 1008 
and NAACP, 1007 Justice Powell argued, the Singleton case was much 
closer to Warth v. Seldin. 1008 In Warth, taxpayers were not allowed to 
assert the rights of low-income persons partially because no obstacle 
prevented these persons from asserting their own rights. 1009 
The arguments of Justice Powell are the more persuasive. Under 
the plurality's "obstacle" test, one can find no "genuine obstacle." In 
fact, the Missouri medicaid statute provided a right to an administra-
tive hearing for persons denied payment of claims. 1010 An adverse deci-
sion could be appealed. 1011 Thus, a ready mechanism existed for asser-
tion of welfare recipients' claims. 
Further, Justice Powell's approach of allowing the physician to 
assert his own rights, but not those of third parties, squares with Moose 
Lodge No. 107 v. /rvis. 1012 In Irvis, a guest of a lodge member was 
denied service. The guest was allowed to assert an equal protection 
claim regarding the lodge's treatment of guests. However, he was de-
nied standing to attack the lodge's membership policies, because he had 
never applied for membership and could not assert jus tertii. 1013 
The Bolton decision, cited by the Singleton plurality as supporting 
a physician's right to assert jus tertii, did not use the causation test 
1001. /d. at 128. 
1002. /d. at 128-29. 
1003. /d. at 127-28 n.S. 
1004. /d. 
1005. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
1006. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
1007. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
1008. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
1009. /d. at 509-10; Singleton, 428 U.S. at 127 (citing for comparison McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961)). 
1010. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 208.156 (Supp. 1975). 
1011 /d. § 205.10(a)(S) (1973). 
1012. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
1013. /d. State action was found in the issuance of a liquor license. 
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established in the 1975 case of Warth v. Seldin. 1014 Had it been ap-
plied, as one commentator noted, the physicians would have had to es-
tablish "that a substantial probability existed that they would be prose-
cuted under the statute and that such harm would be alleviated if the 
doctors were successful in the suit."10111 The causation test was ignored 
in the 1976 abortion cases of Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri 
v. Danforth1016 and Singleton v. Wuljf. 1017 The same commentator ob-
served, "if the plaintiff's claims were subjected to the causation test, the 
plaintiffs should have been denied standing [in Bolton, Danforth, and 
Singleton]. "1018 
Another writer stated: 
To obtain standing under this test the doctor would have to show that 
he had a pregnant patient who had asked for an abortion, that he had 
decided to perform the abortion, the patient was withholding consent 
or the doctor has tried to get the consent of a parent or spouse but has 
been unable to do so, and the only reason the patient has decided to 
forego the abortion is because of the statute. Additionally, the doctor 
must forego the abortion or risk the penalty. To meet the causation 
test the doctor will be required to show-as were the builders in 
Warth-that there is a 'specific project' involved which is 'currently 
precluded' by the statute. 1019 
Conversely, had the jus tertii rules used in the abortion context been 
applied, the builders in Warth would have been granted standing.1020 
The arguments of dissenting Justice Powell in Singleton, with re-
gard to the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship, are 
also persuasive. Not only did the plurality incorrectly make the rela-
tionship the primary emphasis, but the precedents had not merged the 
physician and patient for constitutional purposes. 1021 The precedents 
clearly were distinguishable as they applied only in the criminal con-
text and related to direct interference. 1022 The plurality argued that a 
less direct interference had been allowed as the basis for jus tertii 
1014. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Bolton set further bad precedent by allowing a plaintiff claiming 
no life or health threat to assert the rights of women with such threats. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 
179, 222-23 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
I 015. Comment, The Burger Court's Approach to jus Tertii Standing, 13 GoNz. L. REv. 
961, 984 (1978). 
1016. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
1017. 428 U.S. 106 (1976). 
1018. Comment, supra note 1015, at 985. 
1019. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00-3 (Supp. 1977) (quoting from 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 516 (1975)). 
1020. Comment, supra note 1015, at 985; 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 1019, at § 22.00-4. 
1021. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 128 (Powell,]., dissenting). 
1022. ld. at 128-29. 
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standing in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 1023 As Justice Powell noted, 
however, the issue of third-party standing was not addressed (or even 
mentioned) in that case. 1024 Moreover, the interference with private 
schooling "was as complete as if it had been proscribed," 10211 as the 
statute at issue required the children to be in public school during 
school hours. 1026 The Pierce Court itself noted that "[ t ]he inevitable 
practical result" was the destruction of private schools. 1027 
Finally, the concept of "confidential relationship" is "analytically 
empty," as Justice Powell asserted in Singleton. 1028 This would make 
the decision "difficult to cabin," as there was little to distinguish the 
doctor from providers of other services. 1029 Justice Powell noted that 
this was especially so, "when one recognizes that, realistically, the 'con-
fidential' relationship in a case of this kind often is set in an assembly-
line type abortion clinic. " 1030 He saw little basis for jus tertii standing 
"based on nothing more substantial than a professional (or perhaps 
only an abortion-clinic) relationship and dimly perceived 'obstacles' to 
the rightholder's own litigation. " 1031 
Thus, as Justice Powell observed, the Court violated a rule of self-
governance by reaching unnecessarily to decide a difficult constitutional 
issue when "nothing more [was] at stake than remuneration for profes-
sional services." 1032 In the process, the Singleton Court extended the 
right of privacy through an expanded view of standing. 1033 
The assembly-line abortion clinic raises another issue. Normally, 
one may only assert the rights of another where the interests of both 
coincide. Doctors have often been allowed to assert the rights of their 
patients because it was assumed the patients' interest in getting well 
coincided with the doctors' interest in promoting wellness. However, 
with the commercialization of abortion, questions have been raised as to 
whether a physician's interest in financial gain coincides with his pa-
tient's best interests. While the issue has been given short shrift by 
1023. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
1024. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 129 n.6. 
1025. !d. 
I 026. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530. 
1027. !d. at 534. 
1028. Singleton, 428 U.S at 130 n.7. 
1029. !d. Any provider of services would now be able to claim standing for his customer's 
rights, noted Justice Powell, "in an attack on a welfare statute that excludes from coverage his 
particular transaction." !d. at 129-30. 
1030. !d. at 130 n.7. 
1031. !d. 
I 032. !d. at 129. 
1033. Comment, supra note 998. 
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some courts, 1034 it is worth serious consideration. 
In November, 1978, the Chicago Sun-Times began publication of 
a Pulitzer prize-winning series entitled "The Abortion Profiteers."1035 
It was a culmination of five months of investigation by the newspaper 
and the Better Government Association.1036 Members of the investiga-
tion team had infiltrated six prominent abortion clinics. 1037 They had 
also investigated referral agencies and a laboratory that did work for 
the clinics. 1038 These six clinics accounted for more than half of the 
abortions in Illinois. 1039 
The reporters summarized their findings as follows: 
• Dozens of abortion procedures performed on women who were not 
pregnant and others illegally performed on women more than 12 
weeks pregnant. 
• An alarming number of women who, because of unsterile conditions 
and haphazard clinic care, suffered debilitating cramps, massive infec-
tions and such severe internal damage that all their reproductive or-
gans had to be removed. 
• Incompetent and unqualified doctors, including moonlighting resi-
dents, medical apprentices and at least one physician who has lost his 
license in one state and faces revocation here. 
• Doctors who callously perform abortions in an excruciating 2 min-
utes, when they should properly take 10 to 15 minutes, and doctors 
who don't even wait for pain-killing anesthetics to take effect. 
• Referral services that, for a fee, send women to a disreputable De-
troit abortionist, whose dog, to one couple's horror, accompanied the 
nurse into the operating room and lapped blood from the floor. 
• Clinics that either fail to order critical postoperative pathology re-
ports, ignore the results or mix up the specimens. 
• Dangerously shoddy record keeping by aides who falsify records of 
patients' vital signs and who scramble or lose results of crucial lab 
tests. 
• Counselors who are paid not to counsel but to sell abortions with 
sophisticated pitches and deceptive promises.1040 
The reason for many of the problems was traced to greed. Since 
1034. See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 n.l (N.D. Ill. 1978), appeal dismissed 
sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978). 
1035. The articles, by Zekman, Warrick, Koshner, McCahill, Warren, Sweet, Williams, 
Wheeler, and Hillman, extended from November 12 to December 6, 1978. Citations herein will 
be to a special reprint edition numbering forty-six pages. Hereinafter, it will be cited as The 
Abortion Profiteers. 
I 036. The Abortion Profiteers, supra note I 035, at I. 
1037. /d. at 2. 
1038. /d. 
1039. !d. 
I 040. /d. at 1-2. 
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they are paid by the number of abortions that they perform, doctors 
raced each other to see who could complete the most abortions. 1041 
While safer clinics limited doctors to fifteen abortions per day/042 at 
the dangerous ones, individual doctors were chalking up forty per 
day. 1043 This speed was achieved at the expense of patient comfort, 
careful procedures, sterile environments, adequate counseling, and ac-
curate record keeping. 1044 
Referral agencies received large fees for patients brought in while 
dispensing misleading information and providing pregnancy tests so 
haphazard that three samples of male urine were declared to show pos-
itive signs of pregnancy. 10411 A former worker on one of these hot lines 
declared, "Counseling? There was none. What we were doing there 
[was] selling abortions. We got no training except in what not to say. 
How not to use words like 'fetus' or 'kill' that might scare the custom-
ers away. Don't mention complications."1046 
As noted in the series, "not all women who go to abortion clinics 
are sure they want abortions."1047 Some have been "dragged" there by 
relatives or pressured by husbands or boyfriends. 1048 Recognizing this 
problem, the Illinois legislature required clinics to provide counsel-
ing.1049 However, the investigation revealed that many of these counsel-
ors were taught to sell, not counsel. 10110 One administrator declared to 
an investigator who had infiltrated the staff, "We really have to sit on 
the phones back there and make appointments. Our fiscal year ends in 
September and we have to boost the figures. So go the extra mile."10111 
One counselor said she was trained not to tell the oatient the abor-
tion would hurt, not to discuss the procedure or instruments in any 
detail, not to answer too many questions, and not to talk about birth 
control. 10112 The reason? All unnecessary corners had to be cut to maxi-
mize profits. 10113 
The investigation, therefore, revealed a conflict of interest between 
some doctors' greed and their patients' need. The deaths of twelve 
1041. !d. at 15 
1042. /d. at 35. 
1043. /d. at 16. 
1044. /d. at 18, 24-26. 
1045. /d. at 21. 
1046. !d. at 22 (emphasis in original). 
1047. !d. at 33. 
1048. /d. 
1049. /d. 
1050. /d. 
1051. !d. 
1052. !d. 
1053. /d. 
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women 1054 and the maiming of others,l 055 unreported but discovered in 
the investigation, underscore this conflict. Doctors whose goal is to 
maximize personal profit by performing as many abortions as possible, 
and who encourage their staff "counselors" to sell abortions, are not 
appropriate parties to represent the rights of their patients. 1056 
Thus, the Court has distorted and expanded the usual standing 
rules to accommodate the abortion privacy right. 1057 This abortion dis-
tortion factor is also apparent in the Court's application of the rules of 
constitutional adjudication to abortion cases. 
b. Constitutional adjudication. This subsection deals with three 
principles of constitutional adjudication. First is the principle that con-
stitutional problems should be avoided in judicial decisions where possi-
ble. Special emphasis is placed upon the rule requiring construction of 
statutes which avoids their unconstitutionality where fairly possible. 
The second principle is the closely related one of construing statutes to 
uphold their constitutionality where a vagueness challenge is made. 
The third principle is the deference required of federal courts to lower 
courts, states, and legislatures, including the doctrine of abstention. 
(1 ). Avoiding constitutional issues. The principle of avoiding con-
stitutional issues was probably best summed up by Justice Brandeis in 
his famous concurrence to Ashwander v. TVA. 1058 Justice Brandeis 
listed seven rules which the Court had developed to avoid "passing 
upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for 
decision." 1059 Four of his rules were based on article IIP060 standing 
considerations. First, "[ t]he Court [would] not pass upon the constitu-
tionality of legislation in a friendly non-adversary, proceeding .... " 1061 
Second, "[t]he Court [would] not 'anticipate a question of constitutional 
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' " 1062 Third, "[t]he Court 
1054. /d. at 24. The deaths were the result of the abortions, but were unreported as such. /d. 
1055. /d. at 16. 
1056. The picture painted, in Roe, of a woman carefully weighing all the options, in consul-
tation with her good-hearted family doctor, was unrealistic in the light of the way a majority of 
abortions were being performed in Illinois. The shift to clinics seems to be a national trend and 
not limited to Illinois. Interestingly, in Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452. 462-63 (7th Cir. 1984), 
the Seventh Circuit decided the Abortion Profiteers series was irrelevant as evidence of the need to 
protect the state's interests in seeing that true informed consent was obtained. 
1057. In 1987, a federal appellate court cited the Singleton rationale in giving a Planned 
Parenthood Clinic and its medical director standing to assert their patients' rights. Planned 
Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d at 1396 & n.4. It noted that this 
was a relaxation of the usual rules. /d. 
1058. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (joined by Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo. J). 
1059. /d. at 346. 
1060. U.S. CoNST. art. III. 
1061. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346. 
1062. /d. (citations omitted). 
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[would] not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one 
who fail[ed] to show that he [was] injured by its operation."1063 Fourth, 
"[ t ]he Court [would] not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at 
the instance of one who [had] availed himself of its benefits."1064 
Three of Justice Brandeis' rules were based on policy considera-
tions developed by the Court itself. First, "[t]he Court [would] not 'for-
mulate a rule of constitutional law broader than [was] required by the 
precise facts to which it [was] to be applied.' " 10611 Second, "[t]he Court 
[would] not pass upon a constitutional question although properly 
presented by the record, if there [was] also present some other ground 
upon which the case [might] be disposed of. " 1066 If the Court could 
choose to decide a case on a constitutional ground or on a ground of 
statutory construction or general law, it should select the latter 
grounds. 1067 Third, " '[ w ]hen the validity of an act of the Congress 
[was] drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality 
[was] raised, it [was] a cardinal principle that this Court [would] first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute [was] fairly possible by 
which the question [might] be avoided.' " 1068 
These rules were quoted by the Court in Rescue Army v. Munici-
pal Court of Los Angeles, 1069 where the Court added that the rules 
were employed to "avoid[] passing upon a large part of all the constitu-
tional questions pressed upon it for decision ... , notwithstanding con-
ceded jurisdiction, until necessity compel[led] it in the performance of 
constitutional duty." 1070 "Like the case and controversy limitation itself 
and the policy against entertaining political questions," the Court de-
clared, the avoidance principle "is one of the rules basic to the federal 
system and this Court's appropriate place within that structure. " 1071 
This avoidance principle has been reflected in "numerous cases 
and over a long period."1072 It has been repeated by the Supreme Court 
1063. /d. at 347. 
I 064. /d. at 348. 
1065. /d. at 347 (citations omitted). 
1066. /d. at 347. 
1067. /d. 
1068. !d. at 348 (citations omitted). This principle applies to acts of state legislatures as well. 
See, e.g., Thornburgh, 737 F.Zd at 294. 
1069. 331 U.S. 549 (1947). 
I 070. /d. at 569. 
1071. Id. at 570. 
1072. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion). There 
has been controversy over particular applications of the principle, but not the principle itself. See 
Mattiello v. Connecticut, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 55, 225 A.2d 507, appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 209 
(1966); Nairn v. Nairn, 197 Va. 80,87 S.E.Zd 749, vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam); A. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGERous BRANCH: TH~: SuPREME CouRT AT THF. BAR OF Pouncs 
(1962); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" -A Comment on Principle and Expe-
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in cases involving state abortion laws. 1073 However, the avoidance prin-
ciple has not been consistently employed in abortion jurisprudence. 
Most notable, of course, was the "hypothetical" case employed by the 
majority in Roe. 1074 
One of the avoidance rules often applicable in abortion jurispru-
dence has been the well-settled rule that federal courts should apply 
sympathetic constructions to state statutes in order to uphold their 
constitutionality .10711 
dienry in judicial Heview, 64 Coi.UM. L. Rt:v. 1 (1964). 
1073. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976). The Ashwander avoidance 
principle was also recently cited with approval in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Balder-
man, 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984). 
I 07 4. See supra text accompanying notes 916-22. 
1075. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973); Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstretirs & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 294 (1986). Despite these common statements of 
the rule, one district murt in Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719, 726 (N.D. Okla. 1973), 
and Jus tire Brennan, dissenting in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 60 I, 627 ( 1973), have used 
language seeming to indicate that a federal rourt may not "construe or narrow" a state enactment. 
Of murse, in the same year, 1973, the Court in Bolton (with Justice Brennan joining the major-
ity) "construed" (and used the term, "construed," itself) the word "necessary" to allow an abor-
tion where a woman's "well-being" was at risk. In "well-being," the Court included "all far-
tors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-
being of the patient." Hoe, 410 U.S. at 191-92. The Court noted its earlier broad construction of 
"health" in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971), involving a District of Columbia 
statute, and approved the district court's adoption of such a construction of the Georgia statute. 
Hoe, 410 U.S. at 191-92. Moreover, construction of state statutes is permissible even outside the 
smpe of abortion jurisprudence. The misunderstanding seems to arise from a semantic conflict in 
(;rayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), G<x•ding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), and 
United States v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). In Thirty-seven (37) Photo-
graphs, the Court affirmed the rule requiring constructions favoring constitutionality of statutes. 
Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. at 368-69. It noted two prior rases where it had not done 
so, "the obstacle" being that the statutes at issue were state or city enactments. !d. The Court 
observed, for example, that one statute could be saved by a judicial construction which read time 
limits into the statute, but said "such construction had to be 'authoritative,' and we lark jurisdic-
tion authoritatively to construe state legislation." !d. (citation omilled). 
This statement of the rule was true as to authoritative construction, as a stale court is not 
bound by a federal court's construction of a statute of that stale. The real issue in this bit of 
dictum was not ''authoritative" ronstrurtion, however. A federal rourt may construe a statute so as 
to uphold its constitutionality and a stale may later impose an unconstitutional construction in 
place of the federal one. The lark of authoritative constructive power does not void the rule requir-
ing courts to find statutes constitutional where fairly possible. The real problem was slated by the 
Court when it said, in Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, that it had refused to "rewrite" the stale 
and city enactments (e.g., by adding time limitations). !d. al 369. Thus, the use of the ronrepl of 
ronstruction, which the Court rejected here, included a rewriting of the statute which required 
state authority to do. 
Justice Brennan, writing the Court's opinion a year later in Gooding, 405 U.S. 518, cited the 
Thirty-seven ( 37) Photographs rule in his comment that "ioJnly the Georgia courts can supply the 
requisite construnion, since of course 'we lark jurisdiction authoritatively to mnslrue slate legisla-
tion.'" Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520. In the context or Gooding, the "requisite ronstrurtion" referred 
to an authoritative one, as the stale rourls had already construed the elements of the statute with-
out limiting them as required [or constitutionality of the statute. /d. al 524-27. Thus, the federal 
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As with the rest of the avoidance principle, this rule has not been 
consistently applied in abortion cases. 
In Thornburgh, this rule was violated by seeking to find an un-
constitutional construction of a state statute rather than seeking to avoid 
one. As noted briefly above, the statute at issue required a second phy-
sician to care for the fetus in the case of abortions performed after via-
bility.1076 In Ashcroft, the Court had allowed a second-physician re-
quirement, provided there was an emergency exception. 1077 Although 
the provision considered in Ashcroft contained no explicit emergency 
exception, one was construed from the phrase "provided that it does not 
pose an increased risk to the life or health of the woman."1078 
The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Thornburgh provided "a 
complete defense to any charge brought against a physician for violat-
ing the requirements of this section that he had concluded in good faith, 
in his best medical judgment, . . . that the abortion was necessary to 
preserve maternal life or health."1079 Clearly the failure to obtain a 
second physician was excusable where a mother's life or health was at 
risk. In fact, the statute's language in Thornburgh provided the Court 
with greater reason for such construction than did the statute in Ash-
croft. Yet, the Thornburgh Court was unwilling to find a construction 
which avoided unconstitutionality. The Court struck down the 
statute.1080 
In Thornburgh, the Pennsylvania statute also required the use of 
court could not impose any construction on the statute. 
The Grayned case clarified the scope of federal authority to construe state statutes. Grayned, 
408 U.S. at I 04. An anti-noise ordinance at issue had not been construed by the state courts which 
tried the case, but reference was made to similar statutes which had been recently construed and 
sustained. /d. at 109-10. The Grayned Court declared the rule: 
In this situation, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it, we must "extrapolate its allowable 
meaning." Here, we are "relegated, ... to the words of the ordinance itself," to the 
interpretations the court below has given to analogous statutes, and, perhaps to some 
degree, to the interpretation of the statute given by those charged with enforcing it. 
"Extrapolation," of course, is a delicate task, for it is not within our power to construe 
and narrow state laws. 
!d. at 110 (footnotes omitted) (citing Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. at 369). 
It may be seen, then, that some effort has been made to distinguish permissible interpretive 
functions of a federal court from impermissible ones and to assign the term "extrapolation" to the 
former. That this effort has been unsuccessful is evident from the use of the term "construction" 
for the interpretive function of a federal court in the abortion cases cited in this footnote and 
numerous other cases. As noted, however, there are more limits on a federal court than on a state 
court in construing state statutes. 
1076. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 3210(c) (Purdon 1983). 
1077. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482-86 (1983). 
1078. !d. at 485 n.8. 
1079. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 32!0(a) (Purdon 1983). 
1080. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 771 
(1986). 
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the abortion method most likely to preserve the life of a postviable fetus 
unless that method posed "a significantly greater medical risk" to ma-
ternal life or health. 1081 "[P]otential psychological or emotional impact 
of the child's survival upon the mother" was not to be considered in 
determining the medical risk. 1082 
Arguably, a state could require some higher degree of maternal 
risk after viability than before, because the broad health definition of 
Bolton1083 applies only to early pregnancy. 1084 But, even rejecting this 
notion, the Thornburgh Court was offered two other plausible 
constructions. 
First, the state argued for a construction of the phrase "signifi-
cantly greater" risk to mean "meaningfully increased" risk. 10811 Thus, 
in keeping with Colautti v. Franklin, 1088no trade-off would be re-
quired between a mother's health and fetal survivaU087 The district 
court had employed the "meaningfully increased" construction and up-
held the statute, recognizing its "oblig[ation] to give the statute [a] rea-
sonable interpretation which avoids the danger of constitutional invalid-
ity."1088 That Court supported its construction by a dictionary 
definition of the relevant terms. 1089 The Court of Appeals rejected this 
interpretation, holding that the statute was "not susceptible to a con-
struction that does not require the mother to bear an increased medical 
risk in order to save her viable fetus. " 1090 The Supreme Court 
agreed. 1091 
A second construction would also have avoided a claim that in-
creased medical risks were imposed on the mother: 
Section 321 O(b) could reasonably be construed to mandate that the 
physician may not base his decision to use an abortion procedure 
other than the procedure most likely to result in a live birth solely on 
the possibility of psychological or emotional harm to the woman if her 
1081. 18 PA CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(b) (Purdon 1983). 
1082. /d. 
I 083. Roe, 410 U.S. at 192. See supra note I 07 5 for the definition. 
1084. Brief for the National Right to Life Committee, Amicus Curiae, at 12-22; Thornburgh 
v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495). See also 
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 807-08 (White, J., dissenting). 
1085. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769. 
1086. 439 U.S. 379, 400 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
1087. But see Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 807 (White, J., dissenting) ("Colautti held no such 
thing."). 
1088. Thornburgh, 552 F. Supp. 791, 807 (E. D. Pa. 1982). 
1089. /d. 
1090. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 
283, 300 (3d Cir. 1984) rev'd 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
1091. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769. 
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child is delivered alive rather than dead. 1092 
However, neither the appellate court nor the Supreme Court consid-
ered abstaining to determine if the state courts might adopt a constitu-
tional construction. Nor did the two courts adopt a constitutional con-
struction. Instead they resorted to "linguistic nit-picking" to strike 
down the provision. 1093 
One further item in Thornburgh is relevant here. Pennsylvania 
had promulgated its abortion regulations based in part on its finding 
that many women were undergoing abortions "without full knowledge 
of the development of the unborn child or of alternatives to abor-
tion. " 1094 To remedy this defect in the informed consent process, a pro-
vision was enacted to give some structure to the physician-patient dia-
logue. The Supreme Court followed the appellate court in finding that 
provision, Section 3205, unconstitutional. 10911 
A cross-reference tied Section 3205 to Section 3208, which pro-
vided for printed information to be prepared by the state. This material 
was to list agencies providing resources to women desiring to carry 
their unborn children to term (and to assist thereafter with adoption or 
child support). The material also provided "anatomical and physiologi-
cal characteristics" of an unborn child at two week intervals. The ap-
pellate court had found no flaw with Section 3208, but held it was 
"inextricably intertwined" with Section 3205, and so was not severable. 
This was erroneous, as a mere cross-reference does not make for inex-
tricable intertwining. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court had held that a state may "make a 
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and ... [may] imple-
ment that judgment by the allocation of public funds." 1096 In imple-
menting its value judgment, the state should be able to print any mate-
rial it desires. Striking down Section 3208 seems little more than an 
1092. Brief for the National Right to Life Committee, Amicus Curiae, at') n.1, Thornbuq~;h 
v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 47(, U.S. 747 (19!l6)(No. 84-495). 
1093. Thornburgh, 476 US. at 807 (White, J, dissenting). 
!d. 
The term 'significant' in this context, however, is most naturally read as synonymous 
with the terms 'meaningful,' 'cognizable,' 'appreciable,' or 'non-negligible.' That is, the 
statute requires only that the risk be a real and identifiable one. Surely, if the State's 
interest in preserving the life of a viable fetus is, as Hoe purported to recognize, a 
compelling one, the State is at the very least entitled to demand that that interest not be 
subordinated to a purported maternal health risk that is in fan wholly insubstantial. 
The statute, on its fare, demands no more than this of a doctor performing an abortion 
of a viable fetus. 
1094. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3202(b)(t)(Purdon 1983). 
1095. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764. 
1096. Maher v. Roe, 432 US. 464, 474 (1977). 
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attempt to censor material of which the courts disapproved. For pur-
poses of this discussion, however, it is clear that the appellate court in 
Thornburgh construed these statutes to create constitutional problems 
and not to remove them. 
The Supreme Court also held Section 3208 to be unconstitutional, 
treating it as a unit with Section 3205, though not alluding to the "in-
extricably intertwined" language. 1097 It did not even consider the possi-
bility of severing one of the two sections, and, when it refused to sever 
provisions within Section 3205, it rested its refusal partially on the ab-
sence of a broad severability clause in the Pennsylvania Abortion Con-
trol Act. 1098 That the Court failed to find a severability clause is aston-
ishing, because the Brief for Appellants mentioned the relevant 
severance clause twice/099 and it was also argued in connection with 
these sections in the United States' brief. 1100 
Such eagerness to strike down abortion legislation does not square 
with the Ashwander principles. Justice White, dissenting in Thorn-
burgh, summed up the matter well in his comment on the majority's 
refusal to find an emergency exception in the two-physician require-
ment for postviability abortions: 
The Court's rejection of a perfectly plausible reading of the statute 
flies in the face of the principle-which until today I had thought 
applicable to abortion statutes as well as to other legislative enact-
ments-that '[ w ]here fairly possible, courts should construe a statute 
to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.' Planned Parenthood Ass'n 
v. Ashcroft [citation omitted]. The Court's reading is obviously based 
on an entirely different principle: that in cases involving abortion, a 
permissible reading of a statute is to be avoided at all costs. 1101 
In Danforth, 1102 the Court was presented with a construction 
problem involving a statute designed to protect the lives of aborted fe-
tuses. The statute provided: 
Section 6. (1) No person who performs or induces an abortion shall 
fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to 
preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be 
required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any 
fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any physician or person 
1097. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762. 
1098. Jd. at 765. 
1099. Brief for Appellants at 74, 45a, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495). The clause is found in Act No. 1982-138, § 5, 
1982 Pa. Legis. Serv. 750, 794 (Purdon). 
1100. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 7. 
1101. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 812 (White, J., dissenting). 
1102. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
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assisting in the abortion who shall fail to take such measures to en-
courage or to sustain the life of the child, and the death of the child 
results, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter .... Further, such 
physician or other person shall be liable in an action for damages ... 
1103 
The challenge to this provision was based on overbreadth. Appel-
lants argued that "the statute on its face effectively preclude[d] abortion 
and was meant to do just that. " 1104 The district court held it to be 
"unconstitutionally overbroad because it failed to exclude from its reach 
the stage of pregnancy prior to viability."11011 
Under the usual rules, the Court had an obligation to find a con-
stitutional construction for the statute whenever possible. It began its 
task but aborted it too early. The Court considered the construction 
offered by the state of Missouri's Attorney General: "the first sentence 
of § 6(1) establishes only the general standard of care that applies to 
the person who performs the abortion, and . . . the second sentence 
describes the circumstances when that standard of care applies, namely, 
when a live child results from the procedure."1106 
The Danforth Court was "unable to accept the appellee's sophisti-
cated interpretation of the statute."1107 The Court declared that section 
6(1) required the special standard of care on behalf of a fetus; and it 
did so without specifying that it applied only after viability. 1108 Thus, 
the Court held, "it impermissibly require[d] the physician to preserve 
the life and health of the fetus, whatever the state of pregnancy."1109 
The Court decided that the second sentence referring to child simply 
did not modify the first sentence, but held them unseverable for being 
"inextricably bound together."1110 
1103. /d. at 85-86. 
1104. /d. at 82. 
1105. /d. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1371 (E.D. Mo. 
1975)). This ready application of the overbreadth doctrine to abortion is remarkable in itself, 
because the common perception is that a facial overbreadth challenge will be applied only in free 
expression cases. In a recent case, the Court declared, "[W)e have not recognized an 'overbreadth' 
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 
2095, 2100 (1987) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 n.18 (1984)). Yet, the Court ap-
plied the doctrine in Roe, 410 U.S. at 164, and in Danforth as noted in the text accompanying this 
article, and this practice has been followed in numerous lower court cases. Thus, either the abor-
tion right has been raised to the level of the right of free expression, which has traditionally been 
the most protected of rights, or the Court's analysis is inconsistent. The Court has never directly 
confronted the issue of whether abortion truly should be exalted to the level of free expression. 
1106. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 82. 
1107. /d. at 83. 
1108. /d. 
1109. /d. 
1110. !d. 
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That a reasonable constitutional construction was available and 
had been set before the Court is evidenced by Justice White's dissenting 
opinion. He noted that the standard of care required was only " 'that 
degree of professional skill ... to preserve the ... fetus,' which would 
be required if the mother wanted a live child." 1111 "Plainly, if the preg-
nancy is to be terminated at a time when there is no chance of life 
outside the womb, a physician would not be required to exercise any 
care or skill to preserve the life of the fetus .... " 1112 Thus, the statute 
could easily have been construed to apply only to the time when the 
fetus was viable. 
"Incredibly," Justice White remarked, "the Court reads the stat-
ute ... to require 'the physician to preserve the life and health of the 
fetus, whatever the stage of pregnancy,' ... thereby attributing to the 
Missouri Legislature the strange intention of passing a statute with ab-
solutely no chance of surviving constitutional challenge under Roe ... 
"1113 
Finally, as severability is "entirely a question of the intent of the 
state legislature,"1114 and Missouri clearly intended to protect live ba-
bies resulting from abortions,1116 the Court had an obligation to honor 
that intent and sever the passage if the Court could find no constitu-
tional construction of it. Due to the violation of the usual rules, one is 
left with the feeling that the majority did not like the protection pro-
vided by the statute and found an unconstitutional construction of it as 
a means to an end. 1116 
It is perhaps indicative of the Court's predisposition in Danforth 
that it failed to mention its obligation to employ a constitutional con-
struction of the statute, if possible. 
(2). Avoiding Vagueness. The rule requiring construction of a 
statute to avoid its unconstitutionality covers construction of statutes to 
avoid a finding of unconstitutional vagueness, as well. The courts have 
been especially active in construing abortion laws in light of the vague-
ness doctrine. The principle underlying the doctrine was explained by 
the Supreme Court in 1972 in Grayned v. City of Rockford: 
1111. /d. at 99. 
1112. /d. at 99-100. 
1113. /d. at 100. 
1114. /d. 
1115. /d. at 101 (citing the Missouri Attorney General's argument that the only intent of§ 
6(1) was to require medical support for live babies resulting from abortions). 
1116. Compare the debate in Thornburgh over whether a mother is entitled only to an 
empty womb or to a dead fetus as well. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 784 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
("[18 PA CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3210(c) (Purdon 1983)[ simply states that a viable fetus is to be 
cared for, not destroyed"). 
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It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for 
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws of-
fend several important values. First, because we assume that man is 
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws 
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws 
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must 
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. 1117 
The Supreme Court, in Colautti v. Franklin, llls set forth a 
vagueness test in an abortion case: 
It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that 
'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his con-
templated conduct is forbidden by statute,' or is so indefinite that 'it 
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,' is void for 
vagueness. This appears to be especially true where the uncertainty 
induced by the statute threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitution-
ally protected rights. 1119 
In light of the pervasive use of the vagueness doctrine to strike 
down abortion regulations, a more detailed exposition of the rule is 
appropriate. The Court observed, in Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. that the level of vagueness tolerated 
varied with the nature of the statute at issue.1120 Economic regulation 
receives less scrutiny due to its narrow subject matter, the economic 
motivation for business to consult legislation before acting, and the 
availability of clarification by personal inquiry or administrative rul-
ing.1121 Where criminal penalties are imposed, the scrutiny is 
stricterY22 However, a scienter requirement may mitigate a certain 
amount of vagueness, especially where the principle of adequate notice 
regarding proscribed conduct is involved.1123 Finally, where a law 
"threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights," 
more clarity is req uired. 1124 Prior to the abortion cases, however, this 
higher level of scrutiny was only applied to cases involving restrictions 
of free speech or association. Indeed, these are the examples cited by 
1117. Granyned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) 
1118. 439 u.s. 379. 
1119. /d. at 390-91 (citations omitted). 
1120. 455 U.S. 489, 498 ( 1982). 
1121. /d. 
1122. /d. at 498-99. 
1123. /d. at 499. 
1124. /d. 
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Hoffman Estates1126 and Colautti. 1126 
The vagueness doctrine, which underscores the desire for notice of 
proscribed conduct and adequate guidelines for law enforcement, has its 
limits. First, as noted previously, courts have a duty to give a statute a 
construction which favors the constitutionality of the statute, where 
fairly possible. 1127 Second, that there may be difficulty with marginal 
cases does not cause unconstitutional vagueness. 1128 Third, where one's 
"conduct falls squarely within the 'hard core' of the statute's proscrip-
tions," a facial vagueness challenge will not be allowed. 1129 Fourth, 
where technical terms or terms with special meaning are employed 
(e.g., common law terms), or where the terminology is commonly 
grasped in the context, a fatal ambiguity will not be found. 113° Fifth, 
scienter, as noted before, will ameliorate ambiguity. Sixth, the vague-
ness doctrine does not reqmre "unattainable feats of statutory 
clarity." 1131 
1125. /d. 
1126. 439 U.S. at 391. Free expression has traditionally received greater protection both 
from the vagueness doctrine and from the related overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 
U.S. at 109 (giving heightened scrutiny in context of first amendment constitutional rights only), 
114-15 (overbreadth); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (l'J73)(overbreadth). 
1127. Any limiting construction given by a stale court or enforcement agency must be consid-
ered. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983). 
1128. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954). While many of the discussions of 
the vagueness rule, such as that in Harriss, focus on the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, the Court has applied the principles equally to the fourteenth amendment. This may be 
seen in the common citation of vagueness analysis precedents dealing with federal statutes in rases 
involving state laws. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 n.3. 
1129. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973). 
1130. United States v. Maude, 481 F.2d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
1131. I d. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 ( 1947), set forth the 
requirements of due process in its discussion of a statute which made it unlawful to coerce a 
broadcaster to employ more employees than needed to perform actual services. The Court stated: 
Clearer and more precise language might have been framed by Congress to ex-
press what it meant by 'number of employees needed' But none occurs to us, nor has 
any better language been suggested, effectively to carry out what appears to have been 
the Congressional purpose. The argument really seems to be that it is impossible for a 
jury or court ever to determine how many employees a business needs, and that, there-
fore, no statutory language could meet the problem Congress had in mind. If this argu-
ment should be accepted, the result would be that no legislature could make it an of-
fense for a person to compel another to hire employees, no matter how unnecessary 
they were, and however desirable a legislature might consider suppression of the prac-
tice to be. 
The Constitution presents no such insuperable obstacle to legislation. We think 
that the language Congress used provides an adequate warning as to what conduct falls 
under its ban, and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to 
administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress. Tbat there may be margi-
nal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a partieular 
fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a 
criminal offense. It would strain the requirement for certainty in criminal law stan-
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The Broadrick Court put this last matter in perspective by stating 
that "[ w ]ords inevitably contain germs of uncertainty. " 1132 It continued: 
[T]here are limitations in the English language with respect to being 
both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although 
the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any 
cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising 
ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, 
without sacrifice to the public interest.1133 
Thus, as the cases show, absolute precision in legislative drafting is not 
required. It is enough if "citizens who desire to obey the statute will 
have no difficulty in understanding it."113' 
As this rather detailed analysis of the vagueness rule shows, there 
is more to the rule than Colautti admitted. It is symptomatic of abor-
tion jurisprudence that the ameliorating principles are largely ignored. 
These should be kept in mind as the application of the vagueness doc-
trine is observed. 11311 
One of the most commonly cited cases setting forth the rule against 
vagueness is United States v. Harriss. 1136 Harriss was cited by Co-
lautti for the vagueness rule.U37 The proper analysis of a vagueness 
claim was illustrated by the Harriss Court when it set out the vague-
ness rule1138 and immediately followed it with a paragraph containing 
dards too near the breaking point to say that it was impossible judicially to determine 
whether a person knew when he was wilfully attempting to compel another to hire 
unneeded employees. The Constitution has erected procedural safeguards to protect 
against conviction for crime except for violation of laws which have clearly defined 
conduct thereafter to be punished; but the Constitution does not require impossible 
standards. The language here challenged conveys sufficiently definite warnings as to 
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The 
Constitution requires no more. 
/d. at 7-8 (citations omitted). 
1132. 413 U.S. at 608. 
1133. /d. (quoting United States Civil Service Comm'n. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 
578-79 (1973)). 
1134. Cohen v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (quoting Cohen v. Commonwealth, 467 
S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1971)). 
1135. An excellent explication and application of the vagueness rule is found in the concur-
ring opinion of Judge Williams in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999-1002 (5th Cir. 
1986) (rejecting the majority's finding of unconstitutional vagueness in a fetal experimentation 
statute). 
1136. 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
1137. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979). 
1138. The rule, as stated in Harriss, is: 
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that 
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct 
is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held 
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be 
proscribed. 
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two of the limitations on the expansion of the rule. It stated: 
On the other hand, if the general class of offenses to which the 
statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be 
struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where 
doubts might arise. And if this general class of offenses can be made 
constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, 
this Court is under a duty to give the statute that construction. This 
was the course adopted in Screws v. United States, upholding the def-
initeness of the Civil Rights Act. 1139 
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The Harriss Court proceeded to uphold the statute at 1ssue, even 
though it involved restrictions on highly protected free expression, an 
area in which stricter scrutiny is applied.1140 
The vagueness analysis, as set forth in Harriss, may be summa-
rized as a two-step process. First, evaluate the statute in light of com-
mon understanding, technical use of terms, scienter requirements, ap-
plicability of its "hard core" to the plaintiff, and so on, to determine 
whether vagueness exists. Second, determine whether a construction is 
fairly possible which favors constitutionality and, if one exists, employ 
it. 
One indicator of a court's predisposition toward finding an abor-
tion statute impermissibly vague is whether the court mentions the sec-
ond prong of the Harriss analysis in setting out the rule. In the discus-
sion of the following cases, the presence or absence of the second part of 
the Harriss analysis should be observed. 
Before Roe, the Supreme Court decided the abortion case of 
United States v. Vuitch. 1141 That opinion was noteworthy for a clear 
explication of the constitutional construction principle: "statutes should 
be construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutional-
ity."1142 Applying this principle, the Court construed a "health" excep-
tion to an abortion prohibition broadly to include mental health and, 
thus, eliminated any ambiguity. 1143 
This recognition of the rule and its appropriate application was 
also evident in Doe v. Bolton. 1144 In Bolton, a Georgia statute was 
challenged on vagueness grounds because it forbade a physician to per-
form an abortion except when it was "based upon his best clinical judg-
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617. 
1139. /d. at 618 (citations omitted). 
1140. /d. 
1141. 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
1142. /d. at 70. 
1143. /d. at 71-72. 
1144. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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ment that an abortion [was] necessary."1146 The term "necessary" was 
attacked as being standardless. The Court said, "The vagueness argu-
ment is set aside by the decision in United States v. Vuitch. "1146 The 
doctor was to consider all circumstances in deciding necessity, and, the 
Court observed, such "necessity" of surgery "is a judgment that physi-
cians are obviously called upon to make routinely." 1147 The Court also 
noted that this "room" for a physician to make his "best medical judg-
ment" operated to the benefit of the pregnant woman. 1148 
This clear statement of the rule in Vuitch and its positive applica-
tion in that case and in Bolton are in marked contrast to subsequent 
constructions of abortion statutes by the Supreme Court. Perhaps this is 
explainable by the fact that both of those cases had the effect of ex-
panding the abortion rights of women. Subsequent constructions of stat-
utes where vagueness was found were often employed to strike abortion 
regulation by finding statutes to be unconstitutional. 1149 
In Colautti, the Court was confronted with two vagueness chal-
lenges. They were focused on Section S(a) of the Pennsylvania Abor-
tion Control Act: 
(a) Every person who performs or induces an abortion shall prior 
thereto have made a determination based on his experience, judgment 
or professional competence that the fetus is not viable, and if the de-
termination is that the fetus is viable or if there is sufficient reason to 
believe that the fetus may be viable, shall exercise that degree of pro-
fessional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the 
fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to 
preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not 
aborted and the abortion technique employed shall be that which 
would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so 
long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to pre-
serve the life or health of the mother. 1160 
The first challenged phrase, "the fetus is viable or if there is suffi-
cient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable," was challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague "because it fail[ ed] to inform the physician 
when his duty to the fetus ar[ose], and because it d[id] not make the 
physician's good-faith determination of viability conclusive." 1161 
1145. GA. Com: ANN. § 26-1202(a) ( 1968). 
1146. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 191 (citation omitted). 
1147. !d. at 192. 
1148. !d. 
1149. See infra text accompanying notes 1150-58 (discussing confirmation of this distinrtion 
in Colautti). 
1150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977) (challenged portions emphasized). 
1151. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 389 (1979). 
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The Supreme Court agreed that this portion was ambiguous, that 
this ambiguity was "aggravated by the absence of a scienter require-
ment with respect to the finding of viability," and, therefore, that "the 
viability-determination requirement of [section] S(a)" was "void for 
vagueness. " 11112 
The first step in a proper vagueness analysis is to determine if 
ambiguity exists. The Court did this, citing Harriss 1153 for the rule 
against overly vague criminal statutes. 11114 
The second step is to determine if a construction can fairly be 
found which resolves the ambiguity. However, the Court neither cited 
this rule-although Harris had just been cited for its vagueness princi-
ple-nor made any effort to find a saving construction. 
The Colautti Court virtually conceded that a different construction 
rule existed where abortion rights were being expanded than where 
they were being restricted. The Court noted the Vuitch and Bolton con-
structions favoring constitutionality, but distinguished them on the 
ground that they "afford[ ed] broad discretion to the physician," unlike 
the statute at issue in Colautti. 11511 
Moreover, the Colautti Court found the vagueness at issue to be 
compounded by the lack of a scienter requirement. 1156 A construction 
recognizing a scienter requirement was possible in Colautti because, as 
the Court noted, "the Pennsylvania law of criminal homicide, made 
applicable to the physician by section S(d), conditions guilt upon a find-
ing of scienter."1157 The relevant provision was distinguished, however, 
as applying only to "caus[ing] the death of another human being."m8 
The Court refused to include within the definition of "caus[ing] the 
death of another human being" a physician's negligent failure to ascer-
tain the existence of a viable fetus which caused that fetus' death. 1159 
In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, as briefly 
noted earlier, the Supreme Court struck down a regulation requiring 
"humane and sanitary" disposal of fetal remains. 1160 The city of Akron 
contended that the statute was merely "to preclude the mindless dump-
ing of aborted fetuses onto garbage piles."1161 In Planned Parenthood 
1152. /d. at 390. 
1153. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). 
1154. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 390 (noting also the higher standard where the ambiguity inhib-
ited exercise of constitutionally protected rights). 
1155. /d. at 394. 
1156. /d. 
1157. /d. 
1158. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2501 (Purdon 1973). 
1159. 439 U.S. at 394-95. 
I 160. 462 US. at 451-52. 
1161. /d. (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 573 (E.D. 
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Association v. Fitzpatrick, 1162 a district court had upheld the term "hu-
mane" against a vagueness attack. 1163 That statute required the Penn-
sylvania Department of Health to "make regulations to provide for the 
humane disposition of dead fetuses. " 1164 The district court noted that 
the parties agreed that incineration would be appropriate and that the 
Commonwealth was only protecting the public health by precluding 
"the mindless dumping of aborted fetuses on to garbage piles." 116 ~ The 
court noted that, if "humane" were construed to require "expensive 
burial," it "may very well invade the privacy of the pregnant woman 
and burden her decision concerning an abortion." 1166 This opinion was 
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court in 197 6.U67 
With this body of law available to it, the City Council of Akron 
passed Ordinance No. 160-1978, "Regulation of Abortion." 1168 The or-
dinance contained a clear severability clause1169 and the requirement 
that " [a]ny physician who shall perform or induce an abortion ... 
shall insure that the remains . . . are disposed of in a humane and 
sanitary manner." 1170 This ordinance was enforced by misdemeanor 
penal ties. 1171 
While the imposition of such penalties heightens the level of scru-
tiny, the general rules described above still do not require impossible 
standards. By comparison, the Supreme Court has upheld criminal or 
quasi-criminal statutes against vagueness challenges to such terms as 
"crime involving moral turpitude,"1172 "restraint of trade,"1173 "any of-
fensive, derisive or annoying word," 1174 "connected with or related to 
the national defense," 117~ "fair and open competition," 1176 and other 
similar phrases. 1177 If such phrases may be construed, despite criminal 
penalties, to be sufficiently clear for constitutional purposes, then the 
Pa. 1975), affd mem. sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976)). 
1162. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
1163. !d. at 572-73. 
1164. !d. at 572. 
1165. !d. at 573. 
1166. !d. 
1167. 428 us 901. 
1168. Akron, 462 U.S. at 421. 
1169. The clause provided that "should any provision ... be construed . . unconstitutional . 
. . such unconstitutionality ... shall not extend to any other provision " AKRON ORDINANCE 
No. 160-1978 § 1870.19. 
1170. /d. § 1870.16. 
1171. !d. § 1870.18. 
1172. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 n.15 ( 1951 ). 
1173. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). 
1174. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
1175. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941). 
1176. Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). 
1177. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223,231 n.15 (19~1). 
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phrase "humane and sanitary" would seem to be a candidate for simi-
lar construction. 
As noted by the United States, as amicus curiae, "( t]he phrase 'hu-
mane and sanitary' appears in countless laws regulating health and 
safety. Congress has even mandated the 'humane ... disposal of excess 
wild free-roaming horses and burros.' As a familiar regulatory formula, 
the phrase 'humane and sanitary' resembles the phrase 'informed con-
sent,' which the Court in Danforth held not to be vague."1178 
Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Akron, agreed: 
In light of the fact that the city of Akron indicates no intent to require 
that physicians provide 'decent burials' for fetuses, and that 'humane' 
is no more vague than the term 'sanitary,' the vagueness of which 
Akron Center does not question, I cannot conclude that the statute is 
void for vagueness. 1179 
The fact was ignored by the Court that there was already prece-
dent in Fitzpatrick for not construing "humane" to require a "decent 
burial". The fact that the ordinance was passed after Fitzpatrick, and 
presumably in its light, was ignored. The fact that the city of Akron 
argued for the construction of Fitzpatrick as the intent of the city coun-
cil was ignored. The fact that, even without this precedent, a saving 
construction, excluding a "decent burial," was possible was ignored. 
The fact that severance of the term "humane" was available, leaving 
the undisputed term "sanitary," was ignored. Rather, the Court elected 
to speculate that a "decent burial" was being required and threw out 
the usual rules of construction along with the ordinance. Nowhere did 
the Supreme Court note its duty to apply a constitutional construction. 
The hostility of the Supreme Court to abortion regulations and the 
employment of the vagueness doctrine to strike them down is also re-
flected in lower court opinions. Again, express recognition of the duty 
to employ a constitutional construction serves as a predictor of the 
court's intent to strike the statutes. 
The hostile approach was evident in the Seventh Circuit opinion 
in Charles v. Daley. 1180 The appellate court held unconstitutionally 
vague a 1983 Illinois statute which required a certain standard of care 
of a "physician or person assisting in ... a pregnancy termination" 
performed after the fetus is "known to be viable." 1181 This was held 
1178. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 20 (citations omitted). 
1179. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,475 (1983)(0'Connor, 
]., dissenting). 
1180. 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, 476 
u.s. 54 (1986). 
1181. Daley, 749 F.2d at 455; ILL. REv. STAT. ch.38, para. 81-26 (1983). 
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vague on the ground that the statute did "not specify which party, 
physician or assistant, must make the viability determination."1182 A 
1983 amendment defined "viability" to be dependent on "the medical 
judgment and determination of the attending physician."1183 A 1984 
amendment of the specific section at issue made it explicit that the at-
tending physician's determination controlled. 1184 This made the legisla-
ture's intent clear. 
However, even under the unamended 1983 version,1185 it was clear 
that the legislature intended that the attending physician should make 
the determination. Furthermore, such a constitutional construction was 
plainly permitted under the amended 1983 version due to the definition 
of viability, which made the attending physician's decision controlling. 
Under the usual rules, where such a constitutional construction is 
plainly permitted, the federal court is obligated to give a statute such a 
construction. Instead, the court elected to violate the well-settled rule, to 
which it made no reference. 
Numerous other examples exist of the federal courts' hostile con-
struction of state abortion statutes. 1186 The 1987 case of Planned 
1182. Daley, 749 F.2d at 459. 
1183. /d. at 455. 
1184. H.R. 1399, 1984 Ill.. 
1185. This version was declared constitutional by the district court. Charles v. Carey, 579 F. 
Supp. 46<+, 466, 469 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
1186. In 1986, an Ohio district court in Haskell v. Washington Township found a zoning 
resolution impermissibly vague. 635 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ohio 1986). The problem was that the 
resolution failed to define "abortion clinic." /d. at 561. Since a number of conceivable arrange-
ments could be classified as abortion clinics, it was held that no sufficient warning was given by 
the statute to persons attempting to comply with it. /d. at 562. The court noted that when "per-
sons affected ... are a select group with specialized understanding of the subject being regulated 
the degree of definiteness required to satisfy due process concerns is measured by the common 
understanding and commercial knowledge of the group." /d. at 561 (quoting Fleming v. United 
States Dep't of Agric., 713 F.2d 179, 184 (6th Cir. 1983)). Even specialized knowledge, however, 
would not enable a doctor to know whether a general practice facility equipped to do abortions 
would be considered the same as a facility that performed abortions exclusively and advertised 
itself as an abortion clinic, said the court. /d. at 562. With misdemeanor penalties attached, such 
vagueness proved fatal in the view of this court. /d. at 561. 
However, the standards set out by the Supreme Court require a more sympathetic approach. 
In United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I, 7 (1947), the Court declared, "That there may be margi-
nal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact 
situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal 
offense." Certainly anyone who operated a facility solely to perform abortions would know the 
facility was an abortion clinic. Many clinics of this type exist and account for a large proportion of 
abortions performed. The Abortion Profiteers, supra note 1034, at 2. While it is preferable for 
legislative bodies to precisely define terms used, the Supreme Court has determined that the Con-
stitution only requires the warning of the proscribed conduct to be sufficiently definite "when 
measured by common understanding and practices." Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 8. "Common under-
standing" would certainly include clinics devoted exclusively or principally to the performance of 
abortions within the concept of "abortion clinic." The Haskell court's approach violates the princi-
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Parenthood Association of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati demon-
pie, recently given fresh impetus in United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987), that 
"[a) facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount success-
fully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act 
would be valid'' 
The Northern District of Ohio was exemplary in its handling of vagueness issues in the 1986 
case, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen. 633 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ohio 1986). The 
plaintiffs had argued that a statute providing that "[n)o person shall knowingly perform or induce 
an abortion upon a woman who is unmarried, under eighteen years of age, and unemanci-
pated" without meeting statutory requirements was vague. !d. at 1133; OHIO RFv. Com: ANN. ~ 
2919.12 (B)(1)(a)(Page Supp. 1985). They contended it was undear whether "knowingly" ap-
plied to the performance of the abortion or the physician's determination of the woman's status. 
Rosen, 633 F. Supp. at 1133. The court noted an affirmative defense sertion which protected 
physicians from strict liability where misrepresentation of status had occurred and found the scien-
ter element to apply to both clauses. !d. at 1134. The same court rejected vagueness challenges to 
the terms "reasonable efforts" and "reasonable cause to believe," observing that "[bjy insisting on 
definitions of commonly understood words, plaintiffs only confuse their meanings." !d. Such terms 
"must be interpreted in the context of the conduct they modify, as they are in other legal settings," 
and "[ t[he scienter element in the criminal offense ameliorates any slight uncertainty in these 
words." !d. (citing Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492 n.18 ( 1983); Colautti 
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979)). 
The decision of the Eastern District of Louisiana in the 1984 case, Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 
F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984)(Margaret S. (II)), achieved mixed results. First, the court held a 
provision void for vagueness which required a physician to advise a woman "[o[f the anatomical 
and physiological development of the particular unborn child at the time the abortion is to be 
performed or induced, according to the best medical judgment of the attending physician." LA. 
RFV. STAT ANN. ~ 40:1299.35.6(B)(3)(West Supp. 1981). It is noteworthy that, after initially 
quoting the statute footnote, Margaret S. (II), 597 F.Supp. at (,57 n.15, the court ignored the 
phrase "according to the best medical judgment of the attending physician" throughout the rest of 
its discussion. !d. at 661-64. In fact, in its discussion, the court restated the provision as requiring 
that the woman be informed of the " 'anatomical and physiological development of the unborn 
child at the time the abortion is to be performed.'" !d. at 661. This restatement completely ig-
nored the "best medical judgment" clause of the provision. !d. 
Building on this misrepresented base, the Margaret S. (II) court noted the plaintiffs' argu-
ments that the statute was impermissibly vague in that "it is impossible for a physician to deter-
mine with accuracy the precise gestational age of a fetus," and that, therefore, the "physinan 
would be required to describe a range of fetal development of several weeks." !d. They further 
argued that the statute was vague, because it did not specify "the amount of information a physi-
cian must impart." !d. The court agreed that, since a physician muld not "determine fetal age 
precisely," it would be impossible to comply with the statute. !d. at 663 (citing with approval its 
prior case construing the predecessor to this statute). This conclusion completely ignored a whole 
clause of the statute, which only required the physician's "best medical judgment" on the matter. 
Such "rewriting" of the statute in order to invalidate it is inexcusable. If the statute is read 
properly, compliance is rather simple, and no "range" of fetal development need be given. Fur-
ther, "best medical judgment" was never challenged as itself vague. In fact, the roncept is mm-
monly used without challenge. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973)(upholding 
against a vagueness attack the requirement that a physician determine that an abortion is "neces-
sary" based on his "best clinical judgment"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 379, 3%-')7 
(1979) 
The murt also agreed with plaintiffs that a doctor would have difficulty knowing how much 
detail was required in describing fetal development. Margaret S. (II), 597 F. Supp. at 663 (citing 
with approval its prior case construing the predecessor to this statute). However, this provision is 
no more vague than Section 40:1299.35.6(B)(5), which the court upheld. Senion (B)(S) required 
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the patient to be informed of "the type of method or technique which will be utilized in the 
abortion, the means of effectuating the method or technique, and the medical risks and conse-
quences of the method or technique to be utilized." There was no prescribed level of detail in that 
provision, either. However, the court noted that Danforth set forth the informed consent require-
ments "as the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its 
consequences." 597 F. Supp. at 665 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.B). The district court 
held that, under the Danforth standard, Section 40: 1299.35.6(8)(5) was constitutional, 597 F. 
Supp. at 665 (citing Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1 019), 
observing that "[t]he statute requires the woman to be informed of the nature of the abortion 
procedure and the risks associated with it, directives which were specifically approved in Dan-
forth." 597 F. Supp. at 665 (citing in accord Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1019; Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 
F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476). Ironically, this was no more specific a direc-
tive than that which the district court had just overturned, but it was upheld because in Danforth, 
in 1976, the Supreme Court had applied the normal construction rules and had already approved 
more vague language than this district court would allow. 
The district court in Margaret S. (II) did uphold a provision allowing for emergency excep-
tions to the statute's restrictions. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.12 (West Supp. 1981). 
Plaintiffs contended that adequate notice was not provided as to the required conduct, Margaret S. 
(II), 597 F. Supp. at 667, as the statute required "physicians to determine what constitutes an 
'immediate threat and grave risk to life or permanent physical health.' " /d. The court rejected 
this notion, because "physicians make determinations of the existence of medical emergencies that 
threaten a patient's physical health on a regular basis." /d. Surely doctors involved in caring for 
pregnant women make determinations regarding the stage of their pregnancy on a regular basis. 
The logic rejecting a vagueness challenge to this latter provision requires also a rejection of the 
vagueness challenge to the "informed consent" provision, providing for information regarding fetal 
development. This is especially so where only "best medical judgment" is required. Thus, these 
holdings on vagueness are inconsistent. 
The 1982 case of Women's Medical Center of Providence v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136 
(D.R.I. 1982), provides a further example of the amnesia of the courts when an abortion statute is 
to be construed. Reading Roberts, one would never know that the Supreme Court had established 
a duty to give statutes a constitutional construction where possible. The well-settled rule was 
conveniently forgotten. While Roberts noted the rule against unconstitutional vagueness, it was 
silent about any obligation on its part to avoid vagueness by giving a constitutional construction to 
the statutes under review. !d. at 1145. 
The amnesia was evident in the Roberts application of the vagueness doctrine. The court first 
found the term "abortion" vague, noting that it had not been defined and could mean "both doc-
tor-induced and spontaneous fetal loss." /d. Also, "a physician can be said to 'perform' an 'abor-
tion' both when he initiates the termination of a pregnancy and when he performs an operation to 
complete an otherwise incomplete, spontaneous miscarriage." /d. While a precise definition would 
be ideal, as discussed above, the Supreme Court does not require so much. The "common under-
standing" test would quickly resolve the options the court listed. Clearly, the statute at issue re-
ferred to doctor-induced terminations of pregnancies. Where such a constitutional construction was 
permissible, the court ought to have resolved the vagueness issue with such a construction. 
The Roberts court decided that nearly the entire statute must fall due to this ambiguity. /d. 
However, it proceeded to find other ambiguities. The statute at issue required disclosure to the 
pregnant woman of "all medical risks, both physical and psychological, associated with the partic-
ular abortion procedure to be employed, consistent with good medical practice." R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 23-4.7-2(3)(1956). In its discussion of vagueness, the court ignored the phrase "consistent with 
good medical practice" and decided that the provision was too vague, because "new risks associ-
ated with undergoing an abortion are constantly being discovered." Roberts, 530 F. Supp. at 1145. 
With the neglected phrase included, the statute is no more vague than "informed consent," which 
the Supreme Court in Danforth held not to be vague by properly giving the term a constitutional 
construction. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.B (1976). 
The Roberts court then turned to the portion of the Rhode Island statute which required a 
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strates that the trend continues unabated. 1187 
The ordinance at issue in the Cincinnati case required hospitals, 
woman to be advised, "consistent with good medical practice," of "all medical risks, both physical 
and psychological, to herself and the fetus," if she carried the fetus to term. R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 23-
4.7-2(5)(1956). Ignoring again its duty to constitutionally construe state statutes, the court decided 
the concept of "psychological risks to the fetus" was unconstitutionally vague as a "meaningless" 
term. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. at 1145. This jocular approach ("Doctors simply would not know 
what to say to a patient" /d.) is inappropriate. If no psychological risks to the fetus from its birth 
were apparent to the doctor, none need be communicated to the patient. If the concept was impos-
sible for the court to live with, it should have applied the permissible construction that psychologi-
cal risk applied only to the woman and not the fetus. The state legislature was obviously attempt-
ing to include all sorts of potential harm to all parties involved within its provision. A sympathetic 
approach, not a hostile one, was required by the established rules of constitutional construction. 
This doctrine was violated by a demand for precision not required by the Constitution. 
The Roberts court also considered the requirement that a woman be told whether she is 
pregnant and that a copy of her pregnancy test be made available to her before an abortion is 
performed. R. I. GEN. LAWS§ 23-4.7-2(1)(1956). The court discussed blood, urine, and physical 
examination tests, and how for the latter a physician could arguably "comply with the statute by 
making available a copy of his report to the patient." Roberts, 530 F. Supp. at 1149. Rather than 
construing the statute in precisely that manner to remove any possible ambiguity, the court backed 
away from a constitutional construction and found the provision void for vagueness. /d. 
That the Roberts court was capable of sympathetic construction was evident in its treatment 
of the requirement of disclosure regarding "the nature of an abortion." R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 23-4.7-
2(2)(1956). The court interpreted this to mean "an explanation of the medical nature of an abor-
tion" and not "a philosophical or moral discussion," thus upholding the provision. Roberts, 530 F. 
Supp. at 1149 (emphasis in original). The court cited Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8, as controlling 
with its construction of "informed consent" as "the giving of information to the patient as to just 
what would be done ... . "/d.; Roberts, 530 F. Supp. at 1149. Once again, the contrast between 
the constitutional requirement and the near-impossible precision required by the lower courts (and 
recent Supreme Court cases) in abortion cases is remarkable. 
The construction employed by the Roberts court, when it did consider the "consistent with 
good medical practice" clause, is instructive. The court was faced with two possible constructions 
of§ 23-4.7-2(3) and (5): (I) that all risks must be disclosed (regarding abortion or carrying the 
fetus to term), or (2) that all risks "consistent with good medical practice" must be disclosed. The 
court stated that, since no construction of the statute had been made, and since this was a criminal 
statute, it could "only conclude that doctors will be forced to disclose all possible complications ... 
. " Roberts 530 F. Supp. at 1151 (emphasis in original). The conclusion does not, of course, follow 
from the stated premise. The duty to employ constitutional construction applies in criminal cases, 
as seen in the Supreme Court cases above. The absence of a prior construction in no way requires 
one to elect a construction which will render the statute unconstitutional. Rather, one is required 
to select the construction which will preserve the constitutionality of the statute, where fairly pos-
sible. A saving construction was possible here, as the phrase "consistent with good medical prac-
tice" clearly qualified the phrase "all medical risks." Further case-by-case analysis is beyond the 
scope of this article. However, analysis of the following cases in light of the principles set forth in 
the text is illuminating. Cf Thornburgh v. Amer. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 737 
F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984); Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ky. 1984); Schulte v. 
Douglas, 567 F. Supp. 522 (D. Neb. 1981); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980); 
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980); 
Mobile Women's Med. Clinic v. Board of Comm'rs, 426 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Ala. 1977); Rados v. 
Michaelson, 396 F. Supp. 768 (D.R.I. 1975); Montalvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332 (D.P.R. 
1974); Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Okla. 1973); Friendship Med. Center v. 
Chicago Bd. of Health, 367 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 
1187. 822 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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clinics, and laboratories to dispose of aborted fetuses by interment, de-
posit in a vault or tomb, cremation, or otherwise as "approved by the 
Commission of Health." 1188 Any of the medical facilities which dispose 
of fetuses was required to first obtain a permit from the commissioner, 
who was to determine that the proposed "facilities, methods, and capa-
bilities" were suitable for "sanitary" disposal, "consistent with public 
health and safety." 1189 
The federal district court decided that the ordinance was Imper-
missibly vague. 1190 No vagueness was found with interment, entomb-
ment, or cremation, but the phrase "otherwise disposed of in a manner 
approved by the Commissioner of Health" was found to be vague, es-
pecially as the Commissioner planned to issue no regulations under the 
ordinance. 1191 
The Sixth Circuit, in reviewing the case, noted the permitted use 
of "humane" in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 1192 where 
the term was to guide the rule-maker, and the rejection of "humane" in 
Akron, 1193 where the term was to guide the physician. The Cincinnati 
appellate court noted Akron's closing acknowledgement that the city 
could " 'enact more carefully drawn regulations that further its legiti-
mate interests in proper disposal of fetal remains.' " 1194 The Harriss 
rule requiring "fair notice"11911 was given, but the companion rule re-
quiring constitutional construction was ignored. 1196 
The city of Cincinnati argued that the listing of specific methods 
of fetal disposal avoided unconstitutional vagueness. 1197 The court of 
appeals decision acknowledged that the listed methods were not 
vague,1198 as did a concurring opinionY99 However, it insisted that the 
1188. /d. at 1392 (citing CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL Com:§ 749-1). 
1189. !d. 
1190. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 635 F. Supp. 469 (S.D. 
Ohio 1986). 
1191. /d. at 471. 
1192. 401 F. Supp 554, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
1193. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 ( 1983). 
1194. Cincinnati, 822 F.2d at 1397 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 n.45). 
1195. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 (1954). 
1196. Cincinnati, 822 F.2d at 1399. 
1197. /d. 
1198. /d. 
1199. /d. at 1400, (Merrit, J., concurring). The concurrence stated, in a cryptic passage, that 
"the vagueness of the ordinance is not cured by its more specific language," because "the specific 
means of disposal prescribed by the ordinance constitute an impermissible burden on a woman's . 
. right to an abortion." /d. Of course, the presence or absence of a burden does nothing to create 
or remove vagueness, so the concurring opinion's argument must be that the burden makes the 
ordinance unconstitutional whether or not the vagueness is cured. Possibly, a heightened scrutiny 
was being argued, but heightened serutiny does not make vagueness itself. The concurrence ex-
presses no disagreement with the fact that the three explicit modes of disposal are not vague. /d. 
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granting of authority to the commissioner to specify other methods 
made the statute unconstitutionally vague. 1200 
Analysis of this claim shows its flaws. First, if the commissioner 
promulgated regulations, those would have to be challenged after pas-
sage and not in a facial challenge. So it was in Fitzpatrick, which 
found the Pennsylvania statute not unconstitutional on its face. 1201 Fur-
thermore, if the state can employ the term "humane," as was done in 
Fitzpatrick, 1202 to guide the rule maker, then certainly "sanitary" and 
"consistent with public health and safety" may be so used. These were 
not challenged, nor could they be under Akron. 1203 The Supreme Court 
had declared little more than a month before this case was decided that 
"[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult 
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that 
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."1204 
Because the Cincinnati ordinance was valid as against anyone who dis-
posed of fetuses in any manner without obtaining a prior permit from 
the commissioner, it easily passes the hurdle of facial ambiguity. 
Second, if the commissioner enacted no regulations setting forth 
other methods of disposal, then only interment, entombment, and cre-
mation remain. These had not been challenged for vagueness (nor could 
they reasonably be), but, rather, their sufficient clarity had been con-
ceded. Any medical facility administrator neither employing one of 
these disposal methods, nor having obtained permission for an alterna-
tive method, would be on notice that he or she had violated the ordi-
nance. Moreover, before one could even employ one of the specified 
methods of disposal, a review of one's methods and facilities is required 
and a permit must be granted indicating approval. Where one has "ac-
cess to [an administrative authority] for a ruling to clarify the issue" of 
statutory compliance, a vagueness challenge is even more difficult to 
sustain. 12011 As the dissent in the Cincinnati case observed, "[i]f for 
some reason the plaintiffs ... cannot tell whether the particular dispo-
sal method used by their laboratory ... is a method explicitly approved 
by the ordinance ... [or] approved by the Commissioner of Health ... 
all they have to do is ask the Commissioner of Health."1206 Likewise, if 
they feel their method is sanitary and not dangerous to the public 
1200. !d. at 1399. 
1201. 401 F. Supp. at 572-73. 
1202. !d. at 572. 
1203. Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 n.45. 
1204. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987). 
1205. Cincinnati, 822 F.2d at 1403 n.3 (Nelson, J., dissenting)(quoting Joseph E. Seagram 
& Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 49 (1966)). 
1206. !d. at 1403. 
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health or safety, they may simply seek approval. 1207 
Whatever other complaints Planned Parenthood may have had 
against the Cincinnati ordinance, the ordinance was not vague under 
the application of the normal rules of vagueness. The impression is left 
that vagueness was a convenient means to the end of striking down the 
fetal disposal ordinance. 1208 
(3). Deference. In a federal system, incorporating a separation of 
powers among co-equal branches, federal and state governments, and 
trial and appellate courts, it is necessary that all parties practice mutual 
respect, appropriate deference, and a commitment to remaining within 
allotted boundaries. If not, major disruptions in the carefully balanced 
system occur, usually accompanied by injustices which the checks and 
balances were designed to limit. The overarching principles of respect 
and restraint have been expressed in such doctrines as abstention and 
deference and in such terms as comity and federalism. Without respect 
and restraint, however, the doctrines are easily devoured by exceptions. 
Abortion is the exception which swallows all rules. 
The undisguised hostility of the Court in Thornburgh toward 
Pennsylvania's efforts to assert its compelling interests revealed a fail-
ure of requisite respect. 1209 In dissent, Justice White, joined by now 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, explicitly addressed the lack of deference: 
The majority's opinion evinces no deference toward the State's 
legitimate policy. Rather, the majority makes it clear from the outset 
that it simply disapproves of any attempt by Pennsylvania to legislate 
in this area. The history of the state legislature's decade-long effort to 
pass a constitutional abortion statute is recounted as if it were evi-
dence of some sinister conspiracy.'210 
He added that the real problem was the Court's "changing [of] the 
rules to invalidate what before would have seemed permissible."1211 
The disrespect of the Court was also evident in Thornburgh and 
other cases, as discussed earlier, in the seeking of unconstitutional con-
structions rather than constitutional ones. 
Roe was the consummate example of the refusal of the Court to 
remain within its constitutionally assigned boundaries. The lesser tres-
passes have flowed rather easily from this initial transgression. 
A growing hostility seems evident in the recent opinions in Akron 
1207. ld. If approval is not granted, that is, of course, not a vagueness issue. 
1208. Of course, given the court's approach, it is not surprising that it did not see fit to sever 
the offending provision. !d. at 1399. 
1209. Thornburgh, 47(, U.S. at 751-54, 759. 
1210. !d. at 7'!8 (White, J., dissenting). 
1211. /d. (White, J, dissenting). 
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and Thornburgh. Indeed, Akron has been viewed by many as a turning 
point in the hostility of the Court toward abortion restrictions. 1212 Of 
course, anomalies have been present throughout modern abortion case 
law, but some examples will demonstrate that, excluding Roe itself 
from consideration, things are getting worse. 
In Bellotti v. Baird (!), 1213 the Supreme Court held that a district 
court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of a pa-
rental consent statute. 1214 The Court noted that, under what is com-
monly known as the Pullman abstention doctrine/215 it is appropriate 
to abstain "where an unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a con-
struction by the state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part 
the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materi-
ally change the nature of the problem.' " 1216 
The Bellotti (/) Court refused to accept the assertion that the state 
supreme court would inevitably decide the statute in an unconstitu-
tional manner. 1217 It noted that the presence of a state supreme court 
procedure for certification helped the analysis, although it was not 
mandatory. 1218 Also, where the issue was one of the "relative burden" 
on the abortion right rather than "total denial of access," it became 
easier equitably to consider abstention. 1219 Finally, the Court observed 
that abstention could always be raised by a court sua sponte. 1220 
By contrast, Akron failed to follow the principled approach of Bel-
lotti (/). In Akron, the Court quoted the abstention rule1221 but refused 
to apply it, although both the statutes at issue in Bellotti (/) and Akron 
involved the applicability of parental consent statutes to mature minors. 
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, argued for the usual application of the 
abstention doctrine. 1222 She observed: 
In light of the Court's complete lack of knowledge about how the 
Akron ordinance will operate, and how the Akron ordinance and the 
State Juvenile Court statute interact, our 'scrupulous regard for the 
rightful independence of state governments' counsels against 'unneces-
sary interference by the federal courts with proper and validly admin-
istered state concerns, a course so essential to the balanced working of 
1212. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 16. 
1213. 428 U.S 132 (1976). 
1214. /d. at 151. 
1215. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) 
1216. Bellotti(/), 428 U.S. at 147 (quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959)). 
1217. /d. at 147-48. 
1218. /d. at 151. 
1219. /d. 
1220. /d. at 143 n.lO. 
1221. 462 U.S. at 440. 
1222. /d. at 469. 
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our federal system.n223 
The Akron Court found distinguishing features between the laws at 
issue to explain the disparate treatment. 1224At heart, however, the real 
problem seemed to be the familiar approach of seeking unfavorable 
constructions of statutes, where abortion regulation was involved, rather 
than favorable ones. 12211 
In Thornburgh, the Court declared that a federal court need not 
abstain from addressing the constitutional issue, "pending state-court 
reviews," if "the unconstitutionality of the particular state action under 
challenge is clear."1226 However, the unconstitutionality of the Pennsyl-
vania statute was not clear, as the dissenters demonstrated by employ-
ing the usual adjudicatory principles. 1227 
The federal courts have also been reluctant to sever offending por-
tions of statutes, preferring instead to strike down the whole statute. 
This approach is usually hostile to the wishes of the legislatures, which 
would generally prefer truncated regulation of abortion to none. A 
prime example was the refusal of the Akron Court to sever the term 
"humane" from the unchallenged term "sanitary" in Akron's fetal dis-
posal ordinance. 1228 Clearly, Akron would have preferred a "sanitary" 
fetal disposal ordinance to none at all. The hostility of lower federal 
courts to severance in abortion contexts often mirrors that of the Su-
preme Court. 1229 
1223. /d. at 470 (citations omitted). 
1224. /d. at 441 
1225. The Akron majority declared that "we do not think the . . ordinance . . ts reasona-
bly susceptible of being construed to create an 'opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the 
maturity of pregnant minors.'" /d. (quoting Bellotti (II), 443 U.S. at 643 n.23). 
1226. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 756. 
1227. /d. at 782-883 (Burger C.J, White, Rehnquist & O'Connor, J.J., dissenting). As 
many constitutional constructions of the Pennsylvania statutes were possible, and as the thrust of 
Pennsylvania's enactments was informed consent, protection of the fetus, and reporting, questions 
of "relative burden," rather than "total denial of access" under Bellotti (/) abstention, was proper. 
Bellotti (/), 428 U.S. at 151. 
In the federal courts, abstention has received disparate treatment in the abortion context. See, 
e.g., Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493 n.21 (rejecting abstention); Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates 
v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983)(rejecting abstention); Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 
F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1981)(rejecting abstention); Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 
1457-58 (N.D. Ill. 1984)(rejecting abstention); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. 
Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 693-94 n.24 (W.D. Mo. 1980)(rejecting abstention); Wynn v. Scott, 
449 F. Supp. 1302, 1311-14 (N.D. Ill. 1978)(rejecting abstention); Mobile Women's Med. Clinic 
v. Board of Comm'rs, 426 F. Supp. 331, 335 (S.D. Ala. 1977)(rejecting abstention); Rodas v. 
Michaelson, 396 F. Supp. 768, 775-76 (D.R.I. 1975)(rejecting abstention); Montalvo v. Colon, 
377 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (D.P.R. 1974)(rejecting abstention); Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 
719, 726 (N.D. Okla. 1973)(abstaining). 
1228. 462 U.S. at 451-52. 
1229. See, e.g., Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1981)(rejecting sever-
ance); Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1464 (N.D. Ill. 1984)(rejecting severance); 
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The Supreme Court has also been willing to substitute its own 
findings for that of a lower court. In Thornburgh, the majority struck 
down the Pennsylvania abortion reporting requirements on the basis 
that "[i]dentification [was] the obvious purpose of th[o]se extreme re-
porting requirements." 1230 Justice White observed the divergence from 
the usual rule: 
Where these 'findings' come from is mysterious, to say the least. The 
Court of Appeals did not make any such findings ... and the District 
Court expressly found that 'the requirements of confidentiality ... 
prevent any invasion of privacy which could present a legally signifi-
cant burden on the abortion decision.' Rather than pointing to any-
thing in the record that demonstrates that the District Court's conclu-
sion is erroneous, the majority resorts to the handy, but mistaken, 
solution of substituting its own view of the facts and strikes down the 
statute. 1231 
Justice White continued, stating that "the majority's action 
[was] procedurally and substantively indefensible. " 1232 It was procedur-
ally wrong for going to the merits, as will be discussed later, and for 
"reflect[ ing] a complete disregard for the principle embodied in Rule 
52(a), that an appellate court must defer to a trial court's findings of 
facts unless those findings are clearly erroneous."1233 The rule is appli-
cable to findings in a preliminary injunction action and applies to the 
Supreme Court in equal measure as other federal courts. 1234 
In Danforth, the Court made a finding without any basis in the 
evidence when it found that prostaglandin abortions were unavailable 
in Missouri. 12311 The Missouri legislature had determined that pros-
taglandin abortions were far safer than the saline amniocentesis 
method. 1236 The district court cited findings based on scientific testi-
mony that the saline method could cause severe complications. 1237 In 
fact, the Chief of Obstetrics at Yale University, in testimony before the 
district court, strongly "suggested physicians should be liable for mal-
practice if they chose saline over prostaglandin after having been given 
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 699 (W.D. Mo. 
1980)(employing severance); Wynn v. Scoll, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1314-15 (N.D. Ill. 1978)(em-
ploying severance); Rodos v. Michaelson, 396 F. Supp. 768, 775 (D.R.I. 1975)(rejecting 
severance). 
1230. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 767 (White, J., dissenting). 
1231 !d. at 805 (White, J., dissenting)(citation omitted). 
1232. !d. (White, J., dissenting). 
1233. !d. (White, J., dissenting). 
1234. !d. (White, J., dissenting). 
1235. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976). 
1236. 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1373-74 (E.D. Mo. 1975). 
1237. !d. at 1372-73. 
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all the facts on both methods."1238 Other methods were also available 
besides prostaglandin which were also safer than the saline method. 1239 
Thus, the district court found the legislative ban on saline abortions a 
legitimate regulation advancing the state's interest in maternal 
health. 1240 
The Danforth Court reversed the district court on the basis of the 
unavailability of prostaglandin in Missouri. 1241 As a careful study of 
the evidence by the dissent noted, this ruling was not based on any 
facts. 1242 Justice White stated, "[ t]here is simply no evidence in the rec-
ord that prostaglandin was or is unavailable at any time relevant to this 
case."1243 He advocated the normative rule, that the Court could not 
strike down a state statute without evidence and that the state did not 
bear the burden of establishing the constitutionality of one of its 
laws. 1244 Justice White concluded with a comment on the majority's 
violation of the rules: "I am not yet prepared to accept the notion that 
normal rules of law, procedure, and constitutional adjudication sud-
denly become irrelevant solely because a case touches on the subject of 
abortion."12411 
Another Thornburgh example further illustrates the diminishing 
deference of the Court. The Thornburgh Court allowed a temporary 
injunction to stand against the enforcement of the parental consent stat-
ute at issue. 1246 The district court had issued the injunction pending 
promulgation of court rules for implementation.1247 These rules were 
issued while the case was before the Supreme Court, leading the dis-
trict court to declare itself without jurisdiction. 1248 The Supreme Court 
sent the matter back to the lower court because "this development 
should be considered by the District Court in the first instance."1249 
Two problems appear upon examination of this action of the 
Court. First, in Ashcroft, an identical situation was treated differently 
when a parental consent provision virtually identical to Pennsylvania's 
had been held constitutional, despite the fact that no procedural rules 
1238. Id. at 1373. 
1239. !d. 
1240. !d. at 1374. 
1241. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 77-79 & n.12. 
1242. !d. at 98 (White, J., dissenting). 
1243. !d. (White, J., dissenting). 
1244. !d. (White, J., dissenting). 
1245. !d. (White, J., dissenting). 
1246. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 758 n.9. 
1247. !d. 
1248. !d. 
1249. !d. 
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had yet been established. 12110 The Court said, "There is no reason to 
believe that [the state] will not expedite any appeal consistent with the 
mandate in our prior opinions."1261 In Thornburgh, the statute was 
found constitutional/262 but the same presumption that "the State 
[would] provide for the expedited procedures called for by the statute" 
was not extended to Pennsylvania;1263 thus, the Court enjoined the 
statute. 
Justice O'Connor observed another incongruity between the two 
cases: 
I add only that the Court's explanation for its refusal to follow Ask-
croft-that the new rules 'should be considered by the District Court 
in the first instance' -does not square with its insistence on resolving 
the rest of this case without giving the District Court an opportunity 
to do so.1u' 
This latter theme will be taken up later. 
Finally, the hostility of the Thornburgh Court was evident in its 
impugning of state legislative motives. The Court treated Pennsylva-
nia's assertion of its compelling state interests as a "sinister conspir-
acy."1266 Rather than examining the statute on its face, the Court pur-
ported to go behind the scenes and determine the true intent of the 
legislators. It termed the informed consent provisions "poorly disguised 
elements of discouragement for the abortion decision" and declared that 
the lack of similar disclosure requirements for other medical procedures 
"reveal[ed] the anti-abortion character of the statute and its real 
purpose. " 1266 
This inappropriate concern with legislative motives is present in 
the lower federal courts as well. For example, the Third Circuit opin-
ion in Thornburgh was even more excoriating than the Supreme 
Court's. The appellate court declared the debate on the legislation 
"scant,"1267 the bills to which it was attached "unrelated,"1268 and the 
1250. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 n.16 (1983). 
1251. /d. See also Roe 410 U.S. at 166 (declining to enjoin state enforcement of the state 
abortion statute). 
1252. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 297. 
1253. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 833 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
1254. /d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(citation omitted). 
1255. "The history of the state legislature's decade-long effort to pass a constitutional abor-
tion statute is recounted as if it were evidence of some sinister conspiracy." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 
at 798 (White, J., dissenting). "Appellants claim that the statutory provisions before us today 
further legitimate compelling interests .... Close analysis ... shows ... an effort to deter a 
woman from making a decision that ... is hers to make." /d. at 759. 
1256. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763-64. 
1257. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 288 (3rd. Cir. 1984). 
1258. /d. at 288-89. 
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whole enactment motivated by "a pervasive invalid intent. " 12119 It did 
note that it could not invalidate the whole regulatory scheme simply by 
finding an invalid intent, but must "instead review the various provi-
sions ... independently, and on their own merit." 1260 
That the Thornburgh appellate court did not invalidate the whole 
act at once made little difference, for the hostility to the perceived inva-
lid legislative intent permeated the whole of the opinion, resulting in 
virtually the whole act being struck down anyway. The step-by-step 
treatment of the various provisions of the statute seemed a mere 
mechanical procedure to accomplish a foregone conclusion. The court 
had already decided and declared that the legislature's motives were 
inappropriate. It even quoted a newspaper article, which revealed that 
one of the co-sponsors was pro-life in his viewpoint on abortion. 1261 
This focus on the legislators' motives was declared inappropriate 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien. 1262 The O'Brien 
opinion declared it "a familiar principle of constitutional law that this 
Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the 
basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive. " 1263 The Court continued: 
"What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not 
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes 
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork." 1264 
Furthermore, the notion that legislators may not have opinions in 
opposition to abortion, and express them, is erroneous. The Supreme 
Court has declared that both municipalities and states may express "a 
preference for normal childbirth" over abortion. 12611 Not only may the 
state have a preference, it may also further its preference by expendi-
ture of public funds. 1266 The first amendment applies to pro-life legis-
lators equally with other members of society, giving them a right to free 
expression on the subject of abortion. 
Much of the confusion in this area has arisen from a misinterpre-
tation by federal courts of a passage in Roe. Justice Blackmun wrote in 
Roe, "[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas 
may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. " 1267 
1259. !d. at 292. 
1260. !d. 
1261. !d. at 288. 
1262. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
1263. Id. at 383. 
1264. !d. at 384. See also Akron, 479 F. Supp. at 1194 (rejecting a "legislative motive" test 
in an establishment clause challenge to an abortion statute). 
325. 
1265. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977)(per curiam); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 
1266. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
1267. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
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The Court did not say that the state could not adopt a view of when 
life begins. It merely declared that, in doing so, the state could not 
implement its view by depriving women of the right to abortion. The 
Court made it clear that states could adopt viewpoints on abortion, as 
already noted, in Maher. 1268 In fact, Roe explicitly left open the ques-
tion of when life begins, and has not addressed it again. Justice Black-
mun stated, "we need not resolve the difficult question of when life 
begins."1269 The matter of when individual human life begins is a sci-
entific fact for the Court to recognize, not a legal question for it to 
decide. 
In Akron, however, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, de-
clared a provision which said "that 'the unborn child is a human life 
from the moment of conception,' " was "inconsistent with the Court's 
holding in Roe v. Wade that a State may not adopt one theory of when 
life begins to justify its regulation of abortions. " 1270 Roe said no such 
thing, but the majority said it had and the lower courts listened. 
In Charles v. Carey, 1271 a district court, relying on the Akron 
statement, struck down a statute referring to a fetus as a "human be-
ing" and went so far as to question the propriety "of the term 'death' in 
conjunction with the term 'fetal.' " 1272 The appellate court declared the 
term "fetal death" to be unconstitutional as well. 1273 
Another district court, in Eubanks v. Brown, 1274 struck down as 
unconstitutional a statute defining a " 'fetus' as 'a human being from 
fertilization until birth.' " 12711 The term "human being" was defined 
"as 'any member of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until 
death.' " 1276 These definitions were "unconstitutional because they in-
corporate[ d] into the law a definition of life as beginning at fertiliza-
tion, a theory which the Supreme Court ha[d] not adopted, and which 
the Supreme Court ha[ d] held may not be used by a state in a statute to 
justify its regulation of abortion."1277 Likewise, in Poe v. Gerstein, an 
appellate court concluded that since, under Roe, a fetus was not a per-
son, it could not be called a "child."1278 
1268. Maher, 432 U.S. 464. 
1269. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. Of course, by requiring permissive abortion laws, the Court 
implicitly decided the issue of when life begins. 
1270 Akron, 462 U.S at 444. 
1271. 579 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
1272. /d. at 379-80. 
1273. Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984). 
1274. 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.O. Ky. 1984). 
1275. /d. at 144. 
1276. /d. 
1277. /d. 
1278. 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975), affd sub nom. mem. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 
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It should be noted that simple use of the term "unborn child" in a 
constitutional definition of viability was allowed in Danforth, without 
comment by the Court. 1279 Moreover, there is an incongruous circular-
ity to the Supreme Court's reasoning. In Roe, the Court surveyed state 
law treatment of the unborn and concluded: "In short, the unborn have 
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."1280 If 
the fetus is not a person, because it is not treated as such in the law, 
does it follow that the fetus may not be treated as a person in the law, 
because the fetus is not treated as a person in the law? 
A state ought to be able to declare its belief that a fetus is a per-
son, a child, or a human being from conception. If the Constitution 
requires a free abortion choice for women, the state would be unable to 
implement its view by banning abortions. That is all that Roe declared. 
The notion that the Supreme Court is the censor of the words and 
findings of state legislators is unsound. 
In a recent Sixth Circuit case, Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Cin-
cinnati v. Cincinnati, the dissenting opinion addressed the free expres-
sion rights of lawmakers: 
[T]he right to criticize the current orthodoxies-whether constitution-
alized or not-is explicitly protected by the same constitution that has 
been held implicitly to prohibit state and local governments from 
making it a crime to procure a first trimester abortion. For the Cin-
cinnati City Council to adopt a resolution expressing open disap-
proval of Roe v. Wade and petitioning for a return of the Constitution 
to the status quo ante 1973 would probably anger many of the plain-
tiff clients even more than they were angered by adoption of the fetal 
disposal ordinance actually passed-but that would hardly make such 
a resolution unconstitutional. 1281 
Of course, this is so, as even a fair reading of Roe admits. It is typical 
of abortion jurisprudence that such basic notions as first amendment 
rights get lost in the flurry to overturn statutes regulating abortion, 
even first amendment rights in the most sacred realm of political 
debate. 
Justice O'Connor, in Akron, stressed a point which capsulizes this 
discussion well. She wrote: 
[W]e must keep in mind that when we are concerned with extremely 
sensitive issues, such as the one involved here, 'the appropriate forum 
for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not 
901 (1976) 
1279. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976). 
1280. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
1281. 822 F.2d 1390, 1405 (6th Cir. 1987)(Nelson, J., dissenting). 
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forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and 
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." ' This 
does not mean that ... we defer to the judgments made by state 
legislatures. 'The point is, rather, that when we face a complex prob-
lem ... we do well to pay careful attention to how the other branches 
of Government have addressed the same problem.'1282 
347 
c. Rush to judgment. Further evidence of the growing hostility of 
the Court toward abortion restrictions was evident in Thornburgh, 
where the Court rushed to judgment on the merits from the appeal of a 
grant of a preliminary injunction. 
Four months after Pennsylvania passed its regulations in 1982, 
but shortly before the statute was to go into effect, the plaintiff abortion 
providers filed a two-volume compendium of forty affidavits. 1283 These 
later became the basis of a court-ordered stipulation. 1284 The state was 
forbidden to contest plaintiffs' facts unless they were able to offer evi-
dence at the hearing for a preliminary injunction. 1285 Because of the 
limited time for preparation, no testimony was offered at the 
hearing. 1286 
No major injustice was imposed, however, because the parties 
were assured the stipulation would be used solely for purposes of the 
hearing. 1287 The district court denied nearly the whole requested in-
junction.1288 Two days later, the appellate court enjoined the entire Act 
pending appeal. 1289 The appeals were argued, then reargued following 
the Supreme Court's decision in Akron and its companion cases. 1290 
Then the appellate court went to the merits, holding the Act largely 
unconstitutional. 1291 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the appellate court 
had erred in going to the merits rather than limiting its scope of review 
1282. Akron, 462 U.S. at 465 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(citation omitted). 
1283. The motion for preliminary injunction was filed on Octolwr 29, 1983, four months 
aftrr the An was passed. The Act was to take effect on December R. The plaintiffs rollected 
extensive affidavits during this time. At a meeting with counsel on November 18, the district murt 
ordered the parties to submit a stipulation of uncontested facts by November 30. However, no 
contesting of facts was allowed unless evidence was presented at the hearing on December 2. As a 
result, the "unusuallv mmplete" (as Justice Blackmun called it) record was lopsided heavily in 
favor of plaintiffs. Brief for Appellant at 35-49. 
1284. !d. at 35-49. 
1285. !d. 
1286. !d. 
1287. !d. 
1288. !d. at 7-8. 
1289. !d. 
1290. /d. at 8. 
1291. !d. 
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to whether the district court had abused its discretion. 1292 The Court 
admitted that such a standard of review is normally appropriate. 1293 It 
then cited two cases of dubious applicability as creating an 
exception. 129" 
Thornburgh's end result was to work a great injustice on the state 
of Pennsylvania, since under University of Texas v. Cumenish such use 
would not have been made of its stipulations and the State had received 
no notice that it was being subjected to expedited proceedings. 1296 Fur-
ther, the new rule created by the Court will leave parties uncertain 
whether a final ruling on the merits will result from a preliminary 
injunction motion. 1296 The likely result will be that preliminary injunc-
tion hearings will become full-scale trials. 1297 
Justice O'Connor iterated the thesis of the present article well. She 
observed, "If this case did not involve state regulation of abortion, it 
may be doubted that the Court would entertain, let alone adopt, such a 
departure from its precedents. " 1298 
By contrast, in the earlier case of Singleton, the Court unani-
mously held that the appellate court had erred in going to the merits of 
the case, as the state had not had adequate opportunity to present evi-
dence or arguments in defense of the abortion regulations. 1299 This was 
ignored in Thornburgh. 1300 The Singleton Court stated the general 
rule "that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not 
passed upon below."1301 It continued with a commentary which the 
Thornburgh Court ought to have reread: 
In Hormel v. Helvering, the Court explained that this is 'essential in 
order that parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence 
they believe relevant to the issues ... [and] in order that litigants may 
not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon 
which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence.' We have 
no idea what evidence, if any, petitioner would, or could, offer in 
defense of this statute, but this is only because petitioner has had no 
opportunity to proffer such evidence. Moreover, even assuming that 
there is no such evidence, petitioner should have the opportunity to 
present whatever legal arguments he may have in defense of the 
1292. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757. 
1293. Id. at 755. 
1294. Id. at 819-226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
1295. /d. at 816-817. 
1296. /d. at 826 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
1297. /d. 
1298. /d. 
1299. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 119 (1976). 
1300. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 752-754, 755-57. 
1301. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120. 
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statute. 1302 
These inconsistencies within abortion jurisprudence create a cli-
mate of unpredictability in the courts. As in Thornburgh, one may be 
surprised by a decision on the merits before having opportunity to pre-
sent one's case. Cases such as Singleton, while correctly decided on the 
issue of going to the merits, give one no notice of when and where 
abortion jurisprudence will go astray from the usual rules. A compari-
son of Singleton and Thornburgh indicates a failure of the principle of 
stare decisis as well as a violation of the rules of self-governance. Under 
the rules of Singleton, Thornburgh should have been remanded for a 
trial on the merits. The hostile tone of Thornburgh and its radical re-
sult seem indicative of the increasingly defensive mood of the Roe ma-
jority because of the general scholarly rejection of its handiwork in Roe, 
the skillful assaults of Court dissenters on Roe, and, perhaps, the loss of 
yet another member of the pro-Roe majority (with the call of Chief 
Justice Burger for reconsideration of Roe). 1303 
4. Value of rules 
The value of the normal rules of procedure and adjudication seems 
so obvious as to need no recital. However, since the rules have suffered 
so much violation in abortion jurisprudence, a reminder seems appro-
priate. As Justice O'Connor observed in Thornburgh, "no legal rule or 
doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occa-
sion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of 
abortion." 1304 The Court's action in Thornburgh, she declared, was "in 
contravention of settled principles of constitutional adjudication and 
procedural fairness." 130~ 
These "settled principles" assure predictability, stability, and con-
sistent results-notions related to the goals of stare decisis. They also 
allow a normal and detailed development of constitutional law after 
time for reflection and step-by-step development. Further, obedience to 
the normal principles lends legitimacy to the Court's decisions, avoids 
the appearance of result orientation, and maintains the appearance of 
neutrality. 
Transgressions into the realm of the legislature are problematic 
because the Court is ill-equipped to do legislative work. Its decisions 
carve social policy into the granite of constitutionality, which should 
1302. /d. (citation omitted). 
1303. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
1304. 476 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
1305. /d. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
350 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 3 
more properly be written in sand as experiments which may be easily 
erased if unworkable or unjust upon reflection. Legislatures, by con-
trast, can write, alter, and erase social experiments as the seasons of 
social change pass by. 
In Rescue Army v. Municipal Court/306 the Court summed up 
the special virtue of the rule requiring avoidance of constitutional issues 
where possible. Such a policy is not "merely procedural," but is "one of 
substance, grounded in considerations which transcend all such particu-
lar limitations. " 1307 
That policy, declared the Rescue Army Court, had its roots in the 
particular role of judicial review in our governmental scheme and in-
cluded considerations of the "comparative finality" of its decisions, re-
spect for "other repositories of constitutional power," the necessity of 
each part of government "to keep within its power, including the 
courts," and "the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising 
especially from its largely negative character."1308 For those concerned 
with private rights under such a system, the Court noted: 
On the other hand it is not altogether speculative that a contrary pol-
icy, of accelerated decision, might do equal or greater harm for the 
security of private rights, without attaining any of the benefits of tol-
erance and harmony for the functioning of the various authorities in 
our scheme. For premature and relatively abstract decisions, which 
such a policy would be most likely to promote, have their part too in 
rendering rights uncertain and insecure. 1309 
However, the Court noted, in Rescue Army, the choice had long since 
been made, and wisely so, for the rule of restraint not only maintains 
the Court in its proper place but preserves individual rights as well. 1310 
These rules, then, are not a mere product of "the fussiness of 
judges," but are designed to prevent the courts from becoming "roving 
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's 
laws." 1311 The health of the national government and the ultimate pro-
tection of individual rights rests in great measure on observance of these 
rules of respect and restraint. They ought to be observed even in the 
realm of abortion jurisprudence. 
1306. 331 U.S. 549 (1947). 
1307. /d. at 570. 
1308. Id. at 571. 
1309. !d. at 572. 
1310. !d. 
1311. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 131 (Powell, J, dissenting)(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973)). 
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IV. THE CoRRECTION: A CALL FOR Roe v. Wade's REVERSAL 
Abortion jurisprudence is not only incoherent internally, it is in-
congruously related to the precedents in which it is purportedly rooted, 
to the medical procedures to which it is allegedly related, and to the 
state interests by which it is supposedly delimited. The unprincipled 
rhetoric of Roe and its progeny have yielded a body of judicially-crafted 
policies inconsistent with the canons of sound jurisprudence on which a 
liberal democracy depends. 
The tangent set by Roe's unconstitutional departure from the 
norm has led abortion jurisprudence far from the path of the rest of the 
law. A correction in the angle of the trajectory is required. The most 
direct and constitutionally defensible correction is the reversal of Roe. 
Lynn Wardle has listed several reasons why the principle of stare 
decisis is no obstacle to reconsidering Roe v. Wade. 1312 First, he 
noted1313 Justice Powell's declaration of a Court duty to "reexamine a 
precedent where its reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is 
fairly called into question. And if the precedent or its rationale is of 
doubtful validity, then it should not stand."1314 Roe has been relent-
lessly criticized, subjected to continuing efforts to rewrite its rationale, 
and rejected by the co-equal administrative and legislative branches of 
government. 13111 Clearly the Court has a duty to reexamine Roe. 
Second, underlying the doctrine of stare decisis is the principle of 
consistency, which should require the Court to bring the abortion pri-
vacy doctrine into harmony with the rights of the unborn in other con-
texts.1316 In 1983, Justice Brennan remarked that "the same respect for 
the rule of law that requires us to seek consistency over time also re-
quires us, if with somewhat more caution and deliberation, to seek con-
sistency in the interpretation of an area of law at any given time."1317 
As has been demonstrated, Roe and its progeny are anomalous across 
the legal landscape and especially in the highly relevant area of fetal 
rights. A startling inconsistency occurs when an unborn child in one 
hospital room is being aborted, while in the room next door another is 
being medically treated, with full legal protection, simply because one 
mother prefers to abort her offspring and the other does not. 1318 Rights 
dependent on the preferences of another are inconsistent with the usual 
1312. Wardle, supra note 19, at 251-57. 
1313. /d. at 252. 
1314. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring). 
1315. Wardle, supra note 19, at 252. 
1316. /d. 
1317. Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 391 (1983). 
1318. Wardle, supra note 19, at 254. 
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concept of rights. 1319 "That the attempt of a distressed woman to kill 
her child shortly after birth is deemed a repugnant criminal act of child 
abuse or attempted homicide while the attempt of the same woman to 
kill the same child shortly before birth is deemed a fundamental consti-
tutional liberty is an arbitrary discrepancy too large to ignore," ob-
serves Wardle. 1320 
Third, a reexamination of cases which "marked a significant de-
parture" from precedent is recognized by the Court as especially appro-
priate.1321 As shown above, continuous protection of the unborn, by le-
gal restriction of abortion, had been in place from the inception of the 
United States and for centuries before. The unprecedented scholarly 
outcry over Roe is further evidence of the abruptness of the departure 
of Roe from what had gone before. 
Fourth, abortion jurisprudence has "deviated substantially from 
reasonable and workable methods of constitutional analysis," and has, 
instead, resorted to a rigid formalistic reliance on stare decisis (while, at 
the same time, gutting Roe of content). 1322 Justice O'Connor observed, 
in her Akron dissent, that "[ t ]he Court's analysis ... is inconsistent 
both with the methods of analysis employed in previous cases dealing 
with abortion, and with the Court's approach to fundamental rights in 
other areas." 1323 Lower courts have followed this "regressive formal-
ism," reaching extreme results. 1324 "When the underlying principles 
are so unworkable that rigid application of stare decisis results, it is 
time to reconsider the precedent," argues Wardle. 1325 
Fifth/326 "[ s ]tare decisis has a more limited application when the 
precedent rests on constitutional grounds, because 'correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible.' " 1327 The ultimate task of 
the Supreme Court in adjudicating claims of constitutional right is to 
interpret and apply the Constitution. If a line of cases, upon more ma-
ture reflection, appears unconstitutional, then the cases must be over-
ruled. Stare decisis is less binding in constitutional adjudiction precisely 
because the Justices' first loyalty must be to the Constitution and not to 
1319. !d. 
1320. /d. 
1321. /d. at 255 (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627 (1974)(Powell, J., 
concurring), Monnrll v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 ( 197R), and Thomas v. 
Washington Gas Light Co .. 448 U.S. 261, 273 (1980)(Strvens, J., plurality opinion)). 
1322. /d. at 256. 
1323. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452-53 
( 1983)(0'Connor, J., dissenting). 
1324. Wardle, supra note 19, at 257. 
1325. !d. 
1326. !d. 
1327. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272-73 & n.18 (1980). 
181] RIGHT TO ABORTION 353 
their prior pronouncements. Of course, where cases such as Roe have 
not been overruled, then such precedent should be followed, including 
implementation of the state interests declared to be compelling. This 
has not been done, making the abortion right even more anomalous, 
absolute, and unconstitutional. The case for overturning Roe is more 
powerful now than when Roe was conceived in 1973. 1328 
Justice Brandeis said that the Court had "often" overruled its 
prior decisions involving constitutional interpretation. 1329 In fact, the 
Court has expressly overruled its precedent over one hundred times/330 
and it has done so sub silentio numerous other times. 1331 One commen-
tator has observed: 
The practice of overruling error has been defended by the con-
servative nineteenth century Chief Justice Roger Brooke Tanney and 
championed by the liberal twentieth century Justice William 0. 
Douglas. The necessity of jettisoning past mistakes is a belief that 
belongs to the ideology of no party and no faction and is as much an 
institution accepted by the whole Court as judicial review itself. 1332 
Cases have been overruled after a history of one hundred and four 
years1333 and, on rehearing, granted to the same parties within one 
year_Iaa4 
However, some voices may be heard proclaiming that abortion law 
is such a settled part of the legal landscape that reversal is unwar-
ranted. Some decry the possible reversal of Roe by a new Court constit-
uency as a politicizing of the Supreme Court. One commentator re-
marked, "The fate of the abortion right is ... riding on whether or not 
the Roe supporters remain on the bench through President Reagan's 
term, and if they do remain, on who the next president is and who he 
nominates to the Supreme Court." 133~ 
1328. See generally Wardle, supra note 19 (setting forth the many reasons why the Court is 
better equipped to handle the abortion issue now than it was in 1973 and why the constitutional 
imperative is even more pressing). 
1329. Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
1330. Pfeifer, Abandoning Error: Self-Correction by the Supreme Court, in ABORTION AND 
THE CoNSTITUTION: RFVERSIN(: RoE v. WADE THROUGH THE CoURTS 5 (D. Horan, E. Crant 
& P. Cunningham eds 1987). 
1331. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 135-56 (discussing the implicit overruling of 
Gary-Northwest). 
1332. Pfeifer. supra note 1330, at 7. 
1333. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), overruling City of New York v. Miln, 36 
U.S. (II Pet.) 102 (IR37). 
1334. Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943), overruling Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S S84 
(1942). 
1335. Comment, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians: Return to Hoe?, 10 
HARV. JL. & PuB. Po,L'Y 711, 727 (1987). 
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Such a view implies that constitutional law is merely a matter of 
the current political views of five justices. Such a notion, of course, is to 
be rejected. Rather, Justices have a duty to put away their personal 
philosophies and interpret the Constitution by means of neutral princi-
ples. That this is easier at some times than others is no reason to aban-
don the pattern and goal. 
However, where past Court constituencies have politicized the 
process, it is not politicizing it further to reject such unconstitutional 
activities and return to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Refusal 
to do so would be to abandon the Court's ultimate loyalty to the 
Constitution. 
Had the Court in the past allowed itself to be bound by unconsti-
tutional precedent merely because it was entrenched and reversal might 
be disruptive, this nation would yet be shackled to Plessy v. Fergu-
son1336 and Lochner v. New York. 1337 
As recently as 1985, Justice Blackmun, author of Roe, declared 
that "when it has become apparent that a prior decision has departed 
from a proper understanding" of the Constitution, the prior decision 
must be overruled.1338 
A Supreme Court refusal to overrule Roe v. Wade merely because 
it is claimed to be entrenched would be the ultimate illustration of the 
super-protected nature of the abortion right. It would also be a sacrifice 
of the Constitution on the altars of political expediency and personal 
ideology. 
Typical of the political approach is Laurence Tribe's book, God 
Save This Honorable Court. 1339 In his book, Tribe warns of the "con-
stitutional storm" from which the Court must be preserved.1340 Upon 
close examination, however, it becomes clear that the storm he fears is 
the appointment of justices who will adhere closely to the Constitu-
tion.1341 It seems obvious that, given the Court's duty of loyalty to the 
Constitution, any proposed justice who did not adhere closely to the 
Constitution ought to be rejected. That such faithfulness is viewed as a 
vice demonstrates the flawed analysis of Professor Tribe. 
Moreover, Tribe's solution to what he views as politicization of 
the Court is itself politicization of the Court. He advocates the active 
examination of judicial nominees on the basis of their political views 
relating to certain of his favorite doctrines, especially the abortion pri-
1336. 163 U.S. 537 (1896)(separate but equal doctrine). 
1337. 198 U.S. 45 (1905)(economic substantive due process). 
1338. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). 
1339. L. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HoNORABI.t: CouRT (1985). 
1340. /d. at xix. 
1341. /d. at 41. 
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vacy right. 1342 Those failing his litmus test should be rejected. 
Surely an appeal to neutral principles of constitutional adjudica-
tion is in order at this point in history. If certain doctrines are jeopard-
ized by such an approach, there ought to be no cry of politicization. To 
remedy past political transgressions of the Court is not a politicized act 
but an exercise of loyalty to the Constitution and a fulfillment of the 
judicial mission. Thus, there is no principled reason not to overturn 
Roe v. Wade. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 1973, the Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, set out on an abrupt 
angle away from the rest of the law. The decision was firmly rejected 
by the legal community. The criticism continues regarding the failure 
of the Court to anchor the abortion privacy right in the Constitution. 
As the Supreme Court and the lower courts have followed the tra-
jectory set by Roe, abortion jurisprudence has strayed further away 
from the normal rules of law and has made the abortion privacy right a 
super-protected right. The anomalous treatment of the abortion right is 
evident in its special judicial protection, as compared with the usual 
treatment of cases involving other privacy rights, fetal rights in other 
contexts, other permitted medical regulation by the states, procedural 
and adjudicatory rules, and the employment of stare decisis. As the 
Court has repeatedly rebuffed efforts by the legislatures to protect the 
compelling state interests declared in Roe, the right to abortion has be-
come nearly absolute. 
These anomalies undermine the principles of stare decisis, on 
which the Court has relied to uphold the abortion privacy right since 
Roe, and the rule-of-law foundation upon which the Constitution rests. 
Roe itself was an unconstitutional usurpation of power not granted to 
the Court by the Constitution. Continued adherence to Roe violates the 
Supreme Court's duty to uphold the Constitution. 
The only principled remedy is to overrule Roe v. Wade. By so 
doing, the Court may return the matter to the political forum, where it 
properly belongs under the Constitution of the United States. 
1342. /d. <it xviii. 
